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ARTICLES
THE AMBIDEXTROUS LAWYER: CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND
THE MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN LEGAL PROFESSION
JONATHAN RosEt
I. INTRODUCTION
Conflict of interest is one of the most common, important, and complex
forms of modern lawyer misconduct, producing a substantial amount of
litigation' and scholarly comment.2 A series of well-defined conflict of interest
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1. See, for example, SWS Financial FundA v Salomon Bros, Inc., 790 F Supp1392 (N D Ill 1992);
Gould, Inc. v Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F Supp 1121 (N D Ohio 1990); Pennwalt Corp. v Plough,
Inc., 85 FRD 264 (D Del 1980); Zuck vAlabama, 588 F2d 1311 (5th Cir 1979); IBMvLevin, 579 F2d
271 (3d Cir 1978); Westinghouse Co. v Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F2d 1311 (7th Cir 1978); Cinema 5, Ltd. v
Cinerama, Inc., 528 F2d 1384 (2d Cir 1976); Chugach Elec. Assn. v US District Court, 370 F2d 441 (9th Cir
1966); Grievance Comm. v Rottner, 152 Conn 59, 203 A2d 82 (1964); T.C. Theatre Corp. v Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 113 F Supp 265 (SDNY 1953). For an identification of numerous conflict of interest cases,
see Geoffrey Hazard and Susan Koniak The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 580-728 and notes (Foundation
1990).
2. See, for example, 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard and W. William Hodes, The Law ofLawyering: A Handbook
on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 221-382.1 (2d ed 1990); Robert Aronson, Conflict ofInterest, 52
Wash L Rev 807 (1977); John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple
Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U Ill L Rev 741; Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, An
Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 Iowa L Rev 965 (1997); Nancy Moore, Restating the
LawofLawyer Conflicts, 10 GeorgetownJ Legal Ethics 541 (1997); Nancy Moore, Conflicts oflnterestin the
Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients, 61 Tex L Rev 211 (1982); Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a
Current Client, 9 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 1157 (1996); Thomas D. Morgan, Conflicts oflnterest and the
Former Client in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1980 Am Bar Found Res J 993; Charles Wolfram,
Former Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GeorgetownJ Legal Ethics 677 (1997); Note, Developments in theLaw: Conflicts
of Interest, 94 Harv L Rev 1244 (1981). For a comprehensive list of the conflict of interest literature, see
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rules has emerged in both the professional codes of conduct and the judge-
made common law. The basic conflict of interest rule is that a lawyer may not
represent a client "if there is a substantial risk that lawyer's representation of
the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own
interests or by the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third
person" unless the consent of all necessary clients and other persons is
obtained.' However, some conflicts are not consentable' Preserving the
confidentiality of client information and promoting a lawyer's duty of loyalty
to the client are the basic policies underlying these rules.6 Thus, conflict of
interest is an important component of the modern law of lawyering as the
current term used to encompass all the common law, statutes, and ethical rules
applicable to lawyers.
Interestingly, conflict of interest was also an important aspect of the
medieval law of lawyering. Not to be confused with the hitting skills of modern
baseball players, medieval conflict of interest was commonly known as
"ambidexterity."' Literally, it referred to lawyers, "ambidexters," who took
money with each hand from different parties to a dispute.' There were two
Thomas D. Morgan and Ronald D. Rotunda, Problems and Materials on Professional Responsibility 202-06
(Foundation 5th ed 1991).
3. See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers (Third), % 201-16
(Proposed Final Draft, March 29, 1996) ("Restatement"); American Bar Association, Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rules 1.7-1.12, 2.2 (1995) ("Model Rules").
4. See Restatement, § 201 (cited in note 3). The prohibited conflict of an individual lawyer may be
imputed to the other lawyers in a firm, who also may be disqualified from representing the client. See, for
example, Restatement % 203-04; ModelRules 1.9, 1.10 (cited in note 3).
5. Moreover, the application of the conflict of interest prohibitions is sensitive to context. Conflicts
arising in litigation present different problems than those arising in transactional representation and
conflicts in criminal litigation raise specific concerns distinct from those in civil litigation. See, for example,
Restatement §§ 209-12 (cited in note 3).
6. Although conflicts of interest are the subject of several disciplinary rules, enforcement of these
norms probably occurs more commonly through motions to disqualify and increasingly in malpractice
actions rather than in disciplinary proceedings.
7. See Paul Brand, The Origins of the English Legal Profession 122, 139 (Blackwell 1992) ("Origins");
Wilfrid R. Prest, The English Bar, 1550-1700, in Wilfrid R. Prest, ed, Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and
America 65, 74 (Croom Helm 1981).
8. See Blacks Law Dictionary 79 (West 6th ed 1990); 1 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William
Maitland, The History of English Law 216 (Cambridge 2d ed 1898). The terms "ambidexterity" and
.ambidexter" were also used to refer to jurors and public officials that took bribes from both sides. See, for
example, Earl Jowitt and Clifford Walsh, eds, 1 The Dictionary of English Law 110 (Sweet & Maxwell
1959); John Cowell, The Interpreter, or Book Containing the Signification of Words (Cambridge 1607); Percy
Henry Winfield, The History of Conspiracy and Abuse ofLegal Procedure 164 (Cambridge 1921). Fitzherbert
discussed ambidextrous jurors in his renowned 1534 treatise. See Anthony Fitzherbert, New Natura Brevium
171 H (1534). Professor Cam has identified some colorful examples of accusations of, and some convictions
for, ambidexterity by public officials, including the mayor, in the early fourteenth century struggle for
political power in London. See Helen M. Cam, ed, 1 Eyre of London, 14 Edward II, A.D. 1321, cxiii-cxv,
49, 52-53 (85 Selden Soc'y, 1968). For ambidexterity by a sheriff, who was convicted of the "particular
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primary legal arenas in which ambidexterity appeared: lawyer discipline and
civil liability to victims.
This article has several interrelated objectives. First, it will discuss these
two ways in which conflict of interest manifested itself in legal proceedings. In
so doing, the article will identify and analyze numerous specific instances of
individual lawyers alleged to have been involved in this type of misconduct.
Second, the article will examine the medieval regulation and its application by
analyzing the different types of medieval conflicts, the specific conflict rules,
the rationales revealed in the regulatory prohibitions and cases, and the
discipline and other sanctions applied to this type of lawyer misconduct. This
analysis will use the taxonomy of modern conflict of interest regulation to
identify both similarities and dissimilarities between medieval conflict of
interest regulation and its modern treatment. Such a comparison may provide
historical insights for understanding the present.
II. AMBIDEXTERITY: AN OVERVIEW
Ambidexterity was an important and common form of medieval lawyer
misconduct. This medieval conflict of interest was apparently sufficiently
ubiquitous to prompt significant adverse public reaction. Sayles notes that
there was "a monotonous outcry against the practice whereby the pleader
insinuated himself into the confidence of one party and afterwards transferred
his services to the other."9 Christian stated that serjeants "were often accused of
being 'ambidexters' and taking fees from both sides.""0 The Mirror ofJustices, a
late thirteenth century attack on judges and the legal system, said that a lawyer
should be "suspended if he is attainted of receiving a fee from both sides in one
cause."" In 1343, in order to keep the peace and maintain the law, the justices
offence" and "was accustomed to do such things," see Donald W. Sutherland, ed, 1 Eyre of
Northamptonshire, 3-4EdwardIII, A.D. 1329-1330,237 (97 Selden Socy, 1983). Concern about this type
of conduct manifested itself at least by the early thirteenth century. See 2 Henry de Bratton (Bracton), On
the Laws and Customs of England 332 (Belknap 1968) (Samuel E. Thorne, trans). For some years, it was
believed that Bracton was written between 1250 and 1258. More recent scholarship suggests that it was
written earlier and by someone other than Henry de Bratton. See Paul Brand, The Age of Bracton, in John
Hudson, ed, The History of the English Law: Centenary Essays on "Pollock and Maitland" 65-89 (Oxford
1996).
9. G.O. Sayles, ed, I Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench under Edward I cviii & n 2 (55 Selden
Soc'y, 1936).
10. Edmund B.V. Christian, A Short History of Solicitors 14 (Reeves & Turner 1896).
11. Andrew Horn, The Mirror ofJustices 48 (c. 1290) (7 Selden Socy 1895) (William J. Whittaker, ed).
In all likelihood, the Mirror is paraphrasing the London Ordinance of 1280 or interpreting the Statute of
Westminster I, chapter 29. See notes 36-50 and accompanying text. Although this statement in the Mirror
seems non-controversial and accurate, Maitland and others have questioned the accuracy of some of the
statements in this controversial volume. See Matiand's introduction to the Mirror at xxvi-xxvii, xxxvii-
20001
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were directed to inquire into all felonies and trespasses against the peace,
identifying a number of specific offenses including ambidexterity.'2 In the
sixteenth century, the most common complaints against barristers included
taking money from both sides of a dispute and disclosure of a client's
confidential information to opponents, 3 and ambidexterity was "a fairly
common" practice. This medieval image of conflict of interest persisted for
hundreds of years as evidenced by an eighteenth century cartoon, "Councellor
Double Fee," picturing a lawyer saying "Open to all Parties," and with each
hand inscribed "Open to All," one hand extended to the plaintiff and the other
to the defendant to receive each of their fees.' 5 Thus, conflict of interest was an
important issue in the early law of lawyering as the legal profession initially
emerged and subsequently developed.
Legal historians have generally concluded that a legal profession emerged
during the reign of Edward 1 (1272-1307) and that this group of professionals
included two types of lawyers: serjeants, who functioned as pleaders to appear
in court and speak for their clients, and attorneys, who were present in court to
handle procedural matters and manage their clients' litigation.'" During the
xxxviii. Despite some doubt, Andrew Horn has traditionally been considered the author of The Mirror (see
id. at xiii-xxi, xlix-li), but more recent scholarship has denied Horn's authorship. See David Seipp, The
Mirror of the Justices, reprinted in Learning the Law: Teaching and Transmission of English Law 1150-1900
(1999) (Jonathan Bush & Alain Wijffels, eds).
12. See 2 Rot. Parl 137, item 12 (17 Edward III, 1343).
13. See Prest, English Bar at 74 (cited in note 7).
14. See James Cockburn, The Spoils ofLaw: The Trial of Sir John Hele, 1604 in Delloyd Guth and John
McKenna, eds, Tudor Rule and Revolution 309, 322 (Cambridge 1982). Charges of deceiving their clients by
colluding with their opponents were apparently part of the attack on lawyers during civil strife of the
seventeenth century and the associated law reform efforts directed at the legal profession. One lawyer
defender of the profession considered such attacks untrue, libelous, and "the inventions of discontented
clients." See Donald Veall, The Popular Movement for Law Reform 1640-1660 210 (Oxford 1970).
15. See James Oldham, 1 The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth
Century 72 (North Carolina 1992). The cartoon depicted Fletcher Norton, a prominent barrister and crown
lawyer, whose nickname was "Sir Bull Face Doublefee." See id at 68, 73.
16. Paul Brand's recent book is the most significant and comprehensive discussion of the profession's
emergence. See Brand, Origins (cited in note 7). Other books and articles discussing the development of the
English legal profession include John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 177-99
(Butterworths 3d ed 1990) ("Introduction"); John H. Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law:
Historical Essays 75-124 (Hambledon 1986); John H. Baker, The Order of Sereants at Law 8-27 (Selden
Soc'y 1984); Michael Birks, Gentlemen of the Law 10-67 (Stevens 1960); C.W. Brooks, Pettyfoggers and
Vipers of the Commonwealth: The "Lower Branch" of the Legal Profession in Early Modern England
(Cambridge 1986); Christian, History of Solicitors 1-33 (cited in note 10); Herman Cohen, A History of the
English Bar and Attornatus to 1450 112-223, 277-341 (Sweet & Maxwell 1929); William Holdsworth, 2 A
History of English Law 226-31, 311-33, 484-512 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1924); 6 id at 431-99; Eric W. Ives,
The Common Lawyers ofPre-Reformation England (Cambridge 1983); Harry Kirk, Portrait of a Profession: A
History of the Solicitor's Profession, 1100 to the Present Day 1-21 (Oyez 1976); S.F.C. Milsom, Historical
Foundations of the Common Law 37-59 (Butterworths 2d ed 1981); Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise
History of the Common Law 215-30 (Little, Brown 5th ed 1956); 1 Pollock and Maitland, History 211-20
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fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, the legal profession continued
to develop. The Inns of Court assumed a central role in legal education. 7
Barristers appeared as a new name or form of pleader. I" Local practitioners, a
distinct component of the profession in the initial period,"5 continued for a
period, but then declined in importance." Moreover, the significant use of
lawyers reflected the increase in litigation.2 In addition, the complaints about
lawyer misconduct continued.2 As the legal profession emerged at the end of
the thirteenth century and during the next centuries, several statutes and
ordinances were enacted to regulate lawyer misconduct, including conflict of
interest.' In addition, judicial and other records reveal the various instances in
which the legal system confronted conflict of interest.
(cited in note 8); Paul Brand, The Origins of the English Legal Profession, 5 L & Hist Rev 31 (1987). Robert
Palmer has asserted a somewhat different theory regarding the origin of the English profession that placed
heavy emphasis on the use of lawyers in the county and local courts in the twelfth century. See Robert C.
Palmer, The County Courts of Medieval England 1150-1350 89-138 (Princeton 1982); Robert C. Palmer,
The Origins of the Legal Profession in England, 11 Irish Jurist 126 (1976); Robert C. Palmer, County Year
Book Reports: The Professional Lauyer in the Medieval County Court, 91 English Hist Rev 776 (1976). Brand
rejects this theory. See Brand, Origins at 83-84 (cited in note 7); Brand, Origins of the English Legal
Profession, 5 L & Hist Rev 31 at 32-34, 44 (1987). Although these theories are not mutually exclusive and
could describe parallel developments, the difference inheres in identifying the primary influence on the
emergence of the profession. Brand and others have focused on the royal courts and Palmer has emphasized
the county courts. Palmer has also suggested that professional lawyers appeared earlier, perhaps even in the
twelfth century.
17. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 182-85 (cited in note 16); Baker, The Legal Profession and
the Common Law at 7-23 (cited in note 16); Holdsworth, 2 History ofEnglish Law at 493-512 (cited in note
16); Wilfrid R. Prest, The Inns of Court under Elizabeth and the Early Stuarts 1590-1640 (Rowman &
Littlefield 1972).
18. See, for example, Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law at 75-123 (cited in note 16);
C.W. Brooks, The Common Lawyers in England, c. 1558-1642 in Prest, ed, Lawyers in Early Modern Europe
andAmerica at 42, 53-55 (cited in note 7); Prest, The English Bar 1550-1700 in id at 65; Wilfrid R. Prest,
The Rise of Barristers: A Social History of the English Bar 1590-1640 (Clarendon 1986); Veall, Popular
Movement fr Law Reform at 44-51 (cited in note 14).
19. See Palmer, County Courts of Medieval England at 89-112 (cited in note 16). See generally Palmer,
11 Irish Jurist 126 (cited in note 16); Palmer, 91 English Hist Rev 776 (cited in note 16).
20. See Brooks, Common Lawyers in Prest, ed, Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America at 45-53
(cited in note 7). The local lawyers may or may not have practiced also in the royal courts, may have been
less formally divided between the upper and lower branches of the profession, and may have been on the
fringes of the profession or sometimes amateurs. See id.
21. See, for example, Brooks, Pettyfiggers and Vipers ofthe Commonwealth at 48-131 (cited in note 16);
C.W. Brooks, Interpersonal Conflict and Social Tension: Civil Litigation in England, 1640-1830 in A.L.
Beier, David Cannadine and James M. Rosenheim, eds, The First Modern Society: Essays in English History in
Honour ofLawrence Stone 357-98 (Cambridge 1989).
22. See, for example, Veall, Popular Movement for Law Reform at 200-11 (cited in note 14); Eric Ives,
The Reputation of the Common Lawyers in English Society, 1450-1550, 7 U Birmingham Hist J 130 (1961).
23. An earlier article examined in comprehensive detail the history of the regulation of the English
medieval legal profession. See Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England A History of
Regulation, 48 Syracuse L Rev 1 (1998).
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III. AMBIDEXTERITY IN ACTION:
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST
As indicated, conflict of interest had two implications for the medieval
legal system. Most importantly, there were a large number of complaints about
ambidextrous lawyers and requests for punishment. In fact, numerous lawyers
who engaged in conflicts of interest were disciplined pursuant to statutes or by
judges acting upon their inherent power of over lawyers. Although lawyer
discipline was the most normal remedy for ambidexterity, the judicial records
also reveal attempts, sometimes successful, by victims of ambidexterity to
recover damages for their injuries.24
A survey of a large volume of primary and secondary sources sheds light on
these two legal implications of medieval conflict of interest. The primary
sources include a large volume of published medieval cases and other judicial
records,"5 and numerous unpublished original texts and translations of
thirteenth and fourteenth century Common Bench, King's Bench, Eyre cases,
which Dr. Paul Brand made available to me."' Two types of secondary sources
are also important. One type is older works, primarily seventeenth and
eighteenth century abridgements and treatises." The other type consists of
more recent scholarship treating the history of the English legal profession,
particularly that of Paul Brand, the noted medieval scholar and expert on the
history of legal profession, and John Baker, the prolific and leading legal
24. Another important legal implication of conflict of interest was defamation suits by lawyers accused
of being ambidexters. This litigation began in the early sixteenth century and increased in the seventeenth
century. This topic will be dealt with in a separate, subsequent article.
25. There are two major sources: the Selden Society materials and two series of the Year Books. I
reviewed 80 of the 112 currently available Selden Society volumes. These volumes included primarily King's
Bench, Exchequer Chamber, Star Chamber and Chancery cases; Year Books, Eyre proceedings and early
reports. One Year Book series, commonly known as the Rolls Series, contains 19 volumes, covering the later
years (1292-1307) of Edward I's reign and the second decade (1338-47) of Edward III's reign. The Selden
Society volumes contain the Year Books covering the first twelve years (1307-19) of Edward II's reign. The
other Year Book series, published by the Ames Foundation, contains eight volumes and covers a good
portion of the first twelve years (1378-79, 1382-90) of Richard II's reign. The Year Books both preceded
and extended beyond the years covered by these volumes. Many scholars have discussed their origins,
functions and nature. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 204-07 (cited in note 16); Percy H. Winfield,
The ChiefSources of English Legal History 158-83 (Harvard 1925).
26. This voluminous information included conflict of interest cases in addition to those that I had
identified through other sources as well as further information on cases already identified. These plea roll
transcriptions and research notes were provided to me in three installments, which I have designated PB1,
PB2 and PB3, which are on file with the author. I am substantially in his debt for this gracious and
extensive assistance.
27. These works included Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law (A. Strahan 7th ed 1832)
(first published 1736-40); John Comyns (died 1740), A Digest of the Laws of England (A. Strahan 5th ed
1822); William Sheppard, Actions upon the Casefor Deeds (1663); Charles Viner, GeneralAbridgment of Law
and Equity (Robinson et al 2d ed 1791-95); Anonymous, The Impartial Lawyer (J. Nutt 1709).
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historian.' In total, this search identified about 80 instances of ambidexterity
in action."
Certain ambiguities arise regarding these cases, at least three of which are
important to this article's objectives. First, the outcome of the case is not
always evident. In many cases, especially in the more formal proceedings in the
Common Bench and King's Bench, there are disputed issues of fact whose
resolution is not revealed because it would be subsequently determined by a
jury in the appropriate geographical location. Second, it is not always possible
to determine what type of lawyer was involved or whether the matter
concerned a professional lawyer. Some cases clearly involve either a serjeant-
pleader (or in later cases a barrister) or an attorney, the two primary types of
professional lawyers."0  Other cases, however, involved local lawyers or
counsellors whose specific classification is not known,3 and others might have
involved amateurs functioning on the fringes of the legal profession. Finally, in
cases of lawyer discipline, the basis of the punishment is frequently
indeterminable. Lawyers could be punished under several statutes as well as
pursuant to inherent judicial power irrespective of a specific statute; and the
many decisions do not cite a specific statute as authority for the imposition of
sanctions, although the record may offer some evidence for identifying the legal
basis for the discipline. More generally, the modern writer must be careful in
unduly emphasizing positive sources of law such as statutes and cases as the sole
or primary source of doctrine and in underemphasizing commonly held beliefs
about the legal system and its operation as an important source.3
28. See generally the sources cited in note 16.
29. More extensive review of the original plea rolls likely would have produced more cases. Paul Brand's
research and the materials that he provided to me (see note 26) certainly would indicate such. Nevertheless,
the identified cases are quite sufficiently numerous and varied to provide adequate evidence of medieval
conflicts of interest and norms. Moreover, there is sufficient repetition of instances of the conflicts of
interest to establish patterns of behavior and their legal treatment. Thus, the 80 or so cases identified
establish an appropriate data base for this article's purposes.
30. See note 16 and accompanying text.
31. See Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law at 108 (cited in note 16); Prest, The English
Bar in Prest, Lawyers in Early Modern Europe andAmerica at 65 (cited in note 7).
32. See John H. Baker, Why the History of English Law Has Not Been Finished (Downing Professor
Inaugural Lecture, Oct 14, 1998) (Cambridge 1999) ("Lecture"). Professor Baker poses the question of
"what is law for the purposes of legal history." After discussing judicial sources such as the plea rolls and
reports, he concluded that "it might be better to think of the medieval common law as a body of received
wisdom... 'the collective wisdom of the learned,' ... 'common learning.'" See Baker, Lecture at 6-8, 23-27.
David Millon, Positivism in the Historiography of the Common Law, 1989 Wis L Rev 669 ("Positivism").
Although Professor Millon discusses the normative judgments of juries, his comments seem relevant also to
judicial decisions. He noted that "[m]uch of the best legal history of premodern England rests on implicit
but largely unexamined assumptions about theoretical foundations of the common law." Describing these
assumptions as "positivist" in the sense of modern legal theory, he "question[s] the validity of positivist




Although the preferred approach to discussing the discipline of medieval
lawyers might be to use the conflict of interest categories employed by medieval
texts, such an approach is not possible as there is no real evidence of medieval
classification. Yet, the analysis needs some organizing principle. Therefore, this
article classifies medieval conflict cases in categories familiar to modern
students of legal ethics: simultaneous representation of current clients adverse
in the same matter, representation adverse to former client, representation
adverse to current client on unrelated matter, representation of potentially
adverse multiple plaintiffs and defendants, and conflict between client's interest
and the lawyer's personal interest.3 Although there is some hazard in using a
modern taxonomy for discussing medieval problems,' these categories match to
some extent the medieval cases. In addition, these categories are instructive in
comparing medieval and modern concerns, norms, and prohibitions."
foundations of the premodern system were nonpositivist," he identifies the need to "appreciate premodern
legal theory" and to understand accurately "the theoretical and ideological context in which [our
predecessors] lived and worked." However, he does not specifically delineate an appropriate premodern legal
theory. See Millon, Positivism, 1989 Wis L Rev at 669-70, 672, 713-14. 1 am gratefiil to Professor James
Brundage for emphasizing this caveat.
33. Conflicts of interests involving the movement of government attorneys to or from private practice
or government, or vice-versa, a familiar modern conflict problem (see Restatement § 214; ModelRules 1. 11),
are not pertinent to the medieval period and therefore also will not be discussed. But two related contexts
will be noted briefly. One involves private lawyers who are also legislators and the other involves the crown's
legal representatives acting adverse to the crown. See notes 63-67, 158-71 and accompanying text.
34. See Daniel Boorstin, Tradition and Method in Legal History, 54 Harv L Rev 424, 424-28 (1941).
More generally, the utility of modern legal conceptions to study the past may implicate more complex
questions regarding modern legal scholarship and legal history. See Stuart Banner, Legal History and Legal
Scholarship, 76 Wash U L Q37 (1998).
35. Conflict problems arising from imputed disqualification will not be discussed as there is little
evidence of the existence of law firms during the medieval period. Serjeants, like modern barristers, generally
did not practice in firms. However, Maitland believed that the counters, another name for serjeants, who
appeared at the court of the St. Ives Fair in 1275, were practicing in partnership. See 1 Pollock and
Maitland, History of English Law at 217 (cited in note 8); Frederic W. Maitland, 1 Select Pleas in Manorial
and other Seignorial Courts 155, 159-60 & 159 n 1 (2 Selden Soc'y 1889). Whether attorneys practiced in
partnerships is unclear, but it seems quite uncommon. Holdsworth noted some evidence of profit sharing by
attorneys in the seventeenth century. See Holdsworth, 6 History of English Law at 453 (cited in note 16).
Solicitors, their successors, apparently did not organize in firms until the eighteenth century, perhaps as
attorneys and solicitors were merging as a profession. Early partnerships were very small and based on family
relationships; common and larger partnerships did not emerge until the twentieth century. Early attorneys




Two statutes, one ordinance, and inherent judicial power could have been
used to discipline lawyers for engaging in conflicts of interest. The two statutes,
the Statute of Westminster I, Chapter 29 (1275) and the Statute 4 Henry IV,
Chapter 18 (1402) did not explicitly prohibit conflicts of interest, but were
directed more generally at lawyer misconduct. The London Ordinance of 1280
was directed, inter alia, specifically at conflicts of interest. Before turning to
particular instances of conflict based discipline, a brief discussion of these four
possible legal authorizations for disciplining ambidextrous lawyers is useful.
a. Statute of Westminster I, Chapter 29 (1275)
This statute was one of the numerous significant statutes enacted during
the reign of Edward L'6 Chapter 29 was one of a series of sections directed at
various forms of official misconduct and problems in the late thirteenth
century justice system. 7 Chapter 29 targeted lawyers, proscribing "deceit or
collusion" in the "king's court" that deceived the court or beguiled the court or
a party." Punishment for a violation by pleaders was imprisonment for a year
and a day and a prohibition on further pleading. It also imposed imprisonment
on those who were not pleaders and permitted in such cases "greater
punishment . . . at the king's pleasure" if required by the nature of the
misconduct?9
The courts interpreted the prohibition on "deceit and collusion" very
broadly." It was applied to conflicts of interest as well as many other forms of
36. Other important statutes included the Statutes of Gloucester (1278), the Statute of Mortmain
(1279), the Statute of Merchants or Statute Acton Burnell (1283), the Statutes of Wales (1284), the
Statutes of Westminster 11 (1285), the Statute of Winchester (1285), the Statute of Merchants (1285), the
Statute Quia Emptores (1289-90), the Statutes Quo Warranto (1289-90), the reenactment (fifth and first
public enrolling) of Magna Carta (1297), the Articuli Super Cartas (1300) and the Statute of Carlisle
(1306-07). See, for example, Holdsworth, 2 History ofEnglish Law at 299-304 (cited in note 16); Plucknett,
Concise History ofthe Common Law at 27-31 (cited in note 16) ("one of the greatest outbursts of reforming
legislation in English history").
37. See Rose, Legal Profession in Medieval England, 48 Syracuse L Rev at 49-63 (cited in note 23).
38. See Statutes of Westminster I, chapter 29, 1 Statutes at 34 (1275). The prohibition was expressly
directed at any "serjeant-countor or other" and the latter was interpreted to include attorneys. See Brand,
Origins at 120, 128-36 (cited in note 7); Sayles, ed, 1 Select Cases in the Court ofKing's Bench at cvi n 8 (55
Selden Soc'y) (cited in note 9); Edward Coke, 1 Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 214
(William S. Hein 1986) (reprint of 1797 ed) (first published 1642); Edward Coke, Fourth Part of the
Institutes of the Laws ofEngland 100-02 (William S. Hein 1986) (reprint of 1797 ed) (first published 1644).
39. The same penalties were applied to pleaders and attorneys despite the difference in statutory
language. See text accompanying note 16.
40. Brand concludes that Chapter 29 enacted "no more than a vague and unspecific obligation,"
authorizing the courts to develop more specific behavioral norms and that the courts gave "deception" "a
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lawyer misconduct." This regulation, the first and probably most significant
regulation of lawyer conduct,42 was probably the primary and most important
conflict of interest prohibition. Although, as mentioned earlier, it is difficult
often to identify the legal basis of the punishment, Chapter 29 was probably
applied to lawyer misconduct with relative frequency for a long time."3
b. The London Ordinance of 1280
This Ordinance was a long, detailed enactment, regulating both admission
to practice and lawyer conduct in the City of London courts." The Ordinance
prohibited a significant number of specific types of lawyer misconduct, making
it perhaps the earliest antecedent of modern lawyer ethics codes. Permanent
suspension was the penalty for the most serious violations and imprisonment
"according to the statute of the king" was the penalty for losing a client's case
due to negligence or default.45
Among the enumerated prohibitions were two directed specifically at
conflicts of interest. First, the Ordinance banned representing both sides of a
dispute simultaneously; it stated "no countor is ... to take money from both
parties in any action. " 6 The Ordinance also subjected lawyers to discipline for
fairly broad interpretation." See Brand, Origins at 127, 135 (cited in note 7). In general, medieval judges
used considerable discretion in interpreting statutes. See Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Statutes and Their
Interpretation in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century 40-163 (Cambridge 1922); G.O. Sayles, ed, 3 Select
Cases in the Court of King's Bench under Edward I xi-xlii (58 Selden Soc'y 1939).
41. Other forms of misconduct to which the statute was applied included forgery of writs, altering,
damaging or removing official documents; false statements to the court, the client, the opponent, and in
pleadings and other documents; acting as an attorney without proper authority, or continuing to act after
removal; failure to act or premature termination of representation; antagonizing judges by unconvincing
arguments, overzealousness, or not speaking in good faith; defective pleadings and documents; unjustified
initiation or continuation of litigation, and repleading issues; and misconduct in the lawyer's own litigation
or business dealings. See Rose, Legal Profession in Medieval England, 48 Syracuse L Rev at 60-61 & n 260,
123-30 (cited in note 23).
42. See id at 62-63.
43. One commentator believed that it was still in force in 1908. See John C. Fox, TheKingv. Almon I,
24 L Quarterly Rev 184, 193 n 3 (1908). It was apparently not specifically repealed until 1948. See
Chronological Table of the Statutes: Part 1: Covering the Period from 1235 to the end of 1963 10 (The
Stationery Office Ltd 1997).
44. See Henry T. Riley, ed, 2 Munimenta GildhalLa Londoniensis: Liber Custumarum, Part 1 280
(Longman, Green 1860) (compiled early fourteenth century). For an English translation, see Henry T.
Riley, ed, 2 Munimenta GildhalLa Londoniensis: Liber Custumarum, Part 2 595 (Longman, Green 1860).
Like the Statute of Westminster I, Chapter 29, it applied to both pleaders and attorneys.
45. This reference presumably was to Chapter 29 of the Statute of Westminster I. See Brand, Origins at
137 (cited in note 7).
46. Riley, ed, 2 Munimenta Part 1 at 281-82 (Law French) (cited in note 44) and Riley, ed, 2
Munimenta Part 2 at 596 (English) (cited in note 44). James Brundage believes that the London Ordinance
adopted "long-standing disciplinary practices current in the ecclesiastical courts.. .and well-settled doctrine
in canon law ... before 1280." He believes the London common lawyers would have been aware of these
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ceasing to represent one client and undertaking to represent the adverse party
and perhaps for representation adverse to a former client; it imposed
punishment "where one takes [money], and then leaves his client, and leagues
himself with the other party."47 The penalty for violating the simultaneous
conflict of interest prohibition was suspension for three years; and for
abandoning the client and representing the opponent adverse to the former
client, the Ordinance provided that the lawyer shall "render double and he
shall not be heard in that case."48
It is not clear how often the Ordinance was used to discipline lawyers.
Despite the explicit prohibitions on conflict of interest, existing judicial records
do not reveal many instances of its application to such misconduct." More
generally, very little evidence exists regarding the actual application of the
Ordinance to regulate the various forms of misconduct that it enumerated."0
c. Statute 4 Henry IV, Chapter 18 (1402)
This statute focused chiefly on the admission of attorneys and on insuring
their competence and integrity. The statute required the justices to examine all
aspiring attorneys as well as those already in practice and to enroll only those
"that be good and virtuous, and of good fame."" In addition, the statute
required disbarment from the king's courts of any attorney "found in any
default of record, or otherwise." 2
aspects of canon law because of the ecclesiastical courts in London. See letter from James Brundage to
Jonathan Rose (July 14, 1999) (on file with author).
47. Riley, ed, 2 Munimenta, Part I at 282 (Law French) (cited in note 44) and Riley, ed, 2 Munimenta,
Part 2 at 597 (English) (cited in note 44). The statute also defined the pleader's function, banned
defamatory pleading, regulated the lawyer's physical location in court, prohibited misconduct affecting the
interests of the lawyer's clients, such as incompetence and negligence, and generally protected the integrity
of the court. See Rose, LegalProfession in Medieval England, 48 Syracuse L Rev at 63-66 (cited in note 23).
48. Riley, ed, 2 Munimenta, Part 1 at 282 (Law French) (cited in note 44); Riley, ed, 2 Munimenta,
Part2 at 597 (English) (cited in note 44). Although somewhat unclear, this probably meant that the lawyer
must pay double damages to the client (twice the client's advance) and not be heard against the client in
that case. Medieval statutes commonly included provisions requiring double or treble damages. See, for
example, Statute of Westminster I, Chapters 26 (double damages for extortion of bribes by the king's
officers and sheriffs) and 27 (treble damages for extortion by clerks of court), 1 Statutes at 33.
49. In Dr. Brand's review of the records of the London courts from about 1290-1307, he found at least
one instance of disciplining a lawyer for conflict of interest pursuant to the Ordinance. See Brand, Origins
at 137-38 (cited in note 7).
50. Brand discovered only three cases, two involving serjeants and one an attorney. See id. However, the
customary law of London and the other boroughs evidenced the concern of local courts with lawyer
misconduct. See Mary Bareson, ed, 2 Borough Customs 10-16, 43-45 (21 Selden Soc'y 1906).
51. 4 Henry IV, ch 18, 2 Statutes 138-39 (1402).
52. Id at 139.
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It seems unlikely that this statute was a significant regulation of lawyer
misconduct. Its primary objective appears to have been to reduce the damage
caused by the "great number of attornies, ignorant and not learned in the
law."" Its language, "found in default of record, or otherwise" might have
permitted disciplining lawyers for engaging in conflicts of interest, given the
expansive judicial interpretation of medieval statutes. However, no evidence
has been uncovered revealing the use of this statute to regulate conflicts of
interest or other forms of lawyer misconduct.
d. Inherent Judicial Power
There is no doubt that the courts had inherent power to discipline their
own officers, including lawyers, and that this power was closely related to their
power to punish summarily for contempt.54 Prior to the passage of the
aforementioned regulatory statutes, judges had fined ("amerced") lawyers
pursuant to their inherent power," and this form of judicial discipline of
lawyers continued after the passage of the statutes.5" Brand, Palmer, Sayles, and
Bolland have uncovered a number of instances of this type of lawyer discipline
in both the royal and local courts.57 As the following discussion of the cases
indicates, inherent judicial power was used to punish ambidexterity."
53. Id. See Rose, Legal Profession in Medieval England, 48 Syracuse L Rev at 95-99 (cited in note 23).
54. See Holdsworth, 3 History of English Law at 391-92 (cited in note 16); John C. Fox, The Summary
Process to Punish Contempt 1, 25 L Quarterly Rev 238, 244-45 (1909); John C. Fox, The Summary Process to
Punish Contempt 14, 25 L Quarterly Rev 354, 361-62, 366 (1909); Fox, 24 L Quarterly Rev at 193-94 (cited
in note 43); Fox, The King v. Almon II, 24 L Quarterly Rev 266, 267, 276-77 (1908). Some historians
believe that this power was based on "immemorial" custom or usage. See id at 278; Fox, 24 L Quarterly Rev
at 193 (cited in note 43).
55. See Brand, Origins at 47-48, 55-56 (cited in note 7); Palmer, 11 Irish Jurist at 133 (cited in note
16); Baker, Order of Serleants at Law at 9 (cited in note 16); Holdsworth, 2 History of English Law at 251
(cited in note 16); Plucknett, Statutes and Their Interpretation at 155 (cited in note 40).
56. Broke v Taylard, reported in F.W. Maitland and G.J. Turner, eds, 4 Year Books: 3 & 4 Edward II,
1309-11 194-95 (22 Selden Soc'y 1907), dramatically reveals the exercise of that power. After the attorney
told the judge that he had no bill, but wanted a summons, the following colloquy occurred:
UJudge] Stanton [to the attorney]: You wicked rascal, you shall not have it! But because
you, to delay the woman from her dower, have vouched and have not sued a writ to
summon your warrantor, this Court awards that you go to prison.
Attorney: I pray that I may find mainprise [bail].
Stanton: We will have no mainprise, but stay [in gaol] until you are well chastised.
Turner comments on the case in his introduction. See id at xl-xli.
57. See Brand, Origins at 123-36, 138-41 (cited in note 7); Palmer, 11 Irish Jurist at 128-29, 137-39
(cited in note 16); G.O. Sayles, ed, 5 Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench under Edward III xii, lxii,
cxviii-cxix, cxxv-cxxvi, 45-47, 103-05 (76 Selden Soc'y 1958); Sayles, ed, 3 Select Cases in the Court ofKing's
Bench at 57-59 (cited in note 40); G.O. Sayles, ed, 2 Select Cases in the Court ofKing's Bench under Edward I
cliv-clv, 33-34, 40-41 (57 Selden Soc'y 1938); Sayles, ed, 1 Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench at cii-ciii
& n 6, cvi n 8, 80-81 (cited in note 9); G.J. Turner and W.C. Bolland, eds, 19 Year Books: 9 Edward II, AD
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e. Other Related Prohibitions
Two other types of lawyer misconduct that might be said to involve
conflicts of interest deserve some mention. The first type was lawyers' misuse
of their position as members of the House of Commons to advance the private
interests of their clients. A 1372 Ordinance was intended to prohibit currently
practicing lawyers from serving as members of parliament." The rationale for
the prohibition was a widely held view that lawyers were using the official
petitioning machinery of Commons, the "commons petition," to seek solutions
for the personal grievances of their clients.' This Ordinance and a Commons
Petition of the same year stated that the lawyers "do procure and cause to be
brought into Parliament many petitions in the name of Commons, which in
no way relate to them, but only the private persons with whom they engage. ""
1313-16xIvi (45 Selden Soc'y 1929); W.C. Bolland, ed, Select Bills in Eyre, AD 1292-1333 xliii-xlvi, 3-4,
27-28, 52-53, 59-60, 68-69, 118-19 (30 Selden Soc'y 1914).
58. The use of the inherent judicial power over lawyers was not limited to discipline. Control over
admission of serjeants to the Common Bench, perhaps the most important court for civil disputes, was
pursuant to this power, not the regulatory statutes and ordinances as was the case with other controls of
lawyer admission. See Brand, Origins at 106-10, 115-17 (cited in note 7); Baker, Order of Serjeants at Law
at 8-27 (cited in note 16); Rose, Legal Profession in Medieval England, 48 Syracuse L Rev at 63-70, 73-79,
87-90 (cited in note 23). Moreover, by the sixteefith century, courts issued formal orders regarding the
admission and conduct of attorneys. See, for example, Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers ofthe Commonwealth
at 117, 119, 129, 137-38, 140, 142-45, 152, 188-89 (cited in note 16).
59. See 2 Rot. ParL 310, item 13, (46 Edward III, 1372) and the modern translation in 1 Statutes ofthe
Realm at 394. The regulation actually precluded lawyers from being knights of the shire, which had the
practical effect of disabling them from being members of parliament. There is a possibility that the statute
or ordinance was not in fact enacted, but may have been only a common petition and royal response that
was included in the statutory compilation.
60. See H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, eds, The English Parliament in the Middle Ages XXI 12,
XXIV 34-35 (Hambledon 1981); A.L. Brown, Parliament, c. 1377-1422 in R.G. Davies and J.H. Denton,
eds, The English Parliament in the Middle Ages 109, 126-27 (Pennsylvania 1981); Howard L. Gray, The
Influence of the Commons on Early Legislation: A Study of the Fourteenth and Fiteenth Centuries 445 (Harvard
1932); William Stubbs, 2 The Constitutional History ofEngland: Its Origin and Development 445 (Clarendon
4th ed 1896); Doris Rayner, The Forms and Machinery of the 'Common Petition" in the Fourteenth Century,
Part 1, 56 English Hist Rev 198, 206 (1941); Doris Rayner, The Forms and Machinery of the "Common
Petition"in the Fourteenth Century, Part l, 56 English Hist Rev 549, 569 (1941).
61. See 2 Rot. ParL 310, no 13 (cited in note 59); 1 Statutes of the Realm at 394 (cited in note 59).
Although lawyer members might have manipulated "commons' petitions for their own advantage and did
not always represent the common interest," they were not the only members that had clients. Others
included "persistent litigants or maintainers of plaints or those who live by such gains ... paid supporters of
other men's quarrels, rogues ... whose practice of maintenance was coming to threaten parliament just as it
already threatened the king's other courts." See J.R. Maddicott, Parliament and the Constituencies, 1272-
1377 in Davies and Denton, eds, The English Parliament in the MiddleAges at 61, 76-77 (cited in note 60).
For similar reasons, attempts to exclude lawyers as members of parliament again appeared as an aspect of the
seventeenth century civil strife and law reform movement. See Veall, Popular Movement fr Law Reform at
105, 203-206 (cited in note 14). In Veall's view, "[t]he great number of lawyers in Parliament prevented law
reform measures being enacted" and confirmed the reformers' fears and the rationale of the proposed
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This medieval regulation need not be discussed further for several reasons.
First, abuse of the parlimentary process by lawyers does not involve conflicts
arising by virtue of representing clients with conflicting interests, but is really
part of a broader problem regarding governmental integrity and openness.'
Moreover, this regulation was not a basis for disciplining medieval lawyers.
Finally, the 1372 Ordinance seems to have had little effect as not long after its
enactment, membership in the House of Commons included a significant
number of lawyers.'
The second type of related regulation involved the numerous prohibitions
on champerty and maintenance that parliament adopted, beginning with the
Statute of Westminster 15 and continuing during the medieval period.'
prohibition. Id at 230. More generally, many lawyers were opponents of the law reform movement. See id
at 122-26, 228-32.
62. This form of medieval misconduct certainly anticipates modern concerns with misuse of official
influence on executive and legislative entities, although modern prohibitions more commonly focus on
abuse of influence by former legislators and other former officials, including government lawyers. See, for
example, 18 USCA § 207 (1994 & Supp 1997); ModelRules 1.11 (cited in note 3); Restatement§ 214 (cited
in note 3). The 1989 amendments to the federal criminal prohibition extended the prohibition to members
of Congress and officers and employees of the legislative branch. See 18 USCA §§ 207 (e), 208 (1994 &
Supp 1997). Similar concerns have also been raised about current legislation. See Morgan and Rotunda,
Problems and Materials on Professional Responsibility at 183-95 (cited in note 2). This type of misconduct
should be distinguished from the practice of court officials advising and assisting litigants, which was
common in the medieval era. See Rose, Legal Profession in Medieval England, 48 Syracuse L Rev at 11 & n
35 (cited in note 23); e-mail from James Brundage to Jonathan Rose (June 1, 1999) (on file with author).
63. Other medieval statutes were also concerned with other officials misusing their positions. For
example, the statute of 4 Henry IV discussed above had a conflict of interest provision, barring certain
officials from acting as attorneys in any franchise or bailiwick in which they were an official. See 4 Henry
IV, ch 19 (1402), 2 Statutes at 139. In addition, some believe that clerks abused their position in aiding
private clients. See, for example, Sayles, ed, 1 Select Cases in the Court ofKings Bench at lxxxvi n 5, lxxxvi-
lxxxix, xcvii-ci (cited in note 9); Sayles, ed, 5 Select Cases in the Court ofKings Bench at xii-xiii & n 4 (cited
in note 57). Also, a 1393 petition requested that the right of clerks to practice as attorneys be severely
restricted as they used their positions to falsify records for their clients. See 3 Rot. ParI. 306, item 28 (16
Richard II, 1393).
"One commentator concludes that in the 1422 parliament, 20 of 74 knights of the shire were lawyers and
37 burgesses were lawyers. "Lawyers could not be kept out; and in at least one important respect they may
have contributed to the growing prestige of the commons." See A.R. Myers, Parliament, 1422-1509 in
Davies and Denton, eds, The English Parliament in the Middle Ages at 141, 166 (cited in note 60).
65. The Statutes of Westminster I contained several provisions punishing such conduct. See Statutes of
Westminster I, chs 18, 25, 28, 33 (3 Edward I, 1275), 1 Statutes at 31-35. Chapter 33 seemed clearly
directed at professional lawyers and the other sections may have applied to them. This statute probably
marks the inception of institutional efforts to control this type of conduct. See Holdsworth, 3 History of
English Law at 395-96 (cited in note 16). The concern with this conduct predated the Statutes of
Westminster I and Bracton noted it. See Bracton, 2 On the Laws and Customs of England at 332 (cited in
note 8). For an extensive treatment of the history and development of these offenses, see Baker, The Legal
Profession and the Common Law at 125-50 (cited in note 16); Percy Winfield, The History of Maintenance
and Champerty, 35 L Quarterly Rev 50 (1919).
66. During the next ten years of Edward I's reign, five further prohibitions were enacted. See Statutes of
Westminster II, ch 49 (13 Edward 1, 1285), 1 Statutes at 95; Statute of Conspirators (20 Edward I, 1292), 1
Statutes at 216; Ordinance of Conspirators (21 Edward I, 1293), 1 Rot. Parl at 96; Articulas Super Cartas,
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Although champerty and maintenance involve a conflict of interest in some
sense because of the lawyer's underlying financial interest in the litigation, this
type of misconduct is not generally treated as a conflict of interest problem.'
The primary objective of these statutes was to reduce excessive litigation. As
such, these regulations do not deal with a lawyer's duty of loyalty and the
conflict of interest problems that are the focus of this article. Thus, they are not
discussed further.
2. The Cases and Rules
a. Switching Sides in the Same Litigation
By far the most numerous medieval conflict of interest cases involved a
lawyer switching sides in the same litigation. This type of case accounted for
almost half of the disciplinary cases and was almost twice as numerous as the
next largest category.' It is not surprising that such cases were the most
numerous. First, switching sides in the same litigation is the most serious,
harmful, and clearest form of conflict of interest. Second, the two primary
regulatory prohibitions seemed to have focused on this classic ambidexterity.
The London Ordinance of 1280 expressly prohibited it' and the Statute of
Westminster I, chapter 29 treated it as a core form of "deceit or collusion.""
Finally, to the extent that the typical medieval remedies for ambidexterity were
ch 11 (28 Edward I, 1300), 1 Statutes at 139; Ordinance of Conspirators (33 Edward I, 1305), 1 Statutes at
145. The dates and enforcement of these statutes have prompted dispute. See, for example, Brand, Origim
at 121 (cited in note 7); Sayles, ed, 3 Select Cases in the Court ofKing's Bench at lix (cited in note 40). In the
next hundred years at least five more were adopted. Additional prohibitions were enacted in 1327, 1331,
1347, 1377 and 1383. See Holdsworth, 3 Histoy ofEnglish Law at 397-98 (cited in note 16); 2 id at 452 &
n 11. Holdsworth says that the repeated attempts at prohibition 'illustrate at once the prevalence of the
offences and the incapacity of government to enforce the statutes." See 2 id at 459.
67. A limited exception would be when the lawyer's interest in the litigation is adverse to that of the
client. See Model Rules 1.7 (b) (cited in note 3); Restatement §§ 201, 206 (cited in note 3). Medieval
conflicts of interest involving the lawyer's personal interest and that of the client that resemble the modern
counterpart of that type of conflict will be discussed later. See notes 187-214 and accompanying text.
68. A total of 80 cases have been identified. About 76 cases are classified as discipline cases for
discussion purposes. Of these cases, 33 involved switching sides in the same case, 5 former client conflicts,
17 adversity to a client on an unrelated matter, 11 simultaneous representation of multiple plaintiff or
defendants, and 5 conflicts with a lawyer's personal interest. It is also interesting to note the chronological
dimension of the cases. Slightly more than 60 cases arose between 1278 and 1400, and the great bulk of the
cases involving discipline arose during that period. Only 11 of the discipline cases arose after 1400. To some
extent, the dates of the cases identified are a function of the primary and secondary sources available to me
and of the fact that records made available by Paul Brand focus on discipline cases between 1278 and 1307,
with only one case before and one after that period.
69. See notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
70. See Rose, Legal Profession in Medieval England, 48 Syracuse L Rev at 61, 123 (cited in note 23).
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imprisonment, fines, and disbarment, the cases would most likely focus on the
most serious forms of misconduct, which would merit these severe sanctions.
Many of the cases had a fairly common fact pattern: after being retained
and often paid by one client, the lawyer abandoned that client and began to
represent the adverse party. A few cases will suffice to illustrate the general
flavor of such cases. In the 1286 Norfolk eyre, the county knights charged that
Simon of Cley, after being retained by Fulcher of Surrey to act as his attorney
in the Common Bench in a land dispute, ceased his representation and
"adhered to" his opponent in the dispute. Although Simon denied that he was
Fulcher's attorney and that the latter had been harmed, the jury disagreed. It
found that Simon had been Fulcher's attorney and "had wrongfully adhered to
the opposite party to the defrauding and disinheritance of the said Fulcher and
had absented himself on purpose, with the result that the said Fulcher lost the
said land." Simon was imprisoned.7' In the 1292 Shropshire eyre, Robert
Dauvil complained to the royal justices that he gave John of Ludlow money to
purchase three writs, but "through the procurement and corruption of
[Robert's] opponents," he failed to purchase the writs, causing the former to
lose his right of action during the eyre. John pleaded guilty and was sent to
prison.72 In another case, the Nottingham jurors indicted and fined Walter
Golias in 1340 for taking fees from several co-heirs to bring an assize of novel
disseisin and subsequently taking a fee from the defendant in the same action."
This classic ambidexterity continued for several hundred years. For example, in
1673, Simon Mason was jailed and disbarred after it was proved that "he had
been an ambidexter, viz after he was retained by one side he was retained by
the other side."'74
Often, as was true with Simon of Cley,"5 the ambidextrous lawyer failed to
appear in court on behalf of the first client, causing a default and resulting
judgment against that client. Such an appearance in land litigation was
essential for the defendant to avoid a default judgment.7' For example, in 1299,
71. See JUST 1l579, m.69d (plea roll of Norfolk eyre of 1286), reprinted in PB1, no 3 (cited in note
26); Brand, Origins at 129 (cited in note 7). Although the term of imprisonment is not specifically
indicated, it likely was for a year and a day as the conduct was "contrary to the king's statute," the Statute of
Westminster I, chapter 29. See id.
72. See Bolland, ed, Select Bills in Eyre at 27-28 (cited in note 57).
73. See JUST 1/691, m.5d (Nottingham indictments, 1340), reprinted in PB3 (xxiv) (cited in note 26).
74. Simon Mason's Case, I Freeman's Cases no 90, 89 Eng Rep 55 (Common Bench, Trinity Term
1673).
75. See note 71 and accompanying text. In the 1288 Dorset eyre, Roger of Aumfrey was charged with
taking money from both claimants and tenants in land litigation "to the disinheritance of many." Although
Roger denied his guilt, the jury found him guilty in a specific case. He was remanded to custody and
subsequently fined. See JUST 1/213, m.3Id (1288 Dorset eyre), reprinted in PB3 (v) (cited in note 26).
76. See Brand, Origins at 129 (cited in note 7).
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John de la Haye's clients, defendants in a dower action, complained to the
Common Bench justices that "said attorney by prearranged collusion with [the
plaintiff] had maliciously absented himself and made default after appearance
in this court so the sheriff had been ordered to take the said tenements into the
hands of the lord king." As a result, the sheriff attached the attorney to appear
and answer his clients and the king.' In 1287, at the request of the king,
Matthew le Chrestien was held in prison, pending further investigation, since
he allegedly "made a corrupt default of favour for [the defendant's]
opponents." 8
In some cases, rather than the lawyer abandoning the first client to
represent the second one, one of the parties initially hired one lawyer to
represent it and the adverse party and the lawyer appeared on behalf of both
parties. In 1597, a creditor retained Woolridge, a Common Bench attorney, to
represent both the creditor and the debtor, paying fees for both. Woolridge
commenced a suit and appeared for the debtor, but did not defend him." As a
result, the creditor obtained judgment and execution against the debtor
although the latter had neither notice or service of process, a default for
practical purposes. The debtor sued Woolridge and the creditor in the Star
Chamber. "For this offence," Woolridge was fined, "hurle over the barre at
Westminster, and never to be an attorney, nor to have any office in the law."8"
77. See CP 40/127, m 81d (Easter Term 1299), reprinted in PB3 (xix) (cited in note 26). The ultimate
disposition of the matter is not indicated. In 1300, John of Stamford's clients, also defendants in a dower
action, made similar charges to the Common Bench justices, complaining of John's "fraudulent and
malicious" default, although there was no specific allegation of collusion with the plaintiff. See CP 40/13 1,
m 62d (Michaelmas Term 1300), reprinted in PB3 (xx) (cited in note 26). The victim estimated the
amount of his damages, but the ultimate disposition of the matter is not indicated.
78. See C 47/34/4, no. 51 (royal writ dated March 17, 1287), reprinted in PB3 (iv)(b) (cited in note
26). The ultimate disposition of the matter is nor indicated.
79. As a technical matter, the attorney pled non sum infrmatus, meaning that the defendant-debtor had
not been informed nor instructed him. See Black's Law Dictionary 1058 (West 6th ed 1990).
80. He was also expelled from his Inn. The creditor was fined. See Aldridge v Woolridge in John
Hawarde, Les Reportes del Cases in Camera Stellata 1593-1609 70 (Baildon ed, 1894). According to Baker, in
the sixteenth century, "[mliscreant attorneys were physically tossed over the bar." See John H. Baker, ed, 2
Spelman's Reports 85 n 1 (94 Selden Soc'y 1978). During the sixteenth century, there seemed to have been a
large number of cases involving lawyer misconduct in the Star Chamber. See, for example, John H. Baker,
ed, 1-2 Dyer's Reports xxx-xxxii, lxxxix-xc, 67, 187-89, 213-14, 293-94, 309-10, 361-62 (109-110 Selden
Soc'y 1994). However, Hawarde's claim of frequent disbarment has been disputed. See Michael Stuckey,
The High Court of Star Chamber 37 (Gaunt 1998).
A similar, but more complex and serious case, involved the fringes of the legal profession, although
practicing attorneys were not in fact involved. A debtor, a former attorney who also owed money to the
surety, hired a forger-impostor with the same name as an actual attorney to represent a surety for the debtor.
Although the debtor was not sued and the surety paid the underlying debt, the debtor colluded with the
impostor-attorney, "the one-eyed man," to sue the surety on that obligation and to appear as the latter's
attorney although he was never retained by the latter. He did, pled non sum infirmatus (see note 79), and
the debtor had execution against the surety. "For this horrible falseness," which was apparently devised to
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In sanctioning ambidexterity, these cases established a norm of loyalty.
Numerous cases reflect the objective of prohibiting conduct that was
inconsistent with the client's legitimate expectation of loyalty and that clearly
eliminated, not merely diminished, the lawyer's vigor of representation on
behalf of his initial client. This loyalty rationale for medieval conflict of interest
regulation is evident not only from the sanctioning of the clear and serious
disloyalty in which the lawyers in these cases engaged, but also in the language
of the cases. For example, in 1305, John of Bradenstoke, a Common Bench
serjeant, was fined for agreeing to be counsel in a land plea, but having "acted
for his adversaries when the case was pleaded, defrauding and deceiving" his
initial client.' Also in 1305, the Herefordshire county triers indicted John de la
Barwe because "he later abandoned the side of his client Roger and joined
Robert and supported him against Roger," apparently because Robert paid him
a larger fee. 2 As noted above, in the case involving Simon of Cley, he "adhered
to the opposite party"" and in John of Ludlow's case, his ambidexterity
occurred through "the procurement and corruption of his [client's]
opponents.5 4
In implementing the loyalty duties, the cases also evidenced the sensitivity
of medieval conflict of interest norms to the need to protect client confidential
information. In 1282, the clients of William of Wells, a serjeant, complained
to the King's Bench justices that although they had retained and paid William,
he failed to assist them. Moreover, "in deception of them, after he understood
their counsel ("consilium"), he attached himself to the opposite side without
their leave, reporting their counsel to the said opposite side." 5 In 1290, King
eliminate the prior debt of the debtor to the surety, the Star Chamber ordered the debtor-former attorney,
"a notable trickster," to appear before the Common Bench and to be jailed and fined if wrongdoing was
found. The attorney-impostor was imprisoned and threatened to stand on pillory if he did not confess the
truth. Judgment against the surety was vacated. See Grevill v Holcomb (Star Chamber, Hilary Term 1574) in
Baker, ed, 2 Dyer's Reports 293-94; Richard Crompton, Star-Chamber Cases 52-53 (Theatrum Orbis
Terrarum 1975) (first published 1630).
81. See JUST 1/287, m.4d, reprinted in PB3 (xxii) (cited in note 26). Interestingly, John agreed to pay
a fine, apparently to the victim, before judgment in order to prevent his misconduct from being included in
the "estreats," the fines imposed during the Eyre to be levied by the Exchequer. See id. In so doing, he may
have avoided imprisonment and disbarment or suspension.
82. See JUST 1/306, m.6, reprinted in PB2, no 21 (cited in note 26); Brand, Origins at 140 (cited in
note 7). The ultimate disposition of the matter is not indicated.
83. See note 71 and accompanying text.
84. See note 72.
85. See Sayles, ed, 1 Select Cases in the Court ofKings Bench at 67-68, 80-81 (cited in note 9); Brand,
Origins at 123-23 (cited in note 7); Palmer, II Irish Jurist at 128-29 (cited in note 16). No recorded
judgment or verdict is indicated. In this case, Brand believes that "consilium" probably meant their
litigation strategy. Brand, Origins at 124 (cited in note 7). Brundage believes that it meant their version of
the facts, their theory of the case, and their instructions to the lawyer. See letter from James Brundage to
Jonathan Rose (July 14, 1999) (on file with author) (cited in note 46).
[7:137
TheAmbidextrous Lawyer 155
Edward I alleged to the Common Bench justices that Edmund of Lidington,
after his clients "had fully explained to Edmund his counsel and the cause of
the defence," had "fraudulently gone over to the other side ... once he learned
the counsel."" In the 1292 Shropshire eyre, Robert of Munslow was jailed until
he paid a fine because he had "gone over to her [his client's] adversary and
revealed her strategy and had then given counsel to [the adversary] against" the
initial client.87 In these cases, it is not always easy to detect the nature of the
confidential information that is the object of concern. "Consilium" seems to be
the word almost always used in the original text. It seems to include both
information communicated by the client as well as the lawyer's litigation
strategy. Overall, it seems to be a fairly broad concept of confidential
information. As such, it provided another rationale for the medieval
prohibition of ambidexterity, reinforcing the basic loyalty norm.
The disloyal conduct in these cases was serious and significant. The cases
were not ones in which the lawyer could have maintained in good faith that
both clients' interests could have been served. Nor were they cases where the
primary adverse effect on the client was merely diminished vigor of
representation, a disappointed expectation of loyalty, or a threat to client
confidential information. Rather, these cases often involved more contemptible
and pernicious lawyer misconduct. The cases commonly characterized the
lawyer's wrongdoing as deceitful, malicious, corrupt, collusive, and fraudulent.
Perhaps some of this language resulted from the medieval manner of pleading
such matters, as influenced by the form of the writ of deceit or the language of
the Statute of Westminster I, chapter 29. On the other hand, in many cases,
this strong language was not merely a function of such formal considerations,
but was used because it fairly characterized the misconduct involved.
The particular instances of ambidexterity, as described in the above and
other cases, certainly can be fairly described as fraudulent, deceitful, and so
forth. The common fact pattern, a failure to appear or to defend the initial
client resulting in a default against that client in favor of the second client,
supports this more malevolent characterization. Moreover, some cases involved
even more egregious facts. For example, in several cases, the initial client
complained that the lawyer failed to appear because the adverse party had
bribed him. In 1291, John of Upton was imprisoned for a year and a day and
fined for waiving his client's opponent's default as a result of the latter's bribe
86. See CP 40186, m 115 (Michaelmas Term 1290), reprinted in PB3 (viii) (cited in note 26). There is
no evidence of any further proceedings in this matter.
87. See Ancient Correspondence, vol XXX, no 164, reprinted in Sayles, ed, 5 Select Cases in the Court of
King's Bench at cxxvi (cited in note 57). Paul Brand has graciously provided me with a translation of this
judicial record. See letter from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose (August 22, 1997) (on file with author).
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and request, causing the client to lose the land.88 To make matters worse,
John's client, William of Brockhall, "asked him to act in this case in whatever
way was best and most profitable for William and John had told him that he
could safely go home and his affairs would proceed as well as if he were here in
court in person."89 In 1287, Matthew le Chrestien was accused of making
"corrupt default of favour for [the defendant's] opponents" because they had
bribed him.' Similar charges were leveled against Geoffrey Page in 1254."'
Allegations of this type of conduct apparently continued for some time as John
Hiddsley was charged with bribery in the early seventeenth century." Nor was
this fraudulent, corrupt conduct limited to bribery. In 1293 Staffordshire eyre,
John of Organ's client alleged that John, his attorney, was paid by the client's
adversary in land litigation to forge documents ("charters') regarding the
ownership and transfer of the land to defeat the client's claims." Finally, in the
1299 case involving John de la Haye, discussed earlier, his client alleged that
John, his attorney, "by prearranged collusion with [the plaintiffi had
maliciously absented himself and made default."9 These cases clearly establish
many instances of this classic ambidexterity involved very serious and
fraudulent misconduct that exceeded ordinary disloyalty.
Before moving on to the next category of ambidexterity cases, it is probably
useful to say a few words about how these cases arose. There was no single
process for involving the judicial system in these matters. Most often client
victims brought the misconduct into the legal system either by requesting that
the court discipline the lawyer or by seeking to impose civil liability on him for
the victim's injury. 5 In some cases, local jurors made a presentment or
88. See CP 40/91, m 191d (Michaelmas Term 1291), reprinted in PB3 (x) (cited in note 26). The
language of the case, "a year and a day in accordance with the statute" indicates that this discipline was
pursuant to the Statute of Westminster I, chapter 29. Interestingly, three of John's mainpernors were
attorneys and another was his brother, all of whom were amerced when John failed to appear in court. His
brother also had been involved in previous legal difficulties. See PB3 (x) (cited in note 26).
89. In addition, John and his brother had William execute a deed ratifying John's action. See id.
90. See CP 40/67, m 47d (Easter Term 1287), reprinted in PB3 (iv)(a) (cited in note 26). See also note
78.
91. See KB 26/152, m 13 (Hilary Term 1254), reprinted in PB3 (i) (cited in note 26). No ultimate
disposition of the charge is indicated, as the document reflected only the initial procedural stage. Brand
doubts whether Geoffrey Page was a professional attorney. See id.
92. See Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth at 193 (cited in note 16).
93. See Bolland, ed, Select Bills in Eyre at 52-53 (cited in note 57); PB2, no 11 (cited in note 26);
Brand, Origins at 139 (cited in note 7). There are a number of questions regarding John's status and the
details of the litigation. Moreover, there is no confirmation of the truth or falsity or ultimate disposition of
this matter, as the client, Lovekyn Semon, failed to prosecute the complaint he made in the eyre. See sources
listed in this note.
94. See text accompanying note 77.




indictment against the lawyer although they may have been acting on
information received from the victim. Occasionally, the conflict of interest
surfaced in the context of other litigation such as subsequent litigation to
which the client was a party or some phase of the underlying litigation in
which the injured client was seeking to avoid the adverse result caused by the
lawyer's misconduct. Also, the court, sua sponte, might impose discipline after
learning of the ambidexterity. In later cases, there is some evidence of a court
officer such as a serjeant prosecuting the misconduct.'
Two cases are particularly interesting because of Edward I's role in issuing
a writ to the Common Bench justices on behalf of the aggrieved parties.' In
1287, the king was concerned that litigation in the Bench threatened to
disinherit the earl of Lincoln due to ambidexterity injuring the defendant, his
tenant. Thus, the king, who was not in England, stated that he wished to be
"more fully informed" and ordered the justices to adjourn and withhold
judgment until the king, and the earl who was with him in Gascony,
returned." In addition, the king notified the regent serving during his absence
to order the justices to have the "attorney arrested and kept in safe custody'
until he returned." In 1290, the king, acting on information received from the
lawyer's aggrieved clients and concerned with "creating a real danger of their
disinheritance," told the justices that "since we wish to prevent such collusion
and fraud if planned and executed, as indeed we are bound to do, we order you
to investigate the truth of the matter and apply such remedy that no further
complaint reaches us on the matter.""u Such royal intervention seems unusual.
There were several places where clients could complain. They could pursue
their grievances in the Common Bench or King's Bench. Or, they could
choose, as many did, to proceed in a more informal local forum such as the
96. See, for example, Simon Mason's Case (cited in note 74); Grevil v. Hokomb (cited in note 80).
97. See CP 40/67, m 47d (Easter Term 1287), CP 40/86, m 115 (Michaelmas Term 1290), reprinted
in PB3 (iv)(a)-(b), (viii) (cited in note 26). These cases were discussed previously in another context. See
notes 78, 86 and 90 and accompanying text.
98. The writ stated
the king wishing to ensure that the earl who is staying with us over here by our order
suffers no harm and to help him as far as this can be done with justice wishes to be more
fully informed on that plea and on the default orders that you have that plea adjourned in
its current state before the said justices in our name and the giving of judgment withheld
until the king and the earl return to England so that after we are more fully informed we
may have done what is just in this matter with the advice of you and other faithful
members of our council.
The regent, Edmund, earl of Cornwall, serving during Edward I's long stay in Gascony, actually sent the
writ. See CP 40/67, m 47d (Easter Term 1287), reprinted in PB3 (iv)(a)-(b) & comment (cited in note 26).
99. See id.
100. See CP 40/86, m 115 (Michaelmas Term 1290), reprinted in PB3 (viii) (cited in note 26).
20001
158 Roundtable
eyre or traibaston sessions."' In fact, during the thirteenth and fourteenth
century when the eyre and trailbaston sessions were most active, twice as many
victims pursued their complaints about ambidexterity in these local settings.
The informality of these proceedings, the greater ease of proceeding by bill
rather than by writ,' 2 and the geographical proximity probably contributed
significantly to their popularity. These local proceedings, in addition, were of a
somewhat different nature. Often the purpose of the eyre and trailbaston
sessions was to conduct general investigations into local complaints and
wrongdoing, focusing on conduct that threatened the functioning of the justice
system."' This broader function likely also enhanced their attractiveness as a
forum in which to pursue complaints about lawyer misconduct.
It also had another consequence. Many of the ambidexterity complaints
made in these local settings were part of a larger pattern of misconduct, most
often involving allegations of conspiracy, champerty, and maintenance.
Moreover, participation in these broader wrongful schemes was often focused
on local lawyers and those on the fringe of the profession as well as nonlawyers
and jurors.'" For example, in the 1292 Herefordshire eyre, the local jurors
presented conspiracy charges against 34 individuals, many of whom were
probably not lawyers but included a local lawyer, William de la Haye, whom
the jurors found guilty of ambidexterity.' 5 In the 1293-94 Yorkshire eyre, the
jurors charged Little Michael of Laton, a serjeant, with ambidexterity, resulting
from "a great complaint ... that there were so many and so great supporters of
false pleas and champertors and conspirators allied with each other to support
whatever business etc. in this county that truth and justice were wholly
suffocated."'0 6 In the 1305 Shropshire and Herefordshire trailbaston sessions,
101. During the fourteenth century, circuit justices embarked on local expeditions to investigate criminal
matter and hear private complaints in the counties. These proceedings were known as the trailbaston
sessions, apparently named for the "club-wielding gangsters" (trailbastons), the objects of their efforts. See
Baker, Introduction at 46 & n 12 (cited in note 16).
102. See Baker, Introduction at 46, 63-74, 112-14 (cited in note 16); Milsom, Historical Foundations of
the Common Law at 27-36 (cited in note 16). By the end of the fifteenth century, a plaintiff could proceed
by bill in the King's Bench as well. See Baker, Introduction at 49-51 (cited in note 16).
103. See Brand, Origins at 139-41 (cited in note 7).
104. See, for example, JUST 1/409, m.2 (Lancaster Eyre 1292), reprinted in PB3 (xi) (cited in note 26).
In this case, numerous individuals-lawyers, nonlawyers, jurors-were indicted for conspiracy,
maintenance, and fee splitting that corrupted the functioning of the jury and mainprise (bail) system. There
were no specific allegations of ambidexterity. Interestingly, one conspiracy may have only involved
ambidextrous jurors with no lawyer involvement, although it was alleged that they had advised the aggrieved
party for a fee and knew her counsel (consilium). See Sayles, ed, 3 Select Cases in the Court ofKing's Bench at
lxvi (cited in note 40); KB 27/187, m 4d (Hilary Term 1307), reprinted in PB2, no 28 (cited in note 26).
105. See JUST 1/303, m. 6 7 (Herefordshire Eyre 1292), reprinted in PB2, no 8 (cited in note 26); Brand,
Origins at 139-40 (cited in note 7).
106. See JUST 1/1095, mm.1 & 2d (Yorkshire Eyre 1293-94), reprinted in PB2, no 14 (cited in note
26); Brand, Origins at 140 (cited in note 7).
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six local lawyers-Walter, son of Reginald de 'Playssh' of Egerton, John
Lyghtfot, John Love, Nicholas de Hakeleye, John le Granut of Mershon, and
John of Bradfield-were indicted for ambidexterity, which was part of a larger
wrongful scheme of conspiracy or maintenance. However, as the cases
discussed above indicate, many the of eyre proceedings focused on a single
lawyer and his ambidexterity;" and occasionally, the trailbaston cases did not
involve broader schemes, as was the case with John de la Barwe, a professional
serjeant charged in the 1305 Herefordshire trailbaston.'"
Much later, in 1604, ambidexterity may have been a part of a broader case,
playing a role in the notorious Star Chamber trial of Sir John Hele, the king's
senior serjeant at law. Although the judges were not unanimous in their view of
Hele's misconduct, the trial resulted in the severe sanctions of a £1,000 fine,
suspension from office, and imprisonment."' Although a majority of the judges
"acquitted the serjeant of all note of blemish and infamy,"... the Chancellor,
Lord Ellesmere, Hele's political foe, voted for a £2,000 fine, finding Hele
guilty of "corruption and ambition, craft and covetous practises," which
included his belief that Hele was "a notorious ambidexter.
"
1
107. See JUST 1/744 (Shropshire Trailbaston 1305), JUST 1/306, mm.5-6, reprinted in PB2, nos 20,
22-26 (cited in note 26); Brand, Origins at 140 & n 83 (cited in note 7). Walter, a professional local lawyer,
took two oxen to be of counsel to Roger Kalebach' in a plea against the bishop of Hereford, then abandoned
Roger to represent the bishop, causing Roger to lose the litigation. See PB2, no 20 (cited in note 26);
Brand, Origins at 140 (cited in note 7).
108. See, for example, notes 71, 72, 75, 81, 87, and 90, and accompanying text.
109. See JUST 1/306, m.6, reprinted in PB2, no 21 (cited in note 26); Brand, Origins at 140 (cited in
note 7). Local lawyers were also disciplined for ambidexterity in the more formal royal courts. In 1344, the
King's Bench imprisoned and disbarred, except with respect to his own litigation, Thomas Southover, a
local lawyer, for taking fees from both sides. See e-mail from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose (June 6, 1998)
(on file with author). In 1355, the King's Bench indicted John Lovel, Nicholas Shoreditch, Thomas of
Frodick and John Butterwick, local lawyers, for being "common ambidextors." Some of the money taken
apparently was not only for legal assistance, but to give to jurors. See G.O. Sayles, ed, 6 Select Cases in the
Court of Klng's Bench under Edward 11133-36, 103-04 (82 Selden Soc'y 1965).
110. Although the specific charges involved fraud in Hele's obtaining land to satisfy a debt, the case
involved complexities and political intrigue with overtones of perjury, treason, bribery and other serious
crimes surrounding Hele's desire to be Master of the Rolls. See Cockburn, Spoils of Law in Guth and
McKenna, eds, Tudor Rule and Revolution at 309-43 (cited in note 14); Prest, Rise of the Barristers at 294
(cited in note 18); Hawarde, Les Reportes del Cases in Camera Stellata at 171-76 (cited in note 80).
Cockburn provides a very detailed account of all the events and activities involved in this matter. This
matter was not Hele's first experience with misconduct as a lawyer. In 1579, the Star Chamber censured
him for "subtlety in his practice" and imprisoned him. Chief Justice Dyer felt that he should be disbarred
for seven years. See Baker, ed, 1 Dyer's Reports at xc & n 48 (cited in note 80). In addition, in 1588, he was
indicted for counseling a Chancery suit after a judgment at law. See Baker, The Legal Profession and the
Common Law at 216 (cited in note 16).
111. See Cockburn, Spoils of Law in Guth and McKenna, eds, Tudor Rule and Revolution at 336-37
(cited in note 14); Prest, Rise of the Barristers at 294 (cited in note 18). Both Cockburn and Prest quote
Hawarde's Report.
112. See Cockburn, Spoils ofLaw in Guth and McKenna, eds, Tudor Rule and Revolution at 320, 335-36
(cited in note 14); Prest, Rise of the Barristers at 294 (cited in note 18). The Lord Chancellor rejected Hele's
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Although in many of these cases involving broader allegations there was no
evidence of the ultimate disposition, and in some cases the complainant failed
to prosecute the matter,"' the accused targeted in these cases were sometimes
sanctioned."4 Overall, the availability of these informal, convenient, and
investigatory proceedings may have contributed to the number of complaints
about ambidexterity, especially those involving switching sides in the same
litigation.
b. Representation Adverse to a Former Client
Although there were relatively few cases involving a lawyer acting adversely
to a former client,"5 a sufficient number existed to establish that a medieval
lawyer's duty of loyalty extended to former clients. For example, in 1292 John
of Mutford, a serjeant, "was challenged" when he began to act for the Earl of
Norfolk against John Weyland, a former client, whom he had represented in
related litigation in the King's Bench two years earlier. The Common Bench
precluded John from representing the earl and ordered him to represent his
former client instead."" In discussing this case, Paul Brand notes that "[t]he
efforts to be Master of the Rolls because Hele was a usurer, commonly took excessive fees, was "a notorious
ambidexter," was "insolent and outrageous ... offensive and intolerable," and "was a notorious and violent
drunkard." Cockburn feels that the evidence supported the charges of ambidexterity, as it was a "fairly
common" practice. See Cockburn, Spoils of Law in Guth and McKenna, eds, Tudor Rule and Revolution at
320-22. Prest thinks it "prudent to suspend judgment" on those charges in the absence of corroborating
evidence. See Prest, Rise of the Barristers at 294. Although accusations of ambidexterity prompted lawyers to
sue for defamation, there is no evidence that Hele brought such a suit as a result of these charges. In 1591,
however, he had brought a suit for defamation. See Hele v Gyddy, 72 Eng Rep 846 (1591). This case was
apparently significant in terms of pleading requirements, being the first one to plead the degree of barrister.
See Case CCLXVII, 123 Eng Rep 466, 467; Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law at 111-12
(cited in note 16).
113. The victims failed to prosecute the charges against Adam de la Rue in the 1292 Shropshire eyre and
against John Organ in the 1293 Staffordshire eyre. See Bolland, ed, Select Bills in Eyre at 3-4, 52-53 (cited
in note 57); Brand, Origins at 138-39 (cited in note 7). Moreover, there is no evidence of the disposition of
the numerous lawyers charged with ambidexterity in the 1305 Shropshire and Herefordshire trailbaston
sessions. See notes 107-09. John Organ apparently had other legal problems. See PB2, no 11 (ii (a)-(b))
(cited in note 26).
114. Richard, forester of Cheswardine, was fined in the 1307 Shropshire trailbaston after the sheriff took
him into custody. See JUST 1/746, m.2d (Shropshire Trailbaston, 1307), reprinted in PB3 (xxiii) (cited in
note 26). John Geoffrey and John of Potten, who may not have been professional lawyers, were imprisoned
until they paid a fine in the 1313-14 Eyre of Kent. See F.W. Maitland, W.V. Harcourt and W.C. Bolland,
eds, 1 Eyre of Kent, 6 & 7 Edward II, A.D. 1313-1314 (24 Selden Soc'y 1910).
115. There were five such cases. See note 68.
116. See LI MS Misc 87, f80r, reprinted in PBI, no 5 (cited in note 26); Brand, Origins at 124-25 (cited
in note 7). The underlying litigation involved a very complicated land dispute, arising out of the
misconduct of John's father, Thomas Weyland, former chief justice of the Common Bench, who was
removed in the 1289 judicial scandal. He took an oath of abjuration to leave England, making his exit
barefoot and without any covering for his head. See PB1, no 5 at comments (i), (iv) and (v) (cited in note
TheAmbidextrous Lawyer 161
serjeant's duty of loyalty subsisted beyond the original plea and obliged him
not to appear against that client in any subsequent related litigation."11 7 Other
ambidexterity cases involving former clients, like John of Mutford's case,
required the court to determine the relationship between the prior and current
litigation. In the 1299 Cambridgeshire eyre, Thomas le Moyne, an attorney,
acknowledged receiving a fee from a client, but argued that the subsequent
litigation was unrelated. The jury agreed, finding Thomas had acted against
someone else and not the former client. The court disagreed and determined
that subsequent litigation was connected since it believed it was in substance
adverse to the former client, stating "we understand this to be acting against
one and the same person [the former client].""' In extending the loyalty duty
to Thomas' former clients, the court imprisoned him pending payment of a
fine and suspended him for the remainder of the eyre. 9
In some cases it is difficult to determine whether the disloyalty is to a
current or former client as illustrated by the 1282 case involving William of
Wells,'" which may have involved duties to a former client. William's clients
claimed that they had retained him as their serjeant, but that after being paid,
"in deception of them, after he understood their counsel, he attached himself
to the opposite side without their leave, reporting their counsel to the said
opposite side."" ' William denied their allegations and claimed that he had
agreed to represent the clients in a plea for a fee to be paid at three terms.
Although he acknowledged representing them in the first term, he claimed that
the clients refused to pay him the remainder and said that they no longer
needed his services. Thus, he argued that the nonpayment justified his conduct,
in effect terminating the relationship; and he also denied representing the
clients' opponents in the matter." Although the matter was submitted to a jury
and there is no record of the resolution of the factual dispute, Paul Brand
believes that the allegations if true would have constituted deception in
26); T.F. Tout and Hilda Johnstone, State Trials of the Reign of Edward the First 1289-1293 xiii, xxix-xxx,
49-51 (Royal Historical Soc'y 1906) (Camden Soc'y, 3d series, vol 9); Paul Brand, ChiefJustice and Felon:
The Career of Thomas Weyland in Paul Brand, The Making of the Common Law 113-33 (Hambledon 1992).
117. See Brand, Origins at 125 (cited in note 7).
118. See BL MS Stowe 386, f 99v, reprinted in PB2, no 17 (cited in note 26); Brand, Origins at 130
(cited in note 7). Paul Brand's research notes have reproduced the colloquy on this matter between the
complaining client's lawyer and the defendant lawyer's counsel. The latter was, interestingly, John of
Mutford. See PB2, no 17 (cited in note 26).
119. See id. The underlying litigation was a very complex land dispute. See id at comments. In the 1300
case involving Robert of Kelsey, discussed below, the subsequent matter involved the same parties and the
same property. See note 128 and accompanying text.
120. See note 85 and accompanying text.
121. See Sayles, ed, 1 Select Cases in the Court ofKing's Bench at 67-68, 80-81 (cited in note 9).
122. See id at 80-81.
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violation of the Statute of Westminster I, chapter 29.'" Thus, he concluded
that the court recognized a loyalty norm arising out of the "serjeant-client
relationship" that obligated the lawyer not to terminate representation prior to
the conclusion of the litigation unless he was told he was no longer needed or
was not paid; and more generally, the lawyer was obligated not to represent the
client's opponents without permission if he did leave the client's service."'
Interestingly, in the cases of John of Mutford, Thomas le Moyne, and
William of Wells, the need to protect the former client's confidential
information influenced the court's extension of the duty of loyalty to former
clients. In John of Mutford's case, the court noted that John previously "was of
counsel with him [the former client] and knows all their secrets.""' Similarly,
in Thomas le Moyne's case, the court stated that "after she had shown you her
counsel you left her and took a mark from" her adversary, in concluding that
subsequent and prior litigation were connected.'26 In William of Wells' case,
the clients emphasized the disclosure of their confidences to their opponent."
In addition to challenging the relationship between the prior and
subsequent litigation, another defense that medieval lawyers asserted when
charged with disloyalty to their former clients regarded the extent of their role
in the representation. In 1300, Robert of Kelsey, a serjeant in the London
courts, brought a defamation suit against his former client, who had accused
him of ambidexterity. The client claimed that Robert knew his counsel, had
taken a fee from him for acting in a related case, and should have been acting
for him rather than against him in the present case. Although Robert
acknowledged receiving money from the client in the prior litigation, he denied
agreeing to act on the client's behalf, stating that he had acted only in
challenging the jury at the request of the client's serjeant in the matter." Since
the matter was settled, the issue regarding the extent of prior involvement
123. See Brand, Origins at 124 (cited in note 7).
124. See id. There is some ambiguity regarding the broader duty. In all likelihood, the loyalty extended
only to clients who would have been current clients but for the lawyer's improper termination of service or,
if termination were appropriate, on those matters that were related to the prior representation of the former
client.
125. See LI MS Misc 87, f80r, reprinted in PB1, no 5 (cited in note 26); Brand, Origins at 125 (cited in
note 7). In this case, Paul Brand believes that this meant the "strengths and weaknesses of his case." See id.
The original report is in Anglo-Norman, not Latin, and therefore used the words "tout leur privetez" rather
than "consilium."
126. See BL MS Stowe 386, f99v, reprinted in PB2, no 17 (cited in note 26); Brand, Origins at 130
(cited in note 7). In the 1300 case involving Robert of Kelsey, discussed below, the client alleged that
Robert knew his counsel and then acted against him. See note 129 and accompanying text.
127. See notes 85, 121-124 and accompanying text.
128. See Brand, Origins at 137-38 (cited in note 7); Calendar of City of London Letter-Book C 185-87,
reprinted in PB2, no 18 (cited in note 26). Robert was apparently involved in other misconduct as a lawyer.
See id at Comments.
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necessary to actuate the duty of loyalty to a former .client was not resolved.29 In
the 1293 Staffordshire eyre, Richard of Loges's client complained that Richard
had taken a fee from him and then acted for his opponents against him.
Richard asserted that he had taken no fee to assist the client, in effect claiming
that he had never had an attorney-client relationship with the complainant.
The jury agreed with Richard, and the court entered judgment in his favor and
fined the complainant for making a false claim.'
Finally, it is interesting to compare the remedies used in these former client
cases with those imposed in cases of classic ambidexterity. Not surprisingly,
given the contrast between the typical conduct in the two categories, the
sanctions were less severe in the former client cases although the sample is
much smaller. In John of Mutford's case, there is no evidence of any formal
sanction; the court, probably acting pursuant to its inherent power, simply
ordered him to cease representing the new client and to represent instead his
former client ("It was adjudged that he go to John").'' In Robert of Kelsey's
case, the parties settled and the client withdrew the accusations and agreed not
to repeat them.'32 In Thomas le Moyne's case, although the court imposed
formal discipline, the fine and brief suspension were less than those authorized
by the Statute of Westminster I, chapter 29 and those imposed in most side
switching cases.133 Paul Brand suggests that the lack of severe sanctions in these
cases was due to the newness of the norms regarding former clients."M Although
judges exercised substantial discretion in interpreting medieval statutes and
often interpreted them expansively, 3' the reluctance to impose significant
sanctions in these cases may suggest that the duty of loyalty to former clients
was not clearly envisioned by the Statute of Westminster I, chapter 29 and the
London Ordinance of 1280.'
129. See Brand, Origins at 138 (cited in note 7); Brand also notes that this case extended the duty of
loyalty toward former clients to the London courts. See id.
130. See Bolland, ed, Select Bills in Eyre at xliv, 59-60 (cited in note 57).
131. See LI MS Misc 87, f80r, reprinted in PB1, no 5 (cited in note 26); Brand, Origins at 125 (cited in
note 7).
132. See Brand, Origins at 138 (cited in note 7).
133. See note 39 and accompanying text
134. See Brand, Origins at 125, 130 (cited in note 7).
135. See Rose, LegalProfession in Medieval England, 48 Syracuse L Rev at 47-48 (cited in note 23).
136. Such a conclusion would mean that the prohibition in the London Ordinance of 1280 on "leaving
his client and leaguing himself with the other party" was probably directed at switching sides in the same
case and not representation adverse to a former client. The Ordinance did, however, have another
prohibition on taking "pay from both parties in any action." See notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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c. Representation Adverse to a Current Client
in Different Litigation
Cases in which a lawyer engaged in representation adverse to a current
client in different litigation comprised the second most numerous category of
medieval conflict of interest cases, constituting about twenty-five per cent of
the total and numbering slightly more than half as many as those involving
switching sides in the same litigation.'37 In the basic fact pattern, a lawyer sued
a client to collect fee arrearages pursuant to a retainer agreement with the
client, and the client argued that the failure to pay was justified by the lawyer's
representation of parties adverse to the client. Usually, the lawyer was a serjeant
and the retainer a lifetime annuity with annual payments, evidenced by a
written deed.'38
These cases did not involve the imposition of formal discipline as did the
cases discussed above. Thus, the medieval norms in these cases do not include a
regulatory prohibition in the sense that a lawyer could be imprisoned, fined, or
disbarred for such conduct by the court pursuant to statutory or judicial
authority. Nonetheless, some kind of loyalty norm existed with respect to
lawyers who entered these retainers. In general, these fee arrearage cases implied
that a lawyer forfeited his right to the retainer by suing a client, who had
entered such an arrangement with the lawyer, in cases both unrelated to the
current representation of the client as well as adversity in a particular case
where the client requested representation. This notion would represent a
loyalty norm although more limited than the prohibition on classic
ambidexterity.
A few cases will suffice to illustrate these general principles. In 1291, Alan
Osemund, whom Robert de Say had retained for Alan's life for the annual fee
of a robe worth twenty shillings, sued for two years of arrearages. Robert
acknowledged that the written retainer was his deed, but justified his refusal to
pay on the ground that when Robert was sued in the earl of Oxford's court
"Alan acted against Robert with his opponent and pleaded against him both
137. There were 18 cases. In modern parlance such a conflict of interest is often denominated adversity
to a current client on an unrelated matter. See note 68.
138. During this period, contracts between a serjeant and his client were enforceable and there was no
bar to a serjeant's suit for his fees. It was not until 1629 that the law prohibited a barrister, unlike an
attorney, from suing for fees. See 2 Holdsworth, History of English Law at 491 (cited in note 16); 6 id at
440. In tracing this history, one writer sees the change as a substitution of a principle of Roman law and
attributed the rationale to "a compound of undue deference to Davys and Blackstone, the high prestige of
the civil law, a desire to add distinction to the Bar, and public interest, and is an important illustration of
judge-made law in England." See Ronald Roxburgh, Rondel v. Worsley: The Historical Background, 84 L
Quarterly Rev 178, 184 (1968).
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there and elsewhere giving advice and assistance to his opponents."' 3 Similarly,
in 1297, John fitzNeal sued the abbot of Bruern for six years arrearages and the
abbot, although admitting the validity of the deed, denied liability, alleging
that John had "acted ... against him in a plea of trespass."'40 Again in 1297,
William Pakeman, who had sued numerous clients for arrearages, sued Ellis for
arrearages; and the latter, acknowledging the deed, defended himself on the
ground that although he asked William to defend him in a trespass case,
"William left the counsel of Ellis and joined the side of his opponent John and
pleaded with John against him in the same plea." 4'
In all of these cases and in other similar cases,' 2 the plaintiff-lawyer denied
the client's allegations, which the latter offered to prove; and both parties asked
for a jury, which the court usually ordered the sheriff to impanel. Thus, there is
no evidence of the ultimate disposition in many of these cases, although in
some of them the lawyer was successful in collecting a fee from the client.' It
139. See CP 40/100, m 98d (Easter Term 1293), reprinted in PB3 (xii) (cited in note 26). Alan
Osemund was apparently a figure of some notoriety. He was one of the accusers in the 1289 judicial
scandal, a party to extensive litigation both as a plaintiff and as a defendant, and involved in a 1292 murder.
In the murder case, the victim's wife, who had appealed Alan, complained that he had escaped from custody
and was seen "hearing his mass... as if he were someone accused of no crime" and "rambling and wandering
about the streets, squares and inns of London without irons...." His custodians were punished for their lax
behavior despite their explanation that Alan "was not able to walk properly with irons." Alan was
imprisoned, dying there before the jury determined his guilt. See PB3 (xii) at Comment (cited in note 26);
G.O. Sayles, ed, 2 Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench under Edward 1149-51, 169-70. Paul Brand has
compiled extensive information on Alan's life and career as a professional serjeant in the local courts and as
a steward for local landowners. See e-mail from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose (July 28, 1998) (on file with
author).
140. See CP 40/118, m 59d (Trinity Term 1297), reprinted in PB3 (xvii) (cited in note 26).
141. See LI MS Hale 188, f 13v, reprinted in PB2, no 15 (cited in note 26); Palmer, County Courts of
Medieval England at 95 (cited in note 16). Paul Brand's notes contain some of the argument before the
court. John of Mutford represented William. See PB2, no 15 (cited in note 26). In a somewhat different
conflict of interest context, in 1279, William of Watergate justified his refusal to pay the fee of his attorney,
Henry de Burne, on the grounds that Henry had revealed his counsel to his adversary, had failed to assist
William, and refused to appear on loveday, when William settled the land dispute with his adversary. See
JUST 1/915, m.39 (Sussex Eyre 1279), reprinted in PB3 (iii) (cited in note 26).
142. Very similar cases included Stephen Angot's 1299 arrearage suit against the prior of Broomhill-see
CP 40/129, m 120 (Norfolk), reprinted in PB2, no 16 (cited in note 26); Palmer, County Courts ofMedieval
England at 95-96 (cited in note 16)-the 1302 arrearage suit brought by John de la Chapele's executors
against the abbot of Shap-see CP 40/143, m 113 (Trinity Term 1302), reprinted in PB2, no 19 (cited in
note 26); Palmer, County Courts ofMedievalEngland at 96 (cited in note 16)-and John of Finchingfeld's
1316 arrearage suit agains the vicar of Finchingfeld-see CP 40/179, m 549 (Essex), reprinted in PB2, no
27 (cited in note 26); Palmer, County Courts of Medieval England at 96 (cited in note 16). It is interesting
that in these arrearage cases, the plaintiff-lawyer normally used another lawyer to pursue the claim and did
not aet pro se.
143. See, for example, Adam of Kersey's 1303 suit against Lucy, widow of Thomas of Lewknor, JUST
111328, m.2d (Oxford Assize 1303), reprinted in PB3 (xxi) (cited in note 26); Simon of Kinsham's 1297
suit against William Andrew, CP 40/118, m 34 (Easter Term 1297), reprinted in PB3 (xvi) (cited in note
26); Hugh of Lowther's 1294 suit against three clients, CP 40/104, m 102d (Easter Term 1294), reprinted
in PB3 (xiv) (cited in note 26); Robert del Duffhuss's 1291 suit against William Deneys, CP 40/90, m 107,
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should be noted, however, that when lawyers were unsuccessful they risked
being amerced (fined) for bringing a false claim. '
These retainer arrearage cases indicate that a lawyer who appeared for the
opponent of the client was no longer entitled to the annual payment under the
annuity. Consequently, the retainers established a duty of loyalty to appear
when requested and not to engage in representation adverse to the client even if
the client had not requested representation in the matter, i.e. adversity in an
unrelated matter or in different litigation.' Robert Palmer suggests that the
loyalty ethic embodied in these annuities was derived from the grant for knight
service and was associated with the lifetime annuities and annual payments
used in that context.'46 The use of the word "lord" in the retainer to describe
the lawyer's client supports that conclusion.' 7
Although the duty of loyalty in these cases was probably most often
implicit, the annuities occasionally contained explicit language on this matter.
Such was the case with Robert of Leicester, a counsellor, who promised in the
late thirteenth century "not to give counsel to any of William's [his client]
adversaries" and to indemnify his client "if William should be undefended in
any matter through his [i.e., Robert's] failure or neglect.' 48 Moreover, the
reprinted in PB I, no 4 (cited in note 26). See Palmer, County Courts of Medieval England at 95 (cited in
note 16); Palmer, Origins ofthe Legal Profession, 11 Irish Jurist at 129 (cited in note 16).
144. The court amerced Robert de Duffhus in his 1291 arrearage suit against Maud de Merk because the
jury found that he failed to defend her pursuant to the retainer in eyre proceedings against her for the death
of a man. See CP 40/90, m 107, reprinted in PB1, no 4 (cited in note 26). Although Adam of Kersey was
successful in his 1303 arrearage suit against his client, he was amerced for filing a false claim against a co-
defendant. The court also fined the losing client and another co-defendant. See JUST 1/1328, m.2d
(Oxford Assize 1303), reprinted in PB3 (xxi) (cited in note 26). In Hugh of Lowther's 1294 suit against
three clients (see note 142), all three clients were amerced for their "unjust detention" of Hugh's fees. See
CP 40/104, m 102d (Easter Term 1294), reprinted in PB3 (xiv) (cited in note 26).
145. In some of the cases, it is difficult to know whether the lawyer had simply refused to appear, had
appeared for the opponent and refused to appear for the client pursuant to the annuity, or had actually
undertaken to represent the client and then switched to the representation of the opponent. Thus, some of
the cases may have involved adversity in the same, not an unrelated, matter, or in both the same case and an
unrelated matter. See, for example, John FitzNeal's case (note 139 and accompanying text) and John of
Finchingfeld's case (note 141).
146. See Palmer, County Courts of Medieval England at 94-95 (cited in note 16).
147. Brundage is "not persuaded." He notes that "dominus is used with a wide range of meanings in
different contexts." He believes that in this context lord does not imply any feudal relationship. See letter
from James Brundage to Jonathan Rose (July 14, 1999) (cited in note 46).
148. See Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law at 104 (cited in note 16). Robert was ajuris
professor (a practicing lawyer) and Baker identified him as a royal clerk and keeper of the rolls of the Surrey
Eyre. See id at 104 & n 31. Brand thinks it highly likely that Robert is a canon, not common, lawyer. See
Letter from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose (November 16, 1999) (on file with the author). Baker discusses
the formal and parol retainers used with counsellors. See id at 102-08. Brand has a detailed discussion of the
methods of retaining attorneys and serjeants. See Brand, Origins at 91-94, 100-05 (cited in note 7). This
duty of loyalty extended only to those clients that could be considered current, not former, clients of the
serjeant. See note 124.
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retainer might detail further the specifics of this duty of loyalty. Some of the
retainers explicitly created exceptions to this loyalty duty with respect to prior
existing clients. For example, John de Lisle's 1278 bond with William of
Swinburne stated that John would faithfully represent William "with advice
and assistance to the best of my ability ... against all men in the world other
than my chief lords to whom I am held in just the same way as to William and
his heirs and to whom I was obliged before the making of this deed."'49 Similar
language was contained in the 1278 deeds of Gilbert of Thornton and William
of Kelloe."5 Moreover, in 1307, the Gloucester jurors acquitted William of
Goldington of charges that he had acted against clients, whom he had agreed to
counsel "whenever necessary," since the agreement "excepted the clients who
were already retaining him for a regular fee and that he had long been in the
service of John [the pre-existing client and complainants' opponent], receiving
a fee from him.''
Thus, in general, this loyalty norm arose contractually and consensually
and not by regulatory fiat. However, discipline was not completely out of the
question and apparently could be imposed in particularly egregious cases. For
example, in 1340, Ralph of Buslingthorpe paid Walter of Golias to be counsel
in an undesignated matter although there was no evidence of the typical
annuity. Nevertheless, Walter, in unrelated matter, "procured Cecily . . . to
falsely and maliciously appeal Ralph of the death of her late husband John and
took half a mark from her and for fear that she would appeal him of the said
death Ralph made an agreement to pay her four pounds and sixteen shillings to
149. See PB1, no 1 (cited in note 26); Brand, Originsat 101-02 (cited in note 7); Paul Brand, ed, 2 The
Earliest English Law Reports lxxviii, cxxxvi (112 Selden Soc'y 1996); Michael Jones and Simon Walker, eds,
Private Indentures for Life Service in Peace and War 1278-1476 in Camden Miscellany XXXI1 36 (Camden
Soc'y, ser 5, vol 3) (Royal Historical Soc'y 1994). Paul Brand concludes that John's bond was "quite dearly"
a retainer for a serjeant's services. See PB1, no 1 (cited in note 26). Other scholars suggest that it was a
military retainer. See, for example, J.M.W. Bean, From Lord to Patron: Lordship in Late Medieval England 42
(Pennsylvania 1989).
150. See Brand, Origins at 101-02 (cited in note 7); Brand, 2 Earliest English Law Reports at cviii-cxvii
(cited in note 147). Paul Brand believes that these exceptions made explicit what was implicit in these
retainers. See Brand, Origins at 124 (cited in note 7); e-mail from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose (June 25,
1998) (on file with author). Some of the retainers appear to have had geographical limitations as well. Both
John of Lisle and William Kelloe's deeds stated that they would give advice and assistance "wherever I may
be or can reach when I am forewarned." See id.
151. See JUST 11287, m.4d (1307), reprinted in PB3 (xxii) (cited in note 26). The men of Gloucester
retained William 'to be of counsel to them and the whole community of Gloucester ... in all pleas before
them against all others and also to seek and claim the franchise of the town whenever necessary." The clients
charged that "after William knew the counsel of the community of the said town in a plea between John de
Ferrars and the men of the town he revealed their counsel and acted for John in the said plea against the said
men; and also failed to daim their franchise.., and refused to claim it to the loss and deception of the whole
community of that town." See id.
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have peace and paid this and thus Walter received money from both parties.' 5 2
Walter was indicted and fined.'53 The conduct and procedural context of this
case, however, are quite different from the conduct and procedural context of
the typical arrearage cases that are discussed above.
One final matter regarding this category of medieval conflict of interest
cases requires further comment. It is possible that the crown's legal
representatives, particularly the king's serjeants, were held to a more
demanding duty of loyalty than were ordinary lawyers.'" Although the crown's
lawyers were not precluded from engaging simultaneously in private practice,' 5
they may have been precluded from appearing against the crown at all and
denied the right available to private lawyers to except prior existing clients from
the duty of loyalty. Sayles suggests that initially private representation by the
king's serjeants that conflicted with their royal obligations "did not offend the
contemporary standard of official rectitude."' However, this potential conflict
prompted Britton to call for an investigation into the matter.'57 Moreover,
Sayles suggests that the king's intent in paying his serjeants an annual fee,
despite its inadequacy, was "to prevent them from speaking against him."'
Blackstone implies that salaried and sworn legal representatives of the crown, in
152. See JUST 1/691, m.5d (Nottingham indictments 1340), reprinted in PB3 (xxiv) (cited in note 26).
153. See id.
154. The emergence and development of the crown's legal representatives and the formal positions of
attorney-general and solicitor-general have been the subject of substantial scholarship. See, for example,
Holdsworth, 6 History of English Law at 458-81 (cited in note 16); J.LI.J. Edwards, The Law Offcers of the
Crown (Sweet & Maxwell 1964); Sayles, ed, 5 Select Cases in the Court ofKing's Bench at xxx-li (cited in note
57); Sayles, ed, 6 Select Cases in the Court of King' Bench at xxviii-xxxv (cited in note 109). The King's
Bench cases published by the Selden Society contain Sayles's early work, on which many other scholars rely
for the emergence of these lawyers in the medieval period. Holdsworth says that as these positions
developed, the crown's legal representatives were subject to different rules than ordinary lawyers and not
subject to the court's discipline like the latter. See Holdsworth, 6 History of English Law at 468 (cited in
note 16).
155. The evidence more clearly supports private practice by the king's serjeants than by his attorneys. See
Brand, Origins at 64-65, 103-04 (cited in note 7); Edwards, Law Officers of the Crown at 4, 24 (cited in note
152); Sayles, ed, 6 Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench at xxx (cited in note 109); Sayles, ed, 5 Select
Cases in the Court of King's Bench at I-li (cited in note 57). On the other hand, Baker suggests that
appointment as a king's serjeant resulted in a restriction on private practice. See Baker, Order ofSerieants at
Law at 35-36 (cited in note 16). He is not talking about legal restriction, but a practical one, since the
king's serjeant had a chief demanding client. See Letter from John Baker to Jonathan Rose (February 15,
2000) (on file with the author).
156. See Sayles, ed, 5 Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench at I (cited in note 57).
157. See F.M. Nichols, ed and trans, 1 Britton *37 (Byrne 1901). Britton was written "about 1290" and
is characterized as an "epitome" (summary) of Bracton, although it contains additional material. At one
time, it was thought to have been written by John le Breton, Bishop of Hereford. That view has been largely
rejected, and the author may have been a royal law clerk. It purports to be written under royal authority and
was written as if the king were speaking. See Winfield, ChiefSources ofEnglish Legal History at 263-64 (cited
in note 25).
158. See Sayles, ed, 5 Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench at li (cited in note 57).
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contrast with distinguished barristers who were only granted patents of
precedence, could not be "retained in causes against the crown."'59 More
recently, Baker has stated that the king's "counsel," which may have included
his serjeants and attorneys, were not permitted to appear against the crown.'"
Some later cases seem to support a stricter rule for the king's serjeants and
attorneys. A 1513 case determined that it was defamatory to accuse a king's
serjeant of taking retainers against the crown.'6' In 1540, the Star Chamber
imprisoned and fined a king's serjeant and imprisoned a king's attorney for
"not regarding their oaths and duties, that they ought to have borne to our said
sovereign lord . . . [giving] their advice and counsel" to a knight on how to
avoid paying revenue."6 In addition, a 1682 case also seems to articulate this
prohibition and may have disqualified the king's counsel from arguing against
the king. 3 On the other hand, the annuity of Gilbert Thornton, a king's
serjeant, discussed above, not only excepted prior existing private clients, but
"the faith and service of the king and his heirs,"'" which would have been
159. See William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland*28 (1765).
160. See Baker, Introduction at 188 (cited in note 16); Baker, Order of Sereants at Law at 61-62 & n 7
(cited in note 16). Brand has concluded that no such procedure existed for "king's counsel" taken in the
broader sense, the legal representatives of the crown such as the king's serjeants and attorneys. See e-mail
from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose (June 25, 1998) (cited in note 148). On the other hand, in support of
his conclusion, Baker also referrs to several instances applying the prohibition to the king's serjeants. See
Baker, Order ofSedeants at Law at 61-62 n 7 (cited in note 16). Baker, however, refers to a later period than
Brand does. With reference to the earlier period, he is not aware of any formal prohibition un appearances
by king's counsel against the crown; he thinks that such action would be strange given the counsel's oath to
serve the king. See Baker February 15, 2000 letter, supra note 153.
161. See Elyot v Tofie, KB 27/1006, m 62 (Hilary Term 1513). Baker cites this case in support of his
conclusion. See Baker, Introduction at 499, n 18 (cited in note 16); Baker, Order of Serleants at Law at 61 n
7 (cited in note 16).
162. See In re Sir Humfrey Browne in Baker, ed, 2 Spelman's Reports at 351-52 (cited in note 80).
Although the court characterized the conduct as defrauding the king "by craft and collusion" and contrary
to the laws prohibiting 'frauds and collusions" (see id at 351), Professor Baker states that the advice
involved "a perfectly legal method of avoiding revenue." See Baker, Order of Serjeants at Law at 61 n 7
(cited in note 16). In the notorious case involving the king's senior serjeant, SirJohn Hele (see notes 110-12
and accompanying text), one focus of the legal and political attack on him was that his action in obtaining
land to satisfy a debt defrauded the crown out of land that otherwise would have escheated to it. See
Cockburn, Spoils of Law in Guth and McKenna, Tudor Rule and Revolution at 312, 324-37 (cited in note
14); Prest, Rise of the Barristers at 294 (cited in note 18).
163. See Smith v Wheeler, 1 Modern Reports 38-39 (Case 90) (Hilary Term 1670). The court's approach
is deferential, 'you would do well to be advised, whether or no you, being of the king's counsel, ought to
argue in this case against the king?" and suggestive, "if my lord thinks it not proper, [the lawyer] may give
his argument to some gentleman at the bar to deliver it for him." Baker, however, cites it for the proposition
that a king's serjeant was prohibited from appearing against the crown. See Baker, Order ofSerjeants at Law
at 61-62 n 7 (cited in note 16).
164. See Brand, Origins at 101-02 (cited in note 7); Baker, ed, 2 Earliest English Law Reports at cxvi
(cited in note 147). See also note 148 and accompanying text.
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unnecessary if such lawyers were formally prohibited from appearing against
the king.'
Thus, a somewhat mixed picture emerges on this issue. However, two
conclusions might be drawn. First, it seems that initially there was no formal
prohibition on the crown's legal representatives appearing adverse to the crown
although it was a matter of concern. But over time a loyalty norm emerged
restricting such conduct as a matter of law or at least as a professional
convention." Second, at a minimum the crown was entitled to a priority at all
times on the service of its legal representatives, which would preclude them
from excepting prior existing clients as medieval lawyers did in the annuities
and deeds with private clients.'" Moreover, the volume of the crown's work,
especially in the case of the king's attorneys, probably practically limited their
ability to undertake other work.'68 Finally, political sensitivity and prudence
would have probably discouraged the crown's lawyers from appearing against
it, especially as these positions became more formal and lucrative.
d. Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Parties
Medieval norms apparently did not treat simultaneous representation of
multiple parties as a conflict of interest. Although it was probably a fairly
common practice,"9 in none of the identified cases did the court or the clients
charge the lawyers with ambidexterity or related misconduct. These cases cover
165. Paul Brand finds this reservation by Gilbert in favor of the king "difficult to interpret." He
suggested that perhaps it made clear that the king was entitled to priority if the king wanted Gilbert to act
in one geographical area at the same time as his private client wanted him to act in a different place. See e-
mail from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose (June 25, 1998) (cited in note 148).
166. Brundage believes that such a notion may have its roots in the Roman doctrine about "treasury
counsel" (advocatifisci). See letter from Paul Brundage to Jonathan Rose (July 14, 1999) (cited in note 46).
A leading treatise on the crown's law officers makes no mention of any formal restriction during the
medieval period as these types of lawyers emerged. See Edwards, Law Officers of the Crown at 12-31 (cited in
note 152). Interestingly, this issue seems not to have received any treatment in this work. See id. Paul Brand
suggests that the absence of any formal prohibition may be due to the fact hat there was usually only one
serjeant in any one court durin this period and, therefore, any litigation brought on behalf of the king
would have to be instituted by the serjeant. See letter from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose (November 16,
1999) (on file with the author).
167. See e-mail from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose (June 25, 1998) (cited in note 148); notes 147-49 and
accompanying text.
168. See Edwards, Law Officers of the Crown at 18-19, 24 (cited in note 152); Sayles, ed, 5 Select Cases in
the Court of King's Bench at xlix-li (cited in note 57).
169. Although there was no systematic way to discover such instances, sufficient cases were identified in
the process of looking for cases in other categories to suggest that it was a fairly common practice. My
research turned up eleven cases of simultaneous representation of multiple parties. See note 68. Paul Brand
states that simultaneous representation of multiple parties was "a very common practice" in the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries and may have been "the norm." See Brand November 16, 1999 letter, supra note
146.
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a variety of fact patterns. Several cases involved simultaneous representation of
plaintiffs. The 1282 case involving William Wells"0 involved simultaneous
representation of five plaintiffs, perhaps many of the men of the manor of
South Petherton, who sued the lord of the manor for demanding excessive
"customs and other services."' 7 ' In 1340, Thomas of Knaresborough
represented two knights in their claim for expenses in attending parliament."n
In the same year, four co-heirs retained Walter Golias to sue an assize of novel
disseisin.'73 In 1470, one attorney represented several plaintiffs who sued a jailer
for allowing a judgment debtor to escape. 4 Other cases involved multiple
representation of defendants. In 1292, the King's Bench indicated it was
inappropriate for one man to speak on behalf of multiple defendants unless he
were their attorney.Y In 1330, John and Thomas of Wilton acted as attorneys
for several officials, charged by the plaintiff with releasing the defendant from
custody in return for payments by the latter, thus delaying the plaintiffs suit.'
Two of these cases are particularly significant as they have criminal overtones.
In 1330, Edmund of Cambridge and William of Woodford represented a large
number of defendants, who were sued for an assault that wounded the plaintiff,
and who were also fined by the court for their "default.""7 The attorneys said
that they were "attorney[s] for everyone" except one person.7 8 In 1524,
Thomas Turpyn represented three defendants charged with maintenance.'79
William of Goldingham's successful defense of the 1305 ambidexterity charges
involved an interesting case of multiple representation. William's clients
included not only several named individuals, but "the whole community of
Gloucester," whom he agreed to represent in all pleas, presumably both as
170. See notes 85, 121-24 and accompanying text. To the extent that William represented numerous
men of the city and they seemed to have a common grievance against the lord of the manor, this litigation
may be an example of medieval group litigation, a forerunner of the modern class action. See note 178.
171. See Sayles, ed, 1 Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench at 67-68, 80-81 (cited in note 9).
172. See Sayles, ed, 5 Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench at 89-90 (cited in note 57).
173. See note 73. An assize of novel disseisin was used to recover land, of which a party had been unjustly
dispossessed. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 70, 267, 270-71 (cited in note 16); Black's Law
Dictionary 121 (West 6th ed 1990).
174. See Ely v Chertesey in N. Neilsen, ed, Year Books ofEdward IV- 10 Edward lVand 49 Henry VI: A.D.
1470 92-95 (47 Selden Soc'y 1931).
175. See Sayles, ed, 2 Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench at xlviii-xlix, cxx (cited in note 57).
176. See Sayles, ed, 5 Select Cases in the Court ofKing's Bench at 81-83 (cited in note 57).
177. See id at 45-47.
178. Id at 47. In fact, the attorneys lacked a warrant of attorney for another defendant, and the court
imprisoned them for acting as an attorney without a warrant. See id.
179. See Roos v Hurleston in Baker, ed, 2 Spelman's Reports at 342-44 (cited in note 80).
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plaintiffs and defendants, as well as undertaking the duty "to seek and claim
the franchise of the town whenever necessary. '
In none of these cases was there any indication of any ambidexterity
problem because of the potential conflicts that might occur in simultaneously
representing multiple parties. Undoubtedly problems might arise, especially in
the cases with criminal overtones. Moreover, in a 1339 case, no charges of
ambidexterity arose even though the attorney made incompatible pleas for two
defendants, which troubled the court: "That would be for a man to give
himself the lie. '' 81
Only one case, which involved a different factual pattern, suggested that
multiple representation might involve a conflict of interest. In the 1293
Shropshire eyre, Abbot Thomas, the warrantor of defendants in land litigation
selected his counsel, Matthew of Villiers, to defend them. Although the
defendants "in his counsel ... did put their whole trust, being folk that knew
naught of the law," the counsel took "a bad exception" to release the Abbot
from his warranty and liability. The defendants were dispossessed and lost their
right of action as result of "this wrong ... done by collusion."' 2 The warranty
process by which the defendant asked another to come and defend the suit
made these parties in effect co-defendants,'" but the warrantor's adverse
180. See note 139. The named individuals "and other men of Gloucester" retained William to undertake
these duties. The nature of this litigation is interesting. Although it would appear from the language that
William represented the named individuals personally (see JUST 1/287, m.4d, reprinted in PB3 (xxii) (cited
in note 26)), it may be an instance of his representation of a group. Stephen Yeazell has studied medieval
group litigation as a historical antecedent of the modern class action. He has viewed this medieval group
litigation in terms of medieval societal organization and social, economic, religious and community groups.
See Stephen Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action 23-71 (Yale 1987). He then
puts this group litigation in the context of medieval political theory and the influence of changing context
on its persistence and validation. See id at 72-131. This Gloucester litigation, both in terms of description
of the plaintiffs and the nature of their desire for William to "claim the franchise of the town," resembles
some of the examples that Yeazell discusses. See id at 37-68.
181. See Year Book for 11-12 Edward III (Easter Term 1338), reprinted in Luke Pike, ed, 1 Rolls Series
436 (Stationery Office 1883) (reprint, Kraus 1964). The attorney appeared for one tenant, claiming the
entirety and also as guardian for another tenant, also claiming the entirety. Although the facts are a bit
unclear, the court seemed to treat the matter as one attorney appearing for two parties. The attorney
responded to the court's concern by stating, "Not so; he pleads in the names of two persons." Id. The
attorney was apparently "among the most skillful counsel of his day." See Year Book for 12-13 Edward III
(1338), reprinted in Luke Pike, ed, 2 Rolls Series cxxvii (Stationery Office 1885) (reprint, Kraus 1964). In
another matter, the court, however, said that appearing as an attorney and guardian was different. Id at 344,
no 31.
182. See Bolland, ed, Select Bills in Eyre at 68-69 (cited in note 57).
183. In this case, the obligation of Abbot Thomas to warrant the defendants arose when the Abbot's
predecessor sold the land to the father of one of the defendants. The record indicated that it was "the
custom of the town," of Abbots Bromley for the Abbot and Convent to warrant the title of the purchaser
and his heirs and assigns with respect to land enrolled in their rolls. In such a case, they "are bound to
warranty as effectively as by a charter." See id at 68.
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interest is more evident than in the typical multiple representation cases
discussed above. Although there is no indication of the ultimate disposition of
this complaint, it seems likely that, if true, a remedy would have been
appropriate for the complainants.' Bolland stated that the complaint proved
"the foolishness of the man who puts his trust in the advice of one who has
clients of much greater importance to him; clients whose interests are opposed
to the interests of the smaller one."'85 However, in general, medieval loyalty
norms did not treat simultaneous representation of multiple parties as a form
of ambidexterity. In all likelihood, this benign treatment was because the
parties were not formally adverse and because the conflict of interest was only
potential, not actual.
e. Consent
The medieval loyalty norms that emerged from the cases in the prior four
categories require some discussion of the notion of consent to determine what
role it played, if any, in the medieval law of lawyering. None of the cases deal
with consent explicitly. Examining the various categories suggests that perhaps
a consent principle was operating implicitly. The clearest examples are the cases
involving adversity to a current client in different litigation, the retainer
arrearage cases. First, in these cases, as noted earlier, a voluntary, consensual
agreement was the source of the loyalty norm. Moreover, in some cases the
retainer explicitly authorized adversity in the representation of pre-existing
clients, to whom the lawyer was already bound by an earlier retainer. This
explicit exception is the strongest evidence of a medieval consent principle. In
the other retainer cases, consent likely operated by virtue of the parties'
understanding of an implicit exception."8 One might also find consent
operating implicitly in the multiple representation cases and adversity to
former client cases. In the former group, the knowing retention of one attorney
to represent multiple parties could be understood as consent to the potential
conflict that might arise. Similarly, failure to object in the former client cases
might be seen as implicit consent.
One might suggest also that there was an implicit category of
nonconsentable conflicts, the cases involving switching sides in the same
litigation. Any concept of consent seems quite inconsistent for conduct for
184. The eyre record simply concluded "Endorsements" and "Finished." See Bolland, ed, Select Bills in
Eyre at xxi, xxv-xxx (cited in note 57). Bolland could find no further records and said that he "must leave
the story unfinished." Id at xlv.
185. Id at xliv-xlv.
186. See note 148.
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which lawyers were imprisoned, suspended, disbarred or fined. Similarly,
consent seems inappropriate to the extent that the Statute of Westminster I,
chapter 29 and the London Ordinance of 1280 prohibited ambidexterity. A
1702 case noting a category of nonconsentable conflicts seems to be the first
explicit reference to consent. The court stated, "No man, though by consent of
the parties, can be attorney on both sides."
87
Even if there were an implicit consent principle in operation, it was a quite
limited one. Client agreement or failure to object are the basis of all the above
suggestions. In none of these cases is there any suggestion that medieval norms
imposed any duty on the lawyer to explain anything to the client to insure a
true, knowing consent to the possible conflicts of interest. Thus, consent
played a very limited role in the medieval law of lawyering."'
f. Conflict Between the Client's Interest
and the Lawyer's Personal Interest
Although there appear to be relatively few cases involving this type of
conflict of interest, a sufficient number exist to suggest that these problems
arose from time to time. 8' Moreover, some of these cases suggest that such a
conflict violated medieval loyalty norms although the evidence for this is
mixed.
Several mid-fifteenth century cases involved misuse of the client's
confidential information for the lawyer's personal benefit. William Jenny's
client complained in Chancery that Jenny, a serjeant, promised that he would
assist the client in obtaining land that the client had already bought and
substantially paid for, but instead, without the client's knowledge, acquired the
land himself.'" The client said that the lawyer's conduct caused "great sorrow
that we should be so untruly done to; and it doth us most evil where as we put
all our trust, he soon hath deceived us.""' Similar accusations of personal
profiting from knowledge of a client's affairs were made in Chancery against
187. See Anonymous (Case 64), 7 Modern Reports 47 (King's Bench, Trinity Term 1702). In 1815, the
Lord Chancellor seemed to recognize that some conflicts were nonconsentable. See Cholmondeley v Clinton,
34 Eng Rep 515, 520 (Chancery 1815).
188. Nor was it a major issue in canon law. See e-mail from James Brundage to Jonathan Rose (June 1,
1999) (cited in note 62).
189. Five cases were found. See note 68.
190. See Ives, Common Lawyers ofPre-Reformation England at 314-15, 467 (cited in note 16).
191. Id. The complaint was apparently recounted in a letter to John Paston, a lawyer and member of a
famous family (see note 193), perhaps seeking his help in mediating the dispute. Although there is no
evidence as to the success of such efforts, one might be dubious as Jenny was "engaged in unceasing
litigation with the Pastons." See Neilsen, ed, Year Book 10 Edw IV&49 Hen VIat xix (cited in note 172).
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lawyers John Tunstead and Edmund Hasilwode.'9" A 1305 complaint against
Walter, son of Reginald Plash of Egerton, accused him of several types of
misconduct including conspiracy, which may have involved a conflict between
the complainant's (Alice) interest and Walter's personal interest as Walter
ended up owning the land that Alice sought in litigation against her sister.
Alice alleged that Walter supported the sister-defendant's plea in the matter
and that while the plea was pending "enfeoffed" himself and sold the land in
separate parcels to several others, depriving Alice of her right to the land.'93
Although the outcome in these cases is not known, they suggest that discipline
or some other remedy would be appropriate if the allegations of misuse of the
information were proved.
On the other hand, perhaps the best known instance of conflict with a
lawyer's personal interest may point in the opposite direction. This matter
involved the notorious dispute over the 1459 will of Sir John Fastolf, a
prominent knight."M John Paston, a barrister and member of a famous family,'95
192. See Ives, Common Lawyers ofPre-Refrrmation England at 314, 315 n 38 (cited in note 16).
193. See JUST 1/744 (Shropshire Trailbaston 1305), reprinted in PB2, no 20 (cited in note 26).
Although Walter was a professional lawyer, it is unclear whether he was acting as such for Alice in this
matter, although the record contains evidence of his ambidexterity as a professional lawyer. See note 107
and accompanying text. Paul Brand believes that although Walter was a professional lawyer, he did not
benefit personally from the transaction and was only "a conduit" to transfer land to others to make it more
difficult for Alice to recover the land from her sister. See e-mail from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose
(September 16, 1998) (on file with author).
194. See Birks, Gentlemen of the Law at 60-61 (cited in note 16); Ives, Common Lawyers of Pre-
Reformation England at 315 (cited in note 16). Fastolf was a friend of Henry V and fought at Agincourt. He
was a very successful businessman, whose activities involved many lawyers and much litigation. Although he
may have been a model for Shakespeare's Falstaff, he apparently in fact bore little in common with the
latter. See Birks, Gentlemen of the Law at 59-67 (cited in note 16); "John Fastolf" in Leslie Stephen and
Sidney Lee, eds, 6 Dictionary of National Biography 1099, 1103 (Smith, Elder 1908). Fastolfs activities
seemed to have created some notoriety, perhaps due especially to his involvement in controversy and
extensive litigation, on which he spent an enormous amount of money and to his possible bribery of Sir
John Fortescue, chief justice of the King's Bench. See Ives, Common Lawyers ofPre-Reformation England at
144, 299, 301, 305-06, 309-11, 318-21.
195. The Paston family letters and papers have been an important source of information for historians of
this period. See Norman Davis, ed, Paston Letters and Papers of the Fifteenth Century: Parts I-I (Clarendon
1971-76) ("Davis, Paston Letters"); James Gairdner, ed, The Paston Letters (Alan Sutton 1983) ("Gairdner,
Paston Letters"). Fifteenth century historians have written extensively about the Paston family, including
their relationship with John Fastolf and the will controversy. See, for example, Richard Barber, The Pastons:
A Family in the Wars of the Roses (Boydell 1993); Henry Bennett, The Pastons and Their England: Studies in
an Age in Transition (Cambridge 1922); Frances and Joseph Gies, A Medieval Family: The Pastons of
Fifteenth-Century England (HarperCollins 1998); E.F. Jacob, The Fifteenth Century 1399-1485 (Clarendon
1961); Colin Richmond, The Paston Family in the Fifteenth Century: The First Phase (Cambridge 1990)
("The First Phase"); Colin Richmond, The Paston Family in the Fifteenth Century: Fastolfs Will (Cambridge
1996) ("Fastolfs Wilt"). Legal historians writing about the legal profession, relying on these letters and
papers, also have referred extensively to the Paston family, which included several generations of lawyers,
including John Paston, who were well known for their lawyering activities, especially in Norfolk. See, for
example, Birks, Gentlemen of the Law at 59-67, 72, 78, 89-90 (cited in note 16); Cohen, History of the
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had served as Fastolf's lawyer for many years, ' was one of his most important
counsellors,97 and apparently had great influence over Fastolf in his latter
years."8 On November 3, 1459, two days before he died, Fastolf created a
nuncupative will, superceding his June 1459 will. Paston memorialized this
new oral will in writing, which made Paston its primary beneficiary and one of
its two chief executors."' As a result of "Paston's deathbed 'bargain' with the
old knight,"2" a substantial controversy erupted over the validity of the will and
the right to Fastolfs property. Litigation erupted on several fronts, including a
1464 suit in the Archbishop of Canterbury's Court of Audience contesting the
will's validity instituted by King's Bench Justice Yelverton, also an executor,
and the serjeant, William Jenny, the leaders of the anti-Paston forces in the
Fastolf will controversy."° Testimony was taken for several years with numerous
witnesses on each side, 2 with numerous attacks on the witnesses' credibility
English Bar at 268, 378, 472 (cited in note 16); Holdsworth, 2 History of the English Law at 501, 509-10
(cited in note 16); 6 id at 449, 451 (cited in note 16); Ives, Common Lawyers ofPre-Reformation England at
16, 21, 85, 115, 311-15, 373 (cited in note 16).
196. John Paston seems to have worked regularly as a lawyer for Sir John Fastolf. See, for example, Davis,
2 Paston Letters at 111-19, 122-24, 127-37 (cited in note 193); Barber, The Pastons at 73-74 (cited in note
193); Gies, A Medieval Family at 104-07, 112-14 (cited in note 193); Richmond, The First Phase at 225-28
(cited in note 193).
197. According to Richmond, John Paston and William Jenny were "foremost among his legal
counsellors" by 1450 and by 1455 Paston was Fastolf's "most influential councillor." See id at 231, 248.
198. See Barber, The Pastons at 73-74 (cited in note 193); Bennett, The Pastons and Their England at 9-
10 (cited in note 193); Jacob, The Fifteenth Century at 344-45 (cited in note 193); Richmond, The First
Phase at 243-49 (cited in note 193). John Paston may have been a distant relative of Fastolf. They referred
to each other and often signed their letters as "cousin," although the use of that term was not limited to
actual relatives. See Ives, Common Lawyers of Pre-Reformation England at 115 (cited in note 16); Davis, 1
Paston Letters at 88, 99 (cited in note 193); Davis, 2 Paston Letters at 118, 123, 128-29, 135, 168-69 (cited
in note 193). The relation to Fastolf may have been through Paston's wife, Margaret. See Davis, 1 Paston
Letters at lv, 38-39 (cited in note 193).
199. See Davis, 1 Paston Letters at lxiv-lxviii, 87-91 (cited in note 193); Bennett, The Pastons and Their
England at 10-14 (cited in note 193); Birks, Gentlemen of the Law at 60-61 (cited in note 16); Gairdner, 1
Paston Letters at 234-35 (cited in note 193). The Gies have summarized the provisions of the June 1459
will. See Gies, A Medieval Family at 121-23 (cited in note 193).
200. See Ives, Common Lawyers ofPre-Refrrmation England at 315 (cited in note 16). The Paston Letters
make numerous references to the "bargain" between John Paston and Fastolf. See, for example, Davis, 1
Paston Letters at 161-62, 416, 420, 424, 535, 554-59 (cited in note 193).
201. See Barber, The Pastons at 90-93 (cited in note 193); Bennett, The Pastons and Their England at 14-
17 (cited in note 193); Davis, 1 Paston Letters at xlv, Iv, 203 (cited in note 193). Richmond has the most
detailed discussion of the controversy. See Richmond, Fastolfs Will at 89-220 (cited in note 193). Both
Davis and Gairdner have provided useful summaries in their editions of the Paston Letters. See Davis, 1
Paston Letters at xliv-xlviii, liv-lv, lxviii-lxix; Gairdner, 1 Paston Letters at 195-203, 234-38 (cited in note
193).
202. Richmond has summarized the witness testimony. See Richmond, Fastols Will at 133-40 (cited in
note 193). Davis has included many of the witness declarations in his edition of the Paston Letters, and
Gairdner abstracted many of them in his edition. See Davis, 2 Paston Letters at 534-45, 542-44, 547-48,
561-69 (cited in note 193); Gairdner, 4 Paston Letters at 101-04, 154, 181-85, 236-45, 303.
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and accusations of perjury resulting from bribery of the witnesses. 3 Several
witnesses, including Paston's co-defendant and perhaps Justice Yelverton,
accused Paston of fabricating the will in order to divert Fastolf's large estates in
Norfolk and Suffolk to himself... Prominent persons-the king,2"' important
nobility including Chaucer's granddaughter, judges and lawyers,20 and religious
figures-chose sides in the dispute and it raged for years, with a compromise
finally adopted in 1470."w Although the Pastons ultimately obtained some of
203. Yelverton's witnesses alleged that the testimony of the witnesses supporting Paston was perjured or
unreliable due to Paston's efforts to bribe witnesses and to use witnesses known to be unreliable. See
Gairdner, 4 Paston Letters at 236-45 (cited in note 193); Bennett, The Pastons and Their England at 168-71
(cited in note 193); Birks, Gentlemen of the Law at 61-67 (cited in note 16); Gies, A Medieval Family at
126-29 (cited in note 193); Ives, Common Lauyers of Pre-Reformation England at 315 (cited in note 16).
Gairdner, however, cautions about giving significant weight to these allegations. See Gairdner, 1 Paston
Letters at 234 (cited in note 193). Contemporaneous observers as well as subsequent scholars have had
doubts on whether the evidence supported charges of bribery. See Gairdner, 4 Paston Letters at 245 (cited in
note 193); Richmond, Fastolfs Will at 135 (cited in note 193).
204. See Bennett, The Pastons and Their England at 15 (cited in note 193); Davis, 1 Paston Letters at 160-
63 (cited in note 193); Davis, 2 Paston Letters at 202-03 (cited in note 193); Gairdner, I Paston Letters at
234-36 (cited in note 193); Richmond, Fastolfs Will at 93, 137-40 (cited in note 193). The most famous
accusation of forgery by Paston was by his co-defendant, Thomas Howes, responding to a desire to clear his
conscience. See Davis, 2 Paston Letters at 561-70 (cited in note 193); Gairdner, 4 Paston Letters at 303 (cited
in note 193); Gies, A Medieval Family at 200-01 (cited in note 193); Richmond, Fastolfs Will at 13740
(cited in note 193). The Gies cast doubt on the veracity of Howes's charges of forgery and bribery. Gies, A
Medieval Family at 201 (cited in note 193). Only Ives specifically states that Yelverton accused Paston of
forgery. See Ives, Common Lawyers ofPre-Reformation Englandat 315 (cited in note 16). Ives points out that
Yelverton's motives were suspect as the latter resented being excluded from the will and had Thomas
Playter, a lawyer who did work for the estate, write to Paston that Yelverton "will not hurt you in your
bargain if you could be friendly to him ... for without a friendlihood on your part he seemeth that he
should not greatly help you in your bargain." Id at 287, 315. See also Davis, 1 Paston Letters at 161-62
(cited in note 193).
205. Several documents reflect Edward IV's intervention on behalf of John Paston. See, for example,
Davis, 1 Paston Letters at 14546 (cited in note 193); Davis, 2 Paston Letters at 300-02, 549-50 (cited in
note 193). Although Paston was successful in enlisting the King's support on some occasions, he was
unsuccessful on others; and he may have sufficiently antagonized Edward IV that the king had him
imprisoned for failing to present himself when ordered to do so. See Charles Ross, EdwardIV314-15, 399-
401 (California 1974). Unfortunately, Paston died before the king's proclamation clearing the Paston name
and endorsing its pedigree. See Davis, 2 Paston Letters at 549-52 (cited in note 193); Gies, A Medieval
Family at 184-85 (cited in note 193).
206. Yelverton's King's Bench colleagues, Chief Justice Fortescue and Justice John Markham sided with
the Pastons. William Jenny, a prominent serjeant and longtime adversary of the Pastons (see note 189),
supported Yelveron and was actively involved in many of the anti-Paston activities. See, for example, Gies,
A Medieval Family at 150-55 (cited in note 193); Ives, Common Lawyers of Pre-Reformation England at 315
(cited in note 16); Richmond, Fastolfs Willat 114-22 (cited in note 193). Richmond referred to Jenny as a
"parasitical" lawyer. See id at 118.
207. William Wainfleet, the Bishop of Winchester and only remaining executor, arranged the
compromise. See Davis, 1 Paston Letters at xlviii, 167-68, 419-26 (cited in note 193); Bennett, The Pastons
and Their England at 18-19 (cited in note 193); Gies, A Medieval Family at 230-31, 235-37 (cited in note
193); Gairdner, 1 Paston Letters at 258 (cited in note 193); Richmond, Fastolfs Will at 213-20 (cited in note
193). The compromise released Paston from his obligation under the original bargain to pay 4,000 marks.
See Davis, 1 Paston Letters at xlviii (cited in note 193). The Gies stated that John Paston II and William
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the more important lands, John Paston was not able to enjoy any of the
benefits as he was imprisoned three times between 1461-66... and died in
14 6 6. ' " Despite the settlement of the litigation," ' the fighting over the land
continued as it was intertwined with the War of the Roses and private
disputes.2 "
Most important, from the standpoint of legal ethics, is the fact that Paston
drafted a will for a client under which Paston was the chief beneficiary.
Interestingly, there is no evidence that Paston was disciplined for his role or
that anyone even suggested that his conduct involved a conflict of interest. "2
The accusations of forgery only would have made matters worse; the ethical
Yelverton had agreed to accept Bishop Wainfleet's "binding arbitration." See Gies, A Medieval Family at
230 (cited in note 193). In discussing the will dispute, Birks said that "the legal wrangles ... lasted as long as
the War of the Roses." See Birks, Gentlemen of the Law at 61 (cited in note 16).
208. See Davis, 1 Paston Letters at liv-lv (cited in note 193); Gairdner, 1 Paston Letters at 216-32 (cited in
note 193); Richmond, Fastolfs Will at 125 (cited in note 193). His deposition in the Canterbury Court of
Audience litigation was taken while he was in the Fleet prison. See Davis, 1 Paston Letters at 140-45 (cited
in note 193); Gairdner, 4 Paston Letters at 181-85 (cited in note 193); Gies, A Medieval Family at 175-78
(cited in note 193); Richmond, Fastolfs Will at 125-28 (cited in note 193).
209. Some have thought that the stress of the litigation and fighting over the land hastened his death.
See, for example, Davis, 1 Paston Letters at xlvi (cited in note 193); Gairdner, 1 Paston Letters at 232-33;
Richmond, Fastolfs Will at 153-54 (cited in note 193). Although Paston "made a killing from [Fastolfs]
estates, his entanglement in the affairs of Sir John Fastolf led, in his wife's view, to 'his destruction.'" See
Ives, Common Lawyers ofPre-Reformation England at 373 (cited in note 16). After he died, in discussing his
relationship with Fastolf, she told her son, "Remember it was the destruction of your father." See Davis, 1
Paston Letters at xliv, 361 (cited in note 193). Paston's wife wrote him that the Bishop of Norwich told her
that "he would not have abided the sorrow and trouble that you had abided to win all Sir John Fastolf's
goods." See id at 300.
210. Ultimately, the will was declared valid, but John Paston II agreed to abide by the Wainfleet
compromise, which deprived the Paston family of much of the benefit of the legal victory. See Davis, 1
Paston Letters at 436-37 (cited in note 193); Barber, The Pastons at 167 (cited in note 193); Richmond,
Fastolfs Will at 227 (cited in note 193). The nature of the Chancery proceeding in which John Paston
prevailed against Yelverton and Jenny is not described, nor is its relation to the Canterbury Court of
Audience proceeding. Perhaps it was related to the Chancery proceeding, which may have been initiated a
decade earlier by his father, John Paston I (see Davis, 1 Paston Letters at 98-102 (cited in note 193)), or to a
Paston suit seeking restitution for certain of his lands. See Gies, A Medieval Family at 181 (cited in note
193). Nevertheless, the context makes it clear that John Paston II will "perform and fulfill" all the terms of
his agreement with William Wainfleet despite this legal victory. See Davis, 1 Paston Letters at 437. One
beneficiary of the compromise was Magdalen College, Oxford, founded by Wainfleet.
211. See Gies, A Medieval Family at 237-310 (cited in note 193); Davis, 1 Paston Letters at xlviii-l (cited
in note 193); Gairdner, 1 Paston Letters at 259-98 (cited in note 193); Richmond, Fastolfs Will at 234-57
(cited in note 193).
212. A late nineteenth century historian states that Paston, as one of Fastolf's executors, obtained the
Caistor Castle and lands, one of the most important Fastolf properties, "by forgery and breach of trust." See
James H. Ramsay, 2 Lancaster and York: A Century of English History 345 (Clarendon 1892). The author
does not explain what he meant by "breach of trust." There is no indication that he is referring to Paston's
obligation as a lawyer, for that fact is not even mentioned. In context, it seems most likely that his statement
refers to Paston's role as Fastolf's executor. Moreover, the author cites no authority nor contemporary
documents for his statement. Others opine that the facts did not justify Ramsay's statement. See "John
Paston" in Sidney Lee, ed, 15 Dictionary of National Biography 448 (Smith, Elder 1909).
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issue remained even if those accusations were untrue.213 But the controversy
seemed to focus solely on the validity of the will and not on any special
obligations that Paston might have had as a result of being Fastolf's lawyer.
More broadly, the activities of the judges and lawyers in this matter seemed to
reflect a different perspective on legal and judicial ethics.
Overall, conflicts between the lawyer's personal interest and that of a client
seem not to have been a significant medieval ethical problem."4 It is not even
clear that medieval loyalty norms condemned such conduct. Although the
information misuse cases may point in the direction of such a norm for
lawyers, it is also possible that a remedy in these cases might be justified on a
broader agency principle, not distinctive to lawyers.21' Moreover, the fact that
the client victims sought relief from Chancery may suggest that the focus was
on undoing the consequences of the lawyer misuse of the information,
attenuating the connection of these cases to the violation of loyalty norms for
lawyers and professional discipline. In the Fastolf will controversy, the apparent
lack of concern with John Paston's ethics suggests that medieval loyalty norms
did not prohibit a lawyer from making himself a beneficiary of a client's will.
Paul Brand concurs in this conclusion and has offered a cogent explanation.
First, medieval legal ethics focused primarily on litigation and courtroom
behavior and not on transactional work; and second, wills were the primary
concern of the ecclesiastical courts and drafting misconduct would be within
213. Richmond, whose treatment of the matter is the most detailed and thorough, finds it impossible to
determine whether John Paston had in fact forged the will or drafted a will in conflict with Fastolf's
intentions. He concludes that there are too many conflicting and contradictory statements and it is therefore
impossible to determine what happened and what Fastolf's intentions were. He also believes that it is
unlikely that Fastolf was manipulated. However, he finds the evidence supporting John Paston persuasive
and is willing to give him the benefit of the doubt regarding the will. See Richmond, TheFirstPhase at 225,
255-59 (cited in note 193). The Gies seems to agree. Gies, A MedievalFamily at 128-29 (cited in note 193).
214. Paul Brand reports that in his extensive research regarding the medieval legal profession, he recalls
no cases involving misuse of client information for the lawyer's personal benefit and only found cases
disclosing such information to the client's opponent. See e-mail from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose
(September 16, 1998) (cited in note 191). Conflicts between the client's interest and lawyer's personal
interest were not a significant issue in canon law. See e-mail from James Brundage to Jonathan Rose (June
1, 1999) (cited in note 62).
215. Perhaps any agent who undertook to do something, such as purchase property, on behalf of a
principal would be liable for failure to do so, especially if the agent bought the property for himself. Such a
principle may explain the result in Lucy v Walwyn, a 1581 case important in the development of the
doctrine of consideration. See Baker, Introduction at 388 (cited in note 16); John H. Baker and S.F.C.
Milsom, Sources of English Legal History: Private Law to 1750 485-87 (Butterworhs 1986). There is no
evidence that Walwyn was a lawyer and his liability in that case seems irrespective of whether he was a
lawyer. This notion is discussed in greater detail later. See notes 292-96.
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their jurisdiction and outside that of the common law courts over professional
lawyers.
21 6
3. Medieval Ambidexterity: Some Conclusions and Comparisons
In drawing some conclusions about medieval ambidexterity, there are a
number of interesting similarities with modern conflict of interest regulation.
Perhaps the most significant similarity is that ambidexterity was as common
and important a type of lawyer misconduct in the medieval period as it is
today."7 The large number of cases discussed above establish that it was both a
common and serious problem. In the medieval period, as today, the most
signficant problem involved conflicts between two current clients."' Moreover,
also as is true today, medieval norms extended loyalty duties to former as well
as present clients." 9 In addition, in establishing these loyalty norms, medieval
courts emphasized the need to safeguard the client's confidential information.
Finally, the issues in the medieval former client cases-the relation between the
prior and subsequent litigation and the threat to client information-are
strikingly similar to the issues in modern former client cases.22
On the other hand, the medieval cases reveal important and pronounced
differences with modern conflict of interest law. First, the nature of the core
category of medieval cases, switching sides in the same litigation, is quite
different than most modern conflict cases. These medieval cases often involved
fraudulent and deceitful conduct. The type of conduct involved in these cases
is much more serious and immoral than in modern conflict cases. Many of
these cases involve collusion with the opponent and a failure even to appear on
behalf of the original client. In most of the cases, it is difficult to imagine how
the lawyer could claim a good faith ability to represent both clients, which is at
216. See e-mail from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose (September 17, 1998) (on file with author). A
fifteenth century case confirms Brand's explanation. In that case, a woman sought relief in Chancery for her
lawyer's deception in taking her money but failing to act in her behalf in a dispute over her husband's will
in the Canterbury ecclesiastical court. See Ives, Common Lawyers ofPre-Reformation England at 314 & n 36.
Richard Helmholz also suggests that this lack of concern may be due to the fact that it was uncommon for
lawyers to draft wills, which was more commonly a task for clergy and friends. See e-mail from Richard
Helmholz to Jonathan Rose (September 5, 1998) (on file with author).
217. See Brand, Origins at 120-42 and accompanying notes (cited in note 7); Rose, Legal Profession in
Medieval England, 48 Syracuse L Rev at 59-62, 123-30 (cited in note 23).
218. Switching sides in the same litigation would clearly be prohibited today. See Model Rules 1.7 (cited
in note 3); Restatement § 201, 209 (cited in note 3). Moreover, such conflicts of interest would in all
likelihood be treated as conflicts between two current clients because the "hot potato" rule precludes lawyers
from converting such conflicts into former client conflicts, which are treated under more lenient rules. See
Wolfram, Former Client Conflicts, 10 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 677, 708-09 (1997).
219. See Model Rules 1.9 (cited in note 3); Restatement § 201, 213 (cited in note 3).
220. See Restatement § 213 (2) and Comments (b) and (d) (iii) (cited in note 3).
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least claimed in many modern conflict of interest cases. Perhaps the underlying
motive in both medieval and modern cases is financial with the former more
blatant and the latter more subtle. Nevertheless, the most common medieval
type of ambidexterity involved a more serious and blameworthy form of lawyer
misconduct.
Second, in several respects, the medieval duty of loyalty is narrower than
the modern one. The familiar modern concern with potential conflicts of
interest inherent in simultaneous representation of multiple plaintiffs and
defendants seems nonexistent in the medieval period. Moreover, the role of
consent in the medieval law of lawyering is much more limited and generally
an implicit one, at best. In addition, there is little evidence to suggest that
medieval loyalty norms were sensitive to conflicts between the lawyer's personal
interest and that of the client. At most, it was a very limited concern.=
Moreover, the Fastolf will controversy may reveal an institutional deficiency in
the medieval regulation of conflict of interest. The royal courts apparently
lacked jurisdiction to punish lawyers for transactional misconduct and for
misconduct in other courts; and possibly there were no other avenues for
relief.t ' Finally, the medieval duty of loyalty to avoid adversity to an existing
client on an unrelated matter is significantly more limited in nature and scope
than the modern one.m
221. The use of confidential information by a lawyer to the disadvantage of a client conflicts with both
the law of lawyering and common law agency principles. See Model Rules 1.8 (b) (cited in note 3);
Restatement § 112 (2) (cited in note 3); American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) ofthe Law ofAgency §
388 and Comment (c) (1933). Moreover, it is clearly unethical for a lawyer to draft a will making the lawyer
a beneficiary. See ModelRues 1.8 (c) (cited in note 3); Restatement § 208 (1) (cited in note 3). The possible
distant blood-relationship between John Paston and Sir John Fastolf would not alter this conclusion.
222. It remains to be determined whether a victim client might obtain a remedy elsewhere, for example
in chancery. Perhaps the ecclesiastical courts could punish common-law lawyers for misconduct committed
in or revealed by proceedings in such courts; John Paston's alleged tampering with Fastolfs will would have
been example of such misconduct. In studying the availability of chancery remedies, one must distinguish
between those equitable remedies such as rescission or restitution, sought to undo the consequences of the
lawyer's misconduct, and efforts actually to discipline the lawyer. Brundage's scholarship on canon laws
suggests that lawyers could be sanctioned for ambidexterity and other misconduct in the church courts, but
those courts might not have been concerned with conflicts with lawyer's personal interest as occurred with
John Fastolf's will. See notes 212 and 311.
223. However, it is interesting that some modern scholars have proposed reducing the stringency of the
modern loyalty duty in such cases and would be more lenient in allowing lawyers to sue a current client.
See, for example, Thomas Morgan, Suinga Current Client, 9 GeorgetownJ Legal Ethics 1157 (1996) (cited
in note 2). Professor Morgan believes the current strict rule caused "courts and rule drafters alike to lose
sight of the conflict of interest issues they were trying to address." In particular, he feels that the current rule
does not focus sufficiently on the adverse impact of such representation on the clients as "[w]hat it did was
remove the requirement that the effect of the lawyer's conduct be 'material' and transform a reasonably
balanced rule into a tactical weapon for litigators." Id at 1194. Not surprisingly, not everyone agrees
completely with his proposed relaxation of the rule. See, for example, Brian Redding, Suing a Current
Client. A Response to Professor Morgan, 10 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 487 (1997). Moreover, to the extent
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The remedies also differ in the two periods. In one sense, the remedies for
medieval ambidexterity were narrower than those for modern conflicts of
interest. Punitive sanctions were the primary medieval remedy. Notably,
judicial disqualification of lawyers seems to have been quite uncommon
although civil liability, as discussed later, was also a medieval remedy. On the
other hand, medieval disciplinary sanctions for ambidexterity were generally
much more severe than those in the typical modern case. Imprisonment and
fines, two of the most common medieval sanctions, are not modern forms of
disciplinary sanctions."' Moreover, disbarment and probably suspension seem
to have been more common for medieval than for modern conflicts. But, of
course, the medieval cases typically involved much more serious and flagrant
misconduct.
In some ways, the differences between medieval and modern conflicts of
interest seem more pronounced than their similarities or, at least, create the
need to be careful not to overstate the similarities. These differences seem to be
the product of three interrelated causes. First, the medieval loyalty norms were
relatively new and, therefore, less developed. Modern courts have had the
benefit of years of case development, commentary, professional activities, and
institutional efforts in developing modern conflict of interest rules. Second, the
judicial role in articulating rules or doctrine seems more limited than today.
Although medieval judges certainly played an important role in developing
loyalty norms, they did not articulate doctrine nor rules in the sense that
modern courts do. The nature of medieval pleading limited the extent to which
the courts developed substantive law and engaged in legal analysis; and the
ultimate result in many cases depended on subsequent jury resolution of factual
disagreements.225 In this connection, Professor Baker notes that "[t]he courts
themselves rarely decided points of law with formal judgments .... No one
expected a gradual accretion of law from case to case .... The rules were, in a
sense, given; it was the game that mattered."2 6 Finally, one suspects that the
that the medieval duty arises consensually and not by official fiat, it seems consistent with the views of
modern law and economics scholars. See Macey and Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest
Regulation, 82 Iowa L Rev 965 (cited in note 2).
224. To the extent that they are used at all, it is only when the conflict of interest involves some more
serious offense. For example, a federal court sentenced a lawyer in a leading New York law firm to 15
months in prison for his conviction of fraud and perjury for failing to reveal his conflict of interest to the
bankruptcy court. See United States v Gellene, 182 F3d 578, 1999 US App LEXIS 16715 (7th Cir 1999).
225. See Baker, Introduction at 90-96, 223-27 (cited in note 16); Milsom, Historical Foundations of the
Common Law at 37-50 (cited in note 16). Professor Milsom initially articulated the classic exposition of this
notion. See S.F.C. Milsom, Studies in the History of the Common Law 171-89 (Hambledon 1985).
226. John Baker, The Third University of England: The Inns of Court and the Common-Law Tradition 19-
20 (Selden Soc'y 1990). For a very different reason, Robert Palmer de-emphasizes the judicial role in law
[7:137
TheAmbidetrous Lawyer 183
medieval social and professional expectations of loyalty produced a narrower
and simpler norm. Medieval society probably did not perceive a need for a
more extensive duty of loyalty. In addition, more subtle and broader forms of
disloyalty were probably both less common. Thus, the medieval norm focused
on the most serious form of disloyalty, direct and current adversity in the same
litigation. To a large extent, these differences are all a product of the seven
centuries that separate these two periods.
B. CIVIL LIABILITY
1. Tracing the Initial Development
Although a full discussion of the evolution of the civil liability of lawyers is
outside the scope of this article, some background on this topic is necessary to
facilitate understanding the subsequent discussion of the cases. Moreover,
tracing this development is especially important for the modern student of the
law of lawyering, who may be tempted to view this medieval civil liability as
equivalent to modern legal malpractice. Such an approach would likely be at
least somewhat misleading.
Not surprisingly, there is an abundance of scholarship on the evolution of
tort and contract liability.' However, the development of the civil liability of
lawyers seems to have been outside that development. Moreover, in studying
the process by which liability for negligence emerged through trespass and
more importantly through actions on the case, one finds no cases imposing
negligence based liability on lawyers. In contrast, as early as the fourteenth
century, there are a number of cases dealing with liability of the medical
profession for negligence,' long before the formal recognition of an
making while emphasizing that of the chancery. See Robert Palmer, English Law in the Age of the Black
Death, 1348-1381: A Transformation of Governance and Law 296-306 (North Carolina 1993).
227. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 67-75, 360-426,454-529 (cited in note 16); C.H.S. Fifoor,
History and Sources of the Common Law: Tort and Contract (Stevens 1949); Albert K. Kiralfy, The Action on
the Case (Sweet & MaxweU 1951); Milsom, HistoricalFoundations ofthe Common Law at 283-400 (cited in
note 16); Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law at 424-502, 628-56 (cited in note 16); A.W.B.
Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action ofAssumpsit (Clarendon 1975);
Baker, ed, 2 Spelman's Reports at 220-98 (cited in note 80); Morris Arnold, ed, I Select Cases of Trespass fom
the King's Courts 1307-1399 ix-lxxxv (100 Selden Soc'y 1985). Even among traditional approaches to legal
history, there have been differences of opinion and alternative theories for these developments. See, for
example, Milsom, Studies in the History ofthe Common Law at 28-30, 59-60, 83-90, 91-103, 149-70 (cited
in note 223). For a very different, but provocative and insightful, approach to the development of trespass,
assumpsit and action on the case, see Palmer, English Law in theAge of the Black Death at 137-306 (cited in
note 224).
228. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 376, 460 (cited in note 16); Fifoot, History and Sources of
the Common Law at 66, 82, 92, 156-57 (cited in note 225); Kiralfy, Action on the Case at 8, 40, 90, 138-40,
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independent tort of negligence.229  As subsequent discussion of the
ambidexterity cases will illustrate, one explanation may be that the early lawyer
liability cases, like the discipline cases, did not involve negligent or careless, but
fraudulent and intentional, conduct. More generally, though, the evolution of
the civil liability of the legal profession followed a different path, one quite
distinct from that more general process."5 The civil liability of lawyers had its
origins in the common law writ of deceit and the subsequent action on the case
for deceit."' Before turning to the use of these two remedies against lawyers, a
brief discussion of their general nature is warranted.
The writ of deceit, a very old writ dating to 120 1, was directed at deceit of
the court and used to remedy misconduct toward the court, with a primary
focus on abuse of the legal process." It was one of several writs ordering the
224-26 (cited in note 225); Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law at 318 (cited in note 16);
Palmer, English Law in the Age of the Black Death at 185-96 (cited in note 224); Plucknett, Concise History of
the Common Law at 471 (cited in note 16); Baker, ed, 2 Spelman s Reports, Introduction at 264-65 (cited in
note 80).
229. Although the root of the idea of liability for negligence may be seen in the fourteenth and fifteenth
century cases, its emergence as an identified basis for liability probably did not occur until the eighteenth
century, with many scholars pointing to its inclusion as separate types of action on the case in John
Comyns's Digest in 1762. Late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century cases more clearly reflected
its recognition as an independent tort. Milsom believes that the modern tort of negligence arose in 1833.
See Baker, Introduction at 454-55, 459-70 (cited in note 16); Milsom, Historical Foundations ofthe Common
Law at 392-400 (cited in note 16); Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law at 471-72 (cited in note
16).
230. At least by 1767, negligence was a basis for attorney liability. See Russell v Palmer, 95 Eng Rep 837
(Common Bench 1767); Fifoor, History and Sources of the Common Law at 157 (cited in note 225). An
ambiguous statement in Blackstone's Commentaries, because of its use of "diligence and skill" in referring to
several types of liability including that of attorneys, might be read as imposing liability for negligence,
although that reading seems dubious. See 3 Blackstone, Commentaries at "163-64 & n (x). Although a later
edition of Comyns's Digest referred to a case involving an attorney to illustrate an action on the case for
negligent breach of trust, it was an 1809 American case (Connecticut), which could not have been included
in the original 1762 edition and could not have evidenced the early use of negligence as an English theory of
lawyer liability. See Comyns, 1 Digest at 414 (cited in note 27). The liability of barristers for negligence has
prompted substantial discussion. See notes 260-72 and accompanying text.
231. One category of early cases imposing tort liability involved the "common callings" and the "custom
of the realm" in such cases. Innkeepers and carriers were clearly included and several legal historians have
also included surgeons. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 461-62, 471 (cited in note 16); Kirafy,
Action on the Case at 39-40, 141, 151-57 (cited in note 225); Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common
Law at 318-20 (cited in note 16); Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law at 480-82 (cited in note
16). Although at least one commentator suggests that lawyers were such a calling and that notion influenced
their liability, such a suggestion is clearly against the weight of scholarly opinion and finds no support in
those cases. See Kiralfy, Action on the Case at 148-49 (cited in note 225). Baker suggests that an individual's
status, including that of attorney, played a role in the extension of assumpsit to nonfeasance. See Baker,
Introduction at 382 (cited in note 16).
See Holdsworth, 2 History of English Law at 366 (cited in note 16); 3 id at 407; Kiralfy, Action on the Case
at 73-74 (cited in note 225); Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law at 640 (cited in note 16);
Pollock and Maitland, 2 History ofEnglish Law at 534-35 (cited in note 8); Simpson, History ofthe Common
Law of Contractat 253-54 (cited in note 225). Such actions could also be commenced by bill. See Plucknett,
2000] TheAmbidextrousLawyer 185
sheriff to bring the defendant to the king's court to explain why (ostensurus
quare) he had engaged in wrongdoing. ' Although the victim commonly
obtained the writ, the defendant was required to answer the king as well as the
complainant.' According to Pollock and Maitland, "the cause of action [was]
no mere fraud, but a fraudulent perversion of the course of justice."" 5 As such,
they felt that the "punitive element [was] strong;" and conventional punitive
sanctions such as imprisonment and fines were imposed.' However, the
remedies were not limited to such punishment and remedies for the victim,
including monetary compensation, were available in the same action.'7 This
use of the writ of deceit to obtain both public and private remedies in one
action illustrated perhaps the traditional association of early tort law with the
criminal law." Despite the fundamental nature of the writ of deceit initially as
remedy for deceiving the king and his courts, subsequent writers seemed to
emphasize its use as a private remedy. In his well-known 1534 treatise, The
New Natura Brevium, Fitzherbert's discussion of the writ of deceit seemed to
focus primarily on its use by the private victims of deceit. 9 Similarly in his
1787 History of The English Law, Reeves, in discussing the law during the reign
of Edward 11 (1307-27), stated that the writ of deceit "was to redress a person
in damages for any injury he had sustained by reason of collusive, oppressive or
deceitful proceedings in judicial matters."24
Concise History of the Common Law at 640 (cited in note 16). In his study of the development of the writ of
conspiracy, which was directed at abuse of the legal process comparable to the modern tort of malicious
prosecution, Winfield notes use of the writ of deceit to prevent "cozening a court" and its relation to the
writ of conspiracy. See Winfield, History of Conspiracy andAbuse ofLegalProcedure at 33, 119 (cited in note
8).
233. See Baker, Introduction at 70-71 (cited in note 16). The common law distinguished between the
assertion of a right, which required a praecipe writ, and a complaint about a wrong, which used the pone
writ. The ostensurus quare formula was used in the praecipe writ for the defendant to explain the failure to
comply with the demand, but was imported into the pone writ as its essence. See id at 68-70.
234. Plucknert seems to imply that it was more common for victims to initiate those proceedings and
that the crown did so primarily when the victim had not. See Plucknett, Concise History ofthe Common Law
at 640 (cited in note 16).
235. See Pollock and Maitland, 2 History of English Law at 535 (cited in note 8). They state that the
defendant "is to answer, not only the private person whom he has defrauded, but also and in the first
instance the king." Id.
236. Id. Plucknert also says that the "nature" of the writ of deceit "was essentially penal." See Plucknett,
Concise History ofthe Common Law at 640 (cited in note 16).
237. See Pollock and Maitland, 2 History ofEnglish Law at 535 (cited in note 8).
238. See, for example, David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law,
76 BU L Rev 59 (1996); Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law at 422-23, 455-62 (cited in note
16); Pollock and Maitland, 2 History ofEnglish Law at 511-43 (cited in note 8).
239. See Fitzherbert, New Natura Brevium at 95E-100D (cited in note 8).
240. See John Reeves, 2 History ofthe English Law 329 (3d ed 1814).
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The focus on private remedies for deceit became more dominant as trespass
on the case emerged in the late fourteenth century.24 About the same time, an
action on the case for deceit as a form of trespass on the case appeared,
probably evolving as a form of trespass on the case from the writ of deceit and
providing a remedy to victims injured by deceit.242 For a while, at least, the
action on the case for deceit apparently became available as an alternative in all
cases where the writ of deceit lay. 43 But by the sixteenth century, the action on
case supplanted the writ of deceit. 4
Lawyers were a target of the writ of deceit, which was the initial basis of
their liability."5 Given the writ's central focus, as indicated above, that result is
not surprising. Lawyers were officers of the court and their litigation
misconduct was a clear form of abuse of the legal process and deceit of the
court. Moreover, the Statute of Westminster I, chapter 29, the initial and
primary regulation of lawyer misconduct, was explicitly directed at "deceit and
collusion."246 Although this statute provided new and distinctive remedies,
commentators have stated that it confirmed the common law, presumably
241. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 73-75 (cited in note 16). Kiralfy summarizes the initial
development of the action on the case and identifies its four main features as wrong, damages, need of
remedy and analogy. See Kiralfy, Action on the Case at 1-17 (cited in note 225).
242. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 376-78 (cited in note 16); Fitzherbert, New Natura Brevium
at 95D (cited in note 8); Kiralfy, Action on the Case at 73-98 (cited in note 225); Plucknett, Concise History
of the Common Law at 640-41 (cited in note 16). Although the term "case for deceit" caused some
confusion, it was a form of trespass on the case and not a separate cause of action. See Kiralfy, Action on the
Case at 94-97 (cited in note 225). Baker and Kiralfy note that there was a linkage between the writ of deceit
and trespass. See id at 3, 73-74; Baker, Introduction at 72 n 29 (cited in note 16). Kiralfy attaches
significance to the use of the word "trespass" in the Statutes of Westminster, chapter 29. See Kiralfy, Action
on the Case at 3, 73 (cited in note 225). Baker also points out that in serious trespass cases, a fine payable to
the king could be imposed in addition to a private remedy. See Baker, Introduction at 71 (cited in note 16).
That feature may indicate another connection to the writ of deceit. See notes 234-35 and accompanying
text.
243. See Kiralfy, Action on the Case at 74 (cited in note 225). This duplication of remedies is interesting,
as it was common to deny a new remedy on ground that an older writ could be used. See id at 14-15. The
great debate over the use of assumpsit in cases where debt lay, culminating in the renowned Slade's Case,
involved this issue. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 392-94 (cited in note 16); Milsom, Historical
Foundations of the Common Law at 339-56 (cited in note 16); Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law
at 644-46 (cited in note 16). Reeves discussed the overlap between the newer actions on the case and the
older writs and attempted to identify the fifteenth century distinctions in the use of an action on the case
and a writ of deceit as remedies. See Reeves, 3 History of English Law at 393-94 (cited in note 238).
244. See Kiralfy, Action on the Case at 96 (cited in note 225). Many legal historians have asserted that
deceit played an important role in the development of assumpsit and its extension to nonfeasance. See, for
example, Baker, Introduction at 376-78 (cited in note 16); Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common
Law at 322-39 (cited in note 16); Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law at 640-43 (cited in note
16); Simpson, History of the Common Law of Contract at 253-57 (cited in note 225). Compare Baker, ed, 2
Spelman's Reports Introduction at 274-75 (cited in note 80).
245. See Baker, Introduction at 382-83 (cited in note 16).
246. See notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
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referring to the writ of deceit.247 In addition, a writ of deceit was one way,
perhaps a very common one, that a client victim could initiate a proceeding to
punish a lawyer under this important, initial regulation of the legal
profession.4 s In his discussion of the writ of deceit in the 1534 New Natura
Brevium, Fitzherbert identified several instances of its use against lawyer
misconduct." More recently, Kiralfy catalogued the common instances where
the writ of deceit was used and many of them described various forms of lawyer
misconduct."5 ' Finally, the writ of deceit was not available for similar
misconduct against a nonlawyer, who was, therefore, liable only for damages
and not subject to imprisonment.25'
An action on the case for deceit was also a remedy for lawyer misconduct
and lawyers were targets of such actions for the types of conduct actionable
initially by a writ of deceit.92 William Rastell, in A Collection ofEntries (1566),
247. See, for example, Coke, 1 Second Part of the Institutes at 213 (cited in note 38); Kiralfy, Action on the
Case at 73 (cited in note 225). Kiralfy believes that the Statutes of Westminster, chapter 29, had a
significant impact on the form of the writ of deceit and on the development of the action on the case. See id
at 3, 73-74.
248. Professor Palmer discusses two cases in which the disbarment or imprisonment of an attorney,
perhaps pursuant to Chapter 29, may have emerged from a writ of deceit by the client against the attorney.
See Palmer, Origins of the Legal Profession, 11 Irish Jurist at 137-39 (cited in note 16). Also, Coke, in a
rather confusing discussion of the final phrase in chapter 29, "greater punishment ... at the King's
pleasure," illustrated the meaning with two cases involving an action or writ of deceit by the victim. See
Coke, 1 Second Part of the Institutes at 216-17 (cited in note 38); Coke, Fourth Part ofthe Institutes at 102
(cited in note 38). One of these cases, which involved Matthew of the Exchequer, may be the same case that
Brand discusses regarding imprisonment of a serjeant for violation of chapter 29. Matthew, who was given
two prison sentences for two Chapter 29 violations, was also imprisoned for other misconduct and was the
subject of other complaints. See Brand, Origins at 123 & nn 20-21 (cited in note 7).
249. See Fitzherbert, New Natura Brevium at 95E n (a), 98H (successful defense by attorney against
whom writ was brought), 99G-J (cited in note 8).
250. The common instances included deceit by suing without authority, deceit by non-summons, deceit
by false returns to writs, deceit by casting a false protection, deceit for groundless civil actions, deceit for
suing in a court that has no jurisdiction and deceit for suing on forged documents. See Kiralfy, Action on the
Case at 74-82 (cited in note 225).
251. In 1292, in Bernwellv Vyneter, the defendant said that he was not a common attorney of the Bench
in order to avoid the use of a particular form of the writ of deceit and the possibility of imprisonment. If
not such a common attorney, the plaintiff may have had only a trespass or covenant action against him as
.one of the people." See Palmer, Origins ofthe Legal Profession, 11 Irish Jurist at 138-39 (cited in note 16).
The issue of the defendant's status was set for resolution by a jury at the next assize. See id at 138; Baker,
The Third University ofEnglandat 26 n 22 (cited in note 224). His status was complicated as he was clearly
acting as the plaintiffs "attorney" even if he was not a Bench attorney, illustrating the ambiguity of the
profession's fringes.
252. See Baker, Introduction at 382-83 (cited in note 16); Simpson, History of the Common Law of
Contract at 253-55 (cited in note 225); Baker, ed, 2 Spelman's Reports at 85, 231, 288 (cited in note 80).
One case discussed by Baker in his introduction to the Reports seems both particularly interesting and
unusual as it appears to have involved an attempt by the attorney to plead a contractual defense, an accord,
to his client's deceit suit. See id at 288 & n 5. Baker and Kiralfy both note that London courts recognized
such an action against a lawyer before the royal courts. See Baker, Introduction at 383 n 45 (cited in note
16); Kiralfy at 148-49 (cited in note 225).
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a formulary of pleading precedents, listed a number of examples of actions on
the case against attorneys.2" Early treatises and collections of cases such as
Sheppard's Actions upon the Case for Deeds (1663), The Impartial Lawyer
(1709), and Viner's A General Abridgment of Law and Equity (1741-53) all
included a number of actions against lawyers in the sections dealing with
actions on case for deceit.254 It is noteworthy that some of these cases treated
lawyer misconduct outside the litigation process also as actionable.2"
Interestingly, these early deceit actions were often directed at
ambidexterity. Pollock and Maitland noted that in the thirteenth century, a use
of the writ of deceit included "the case of an attorney who colludes with his
client's adversary.256 In the New Natura Brevium, Fitzherbert noted that a
tenant could obtain relief when his attorney caused a default "by covin" with
the opposing party.257 Later, lawyer conflict of interest was also a target of
actions on the case. Pleading formularies such as the Registrum Brevium and
Rastell's A Collection of Entries illustrated ambidexterity as actionable against an
attorney or counsellor.2" Similarly, two centuries later, Blackstone, in
discussing private wrongs, noted that a damage remedy arose against an
253. See William Rastell, A Collection of Entries 2, 96-97 (1596 ed) (1566).
254. See Sheppard, Actions upon the Casefor Deeds at 12, 277, 295, 331, 384,784 (cited in note 27); The
Impartial Lawyer at 10-11, 16-17, 79, 111-12, 156-66 (cited in note 27); Viner, 1 Abridgment at 562, 576-
77 (cited in note 27); Viner, 8 Abridgment at 491-92, 497-99 (cited in note 27). Viner referred to the
Statutes of Westminster I, chapter 29, although he mistakenly noted it as chapter 30. See id at 499. The
Impartial Lawyer may be the earliest treatise on the legal profession.
255. Kiralfy, in fact, thinks that these cases of lawyer liability for nonlitigation misconduct were the
initial basis for the expansion of assumpsit. See Kiralfy, Action on the Case at 87-90 (cited in note 225). In
this section, he discusses a number of well-known cases regarding the development of assumpsit, such as
Somerton v Colles and Doige's Case. In those cases, he seems to assume that the defendant was a lawyer. That
seems erroneous in Doige's Case and unclear in Somerton. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 382-86
(cited in note 16); Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law at 333-34, 343-49 (cited in note 225);
Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law at 328-32 (cited in note 16); Plucknett at 640-43 (cited
in note 16). In discussing the importance of Somerton and Doige's Case in the expansion of promissory
remedies, Simpson discusses the significance of actions involving the initial court-based deceit and warranty-
based deceit in extending remedies to attorneys acting as agents and more generally to relief in "purely
private transactions" and actionable nonfeasance. See Simpson, History of the Common Law of Contract at
253-57 (cited in note 225). He credited Fitzherbert with identifying a general principle emerging from these
strands of cases: "the principle was that an action for deceit lay where one person acted in the name of
another person in such a way that the other person suffered loss." Id at 254.
256. See Pollock and Maitland, 2 History of English Law at 534-35 (cited in note 8).
257. This example is somewhat different from the typical deceit case, as it illustrated the use of the writ
of audita querela, which was used to obtain relief from a prior judgment (see Black's Law Dictionary 131
(West 6th ed 1990)) to obtain restitution of the land. See Fitzherbert, New Natura Brevium at 103A at 233-
34 (cited in note 8).
258. See Registrum Brevium 113 (1531K) (4th ed 1687); Rastell, Collection of Entries at 2, case no 3
(cited in note 251) (summary translation of 1574 edition in Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law
at 90 (cited in note 225)).
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advocate or attorney who "betray[ed] the cause of their client."259 In addition, a
number of cases in the well known treatises and collections of cases involved
ambidextrous, collusive misconduct." Finally, Kiralfy uses a writ against a
lawyer's disloyal nonlitigation conduct to illustrate the form of an action on the
case for deceit." 1
Despite this history and analysis, there are statements that serjeants were
liable for their negligence in the medieval era. Both Holdsworth and Bolland
asserted such a principle. 62 Moreover, counsel and judges, particularly in the
noted case of Rondel v. Worsley, have also expressed this view.263 The authority
for this position seems to stem entirely from three Henry VI Year Book cases,
only one of which really merits discussion.6
Yet, a careful examination of this 1435 case and what early and subsequent
commentators have said about it create substantial doubt whether it lends any
support for the liability of medieval serjeants or barristers for their negligence.265
259. Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at * 164 (cited in note 157).
260. See, for example, Comyns, 1 Digest at 353-54 (cited in note 27); Sheppard, Actions on the Case for
Deeds at 277, 295 (cited in note 27); The Impartial Lawyer at 10-11, 16-17, 79, 223 (cited in note 27);
Viner, 1 Abridgment at 576 (cited in note 27).
261. He believes that this form of deceit influenced the development of assumpsir. See Kiralfy, Action on
the Case at 87, 219 (cited in note 227).
262. See William Bolland, A Manual of Year Book Studies 14 (Cambridge 1925); Holdsworth, 2 History
ofEnglish Law at 491 (cited in note 16). Later commentators have also taken that position. See, for example,
Roxburgh, Rondel v. Worsley, 84 L Quarterly Rev at 178-79 (cited in note 137a).
263. See, for example, Rondelv Worsley, 1 Appeal Cases 191, 279 (House of Lords 1969) (Lord Upjohn);
Rondel v Worsley, 1 Queen's Bench Division 443, 455-59 (justice Lawton), 518 (Justice Salmon) (Court of
Appeal 1967); Kennedy vBroun, 143 Eng Rep 268, 278-79 (plaintiffs counsel), 289 (ChiefJustice Erie), 13
Common Bench (new series) 677, 702-05, 730-31 (1863); Swinfen v Lord Chelmsford, 157 Eng Rep 1436,
1448 (Chief Baron Pollock) (Exchequer 1860). Rondel v Worsley was a modern consideration of barristers'
liability for negligence. See note 272.
264. See Doige's Case, 20 Henry VI, fol 34, pl 4 (1442), reprinted in Baker and Milsom, Sources of
English Legal History at 391 (cited in note 213), and in Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law at
343 (cited in note 227); Anonymous case, 14 Henry VI, fol 18v, pl 58 (1435), reprinted in Baker and
Milsom, Sources ofEnglish Legal History at 383 (cited in note 213) and in Fifoot, History and Sources of the
Common Law at 344 (cited in note 227); Somerton, 11 Henry VI, fol 18, pl 10 (1433), reprinted in Baker
and Milsom, Sources of English Legal History at 387 (cited in note 213) and in Fifoot, History and Sources of
the Common Law at 343 (cited in note 225). The first and third cases, which do not merit further discussion
here, are ones that are well-known developments in the history of assumpsit. They have been discussed
previously, and Somerton will be discussed in detail subsequently. See notes 253, 289-91 and accompanying
text. Neither of these cases said anything about the liability of barristers for negligence and dealt with
unrelated matters; it is not even clear that they articulated principles distinctive to the legal profession. See
notes 253, 282-83 and accompanying text. Even Justice Lawton, who is largely responsible for the modern
interest in these Year Book cases, acknowledged in Rondel v Worsley that these two cases were not relevant to
the issue of whether barristers were liable for their negligence in the medieval era. See Rondel v Worsley, I
QB at 457 (cited in note 261).
265. In supporting their statements as to the liability of setjeants for their negligence, Bolland referred
only to this case and Holdsworth relied primarily on it although he did mention Doige's Case generally See
Bolland, Manual of Year Book Studies at 14 & n 2 (cited in note 260); Holdsworth, 2 History ofEnglish Law
at 491 & n 5 (cited in note 16). Although some judges and lawyers have stated that Rolle's Abridgment
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In this case, the plaintiff, a vendee of land, brought an action on the case
alleging that defendant had failed to cause third parties to make a release to the
plaintiff as the defendant had covenanted. Thus the issue was whether there
was contractual liability for the defendant's nonfeasance. The court said that
since there was an action for negligent performance, which was "only accessory
to and dependent on the covenant, then as well as having an action for what is
only accessory I shall also have an action for the principal."2 The case says
nothing directly about negligence nor the liability of serjeants for negligence.
The case is yet another development in the actionability of nonfeasance and the
evolution of assumpsit."7 Both older and current commentators have noted and
268discussed this 1435 case in that manner.
In support of the notion that serjeants were liable for their negligence,
subsequent judges, lawyers, and commentators have pointed to the dictum of
Justice Paston.269 He said, "And if you, who are a serjeant at law, undertake to
plead my plea, and do nothing - or do something otherwise than I have told
you - so that I suffer loss, I shall have an action on my case." 7 ' Athough this
statement was dictum, some have claimed it as "strong evidence" of liability for
negligence as it was said in the presence of leading and experienced lawyers and
judges and, therefore, evidenced their views."' Others, however, have merely
relied on this case for authority that barristers were liable for negligence, that statement is inaccurate. Rolle
cited this 1435 case three times. One case involved an instance of nonliability; another stated that an action
on the case was available if the client's counsel became counsel for his adversary; and the third case said that
an action in deceit was available to a client who lost his case because of the failure of his counsel to appear.
See Henry Rolle, 1 Un Abridgment des Plusieurs Cases et Resolutions del Common Ley 91 (1668). Nor, as has
sometimes been claimed, do any of the illustrations in Rastell's Entries regarding attorney liability provide
any authority for the liability of counsel for negligence. One entry concerns the availability of an action on
the case to a client who lost his action because of his attorney's default, another the actionability of an
attorney who discloses confidential information, and another the liability of an attorney who becomes
counsel for his client's adversary. See Rastell, Entries at 2 (cited in note 251).
266. See Anonymous Case, 14 Henry VI, fol 18v, pl 58 (1435), reprinted in Baker and Milsom, Sources of
English Legal History at 383 (cited in note 213).
267. See authorities cited in note 225. See also note 253.
268. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 381-82 (cited in note 16); Fifoot, History and Sources of the
Common Law at 333-34 (cited in note 225); Rolle, 1 Abridgment at 91 (cited in note 263); Simpson, History
of the Common Law of Contract at 224, 227, 248; Baker, ed, 2 Spelman 's Reports at 266-67, 269 (cited in
note 80).
269. See, for example, Rondel v Worsley, I QB at 456-57 (Lawton, LJ) (cited in note 261); Kennedy v
Broun, 143 Eng Rep at 268, 278-79 (plaintiffs counsel), 289 (Erie, CJ); Bolland, Manual of Year Book
Studies at 14 (cited in note 260); Holdsworth, 2 History of English Law at 491, n 5 (cited in note 16).
270. See Anonymous Case, 14 Henry VI, fol 18v, pl 58 (1435), reprinted in Baker and Milsom, Sources of
English Legal History at 383 (cited in note 213).
271. Justice Lawton, in his exploration of history in Rondel v Worsley, is the strongest exponent of that
view. See Rondel v Worsley, 1 QB at 455-59, 468. Others have agreed. See, for example, Rondel v Worsley, 1
App Cas at 279 (Lord Upjohn); Rondel v Worsley, I QB at 449 (Official Solicitor), 518 (Salmon, LJ);
Kennedy v Broun, 143 Eng Rep 268, 278-79 (plaintiffs counsel), 289 (ChiefJudge Erie); Roxburgh, Rondel
v Worsley, 84 L Quarterly Rev at 178-79 (cited in note 137a). In Rondel, Justice Lawton said that Justice
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treated Paston's dictum as the views of one person or as an illustration.'
Moreover, to the extent that there may have been liability for a failure to follow
the client's instructions, the context makes it clear that Paston is talking about
contractual liability for misfeasance and not negligence in the sense attributed
by the subsequent judges, commentators, and lawyers. Insofar as this case says
anything about the liability of serjeants, Professor Baker has treated it as
standing for the proposition that serjeants were liable for nonfeasance on their
retainers and he has characterized Justice Paston's comments as meaning that
an action of deceit was available against dishonest lawyers.' Thus, despite the
eminence of Holdsworth and Bolland, this 1435 case and Paston's dictum do
not seem to establish that medieval lawyers were liable for their negligence.274 In
Juyn, who delivered the court's judgment in the 1435 case, agreed because he did not dissent. See I QB at
459. In Kennedy v Broun, ChiefJudge Erle said that Swinfen v Lord Chelmsford, 157 Eng Rep 1436, 1448, 6
Exch Rep 390, 918 (1863) overruled the three Year Book Henry VI cases.
272. See, for example, Rondel v Worsley, 1 QB at 483-84 (Official Solicitor); Swinfen v Lord Chelmsford,
157 Eng Rep at 1448 (1863) (Chief Baron Pollock). In Swinfen, the defendant's counsel thought that
Justice Paston was probably misreported. See Swinfen, 157 Eng Rep at 1442. In Justice Lawton's view, one
that is likely correct, Paston was accurately reported. See 1 QB at 458-59. Justice Lawton referred to four
manuscripts of this 1435 Year Book case and claimed that the critical phrase, "or do something otherwise
than I have told you" is omitted from two of the manuscripts. However, Baker and Milsom included the
phrase in their reproduction although they cited one of the manuscripts from which Justice Lawton said it
had been omitted. See Baker and Milsom, Sources ofEnglish Legal History at 384 (cited in note 213). Both
Holdsworth and Fifoot included the phrase but did not indicate which manuscript was their source. See
Holdsworth, 2 History of English Law at 491 n 5 (cited in note 16); Fifoot, History and Sources of the
Common Law at 345 (cited in note 225). The manuscript of this case in the Harvard Law Library also
includes the critical phrase. See Anonymous case, Year Book 14 Henry VI, fol 18, pl 58 (1435), reprinted in
Anno decimo quarto Henricisexti (Richard Tottel 1574) (on file with author).
273. See Baker, Introduction at 382 (cited in note 16); Baker, ed, 2 Spelman's Reports at 85 & n 2 (cited
in note 80). Moreover, Baker points out that Paston's views on liability for nonfeasance were "unorthodox"
and "against the weight of opinion." See id at 266-67, 269. Thus, Paston's statement is a slender reed to
support this proposition about serjeants' liability for negligence even when one acknowledges that the
.common erudition" and "inherited wisdom" of the legal profession, not just or even primarily case law,
reflected medieval legal doctrine, perhaps still at the end of the fifteenth century. See Baker, LegalProfession
and the Common Law at 461,466-68, 473-76 (cited in note 16).
274. One reason that this case may have caused this confusion is that many authorities have viewed the
right of barristers to sue for their fees (see note 137a) and liability of barristers for breach of their retainer
contracts as intertwined and as impacting their liability in negligence. See, for example, Rondel v Worsley, 1
QB at 472-74 (Official Solicitor), 497-501 (Lord Denning, MR); Kennedy v Broun, 143 Eng Rep 268 (Erie,
CJ) (1863); Swinfen v Lord Chelmsford, 157 Eng Rep 1436 (Pollock, CB) (1860); Roxburgh, Rondel v.
Worsley, 84 L Quarterly Rev at 178 (cited in note 138). Others have recognized, however, that, although
the contractual basis to sue and be sued had a logical connection, that relationship and incapacity to
contract were not relevant to liability for negligence. See, for example, Rondel v Worsley, 1 App Cas at 197-
98 (appellant's counsel), 281 (Lord Upjohn); Rondel v Worsley, I QB at 466-68 (Lawton, J), 522-23
(Salmon, LJ). Many authorities have believed that the immunity of barristers from liability for negligence
has been clear since Fell v Brown, 170 Eng Rep 104, 1 Peake 131 (1791). This view is evident in the many
opinions in Rondel v Worsly, which reconsidered and affirmed that proposition. Some have criticized this
rule of nonliabiliy and suggested that it ought to be modified. See, for example, David Pannick, The
Advocates 96-102, 197-206 (Oxford 1992).
192 Roundtable
conclusion, the evolution of the civil liability of lawyers was outside the
mainstream of tort law and its antecedents, but the liability of lawyers for their
misconduct had its own distinctive basis and was well established.
2. The Cases and Rules
The cases seeking civil remedies by client victims against ambidextrous
lawyers fell almost exclusively into two categories, switching sides in the same
case and misuse or disclosure of confidential information.275
a. Switching Sides in the Same Litigation
The sides switching cases were clearly the most numerous as was the case
with lawyer discipline. Moreover, the factual patterns were very similar. For
example, in 1291, Arnold Purdeu claimed 100 shillings as damages against
William for representing Arnold's adversaries in two separate cases. Arnold
alleged that he had already lost one case involving land since William had
refused to return the documents of title and that he was about to lose the other
case. William denied all the allegations and asked for a jury.27 Like the
discipline cases, those seeking civil remedies also revealed fraudulent and
corrupt lawyer misconduct again involving default judgments against the
client. In 1293 Ilger of Talighidion complained that his attorney, Simon of
Crucoyl caused him to lose his land because of a default made "fraudulently
and through collusion with Margery [his adversary in a dower action] by way
of prearranged deception."" In 1299, Gilbert de la Greene and his son
complained that they lost a dower action by default as John "by prearranged
collusion with Joan [the plaintiff] had maliciously absented himself and made
default" twice."8 In addition, Kiralfy notes two fourteenth century cases where
a plaintiff used a writ of deceit to obtain restoration of land lost by default
275. At least twenty cases were identified. The references in the various secondary works might increase
that number as they contained yearbook references. Unfortunately, there was no direct access to the cited
yearbooks, so it is not possible to tell whether the reference is an actual case involving civil liability for
ambidexterity or just a recitation or illustration of such a legal principle. Switching sides in the same case
accounted for at least twelve cases and disclosure of information for at least six and perhaps eight cases.
276. See CP 40/90, m 13d (Trinity Term 1291), reprinted in PB3 (ix) (cited in note 26). William may
have prevailed with the jury. At least he was not permanently disbarred, for Paul Brand notes that he was
still practicing as a professional attorney in 1300, when he received 38 appointments. See id.
277. See CP 40/101, m 60d (Trinity Term 1293), reprinted in PB3 (xiii) (cited in note 26).
278. See CP 40/127, m 8 1d (Easter Term 1299), reprinted in PB3 (xix) (cited in note 26). Another 1300
case is similar as the client claimed that he lost in a plea of dower as the "attorney had fraudulently and
maliciously made default." He did not claim, however, that the attorney had colluded with the plaintiff and
thus there was no evidence of ambidexterity. See CP 40/13 1, m 62d (Michaelmas Term 1300), reprinted in
PB3 (xx) (cited in note 26).
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because of a failure to summon the plaintiff resulting from collusion between
the attorney and the defendant. As in the discipline cases, concern with the
actual disclosure of confidential information was also manifested in the side
switching cases seeking civil remedies."5
In some cases, the client victim sought both a civil remedy and punishment
of the lawyer although the nature of civil remedy was not specified. In the
1293 case involving Ilger of Talighidion, he asked to sue Simon "for this
deception" and the Common Bench ordered the sheriff "to produce" Simon
"to answer both the king and Ilger for the said trespass and contempt.""
Similarly, in 1299, Gilbert de la Grene and his son asked "for a remedy against
the... falsity and deception" of their attorney, John de la Haye and the Bench
justices ordered the sheriff to produce John "to answer both the king and
Gilbert [his client] for said falsity and deception."'
The court sometimes felt that more extensive remedies were necessary.
From a remedial standpoint, one of the most interesting cases involved a
complicated 1296 land dispute where John, son of Thomas of Bruneswell, after
losing a suit for land and being amerced for a false claim, brought a trespass
and conspiracy plea against his attorney, Richard of Duylond, alleging that the
latter failed to assist John although he paid him to do so, that he sided with
John's adversary, and that he acquired the land that John claimed from John's
adversary. Richard denied that he had breached his duty to John as John's
neighbors said he had no right to the land and that John's payment to Richard
was to repay a prior personal loan from Richard. John asked for "some
remedy," assessing his damages at twenty marks, and he opposed Richard's
request for a jury, arguing that the deed made Richard's obligations to assist
him clear. John prevailed and the Common Bench awarded him forty shillings
damages and imprisoned Richard, who subsequently agreed to pay a fine.
Moreover, the justices invalidated the deed and statutory bond regarding
John's debt to Richard. Finally, the Bench ordered the county coroners to
produce the sheriff to answer for his contempt for failing twice to produce
Richard as ordered.f3
A much later case involving a debtor aggrieved by a collusive default
judgment presented the possibility for multiple remedies against multiple
279. See Kiralfy, Action on the Case at 76 (cited in note 225).
280. See, for example, The Impartial Lawyer at 17 (citing Somerton v Colles, see note 289) (cited in note
27). In contrast, if the client revealed his confidences to a lawyer that he had not retained, there was no
liability if the lawyer revealed the information to a later client. See id at 11 (also citing Somerton).
281. See note 275.
282. . See note 276.
283. See CP 40/112, m 17d (Easter Term 1296), reprinted in PB3 (xv) (cited in note 26). The court also
ordered the coroners to produce Richard when the sheriff failed to do so the second time. See id.
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parties. The debtor brought an audita querela action in 1625 against the
creditor to nullify a default judgment entered against him. The debtor alleged
that the creditor procured an attorney to act for the debtor without any
warrant from the latter and that the attorney pleaded non sum informatus,
resulting in the default judgment against the debtor. The court refused to
discharge the debt and stated that, rather than an audita quarela for that
remedy, the debtor's remedy was a writ of deceit against the attorney and
perhaps also an action on the case against the creditor for retaining an attorney
for the debtor without his consent."4 As all these cases illustrate, civil remedies
were available against lawyers for classic ambidexterity, switching sides in the
same case. No cases were found imposing liability on lawyers for representation
adverse to a former client. " '
b. Disclosure or Misuse of Client Information
Almost all of the remaining civil liability cases involved the lawyer's misuse
of the client's information or its disclosure to the client's adversary. As
illustrative of disclosure of the client's confidential information, a late
fourteenth century writ of deceit alleged that the plaintiff's lawyer, having
received money and "seen his charters and writings and heard his counsel
abandoned and left the" plaintiff, refusing to represent him further and
"handed over copies of said charters to [defendant] . . . and falsely and
fraudulently revealed to him there the counsel of [plaintiff] to his grave damage
284. See Alleley v Colley, 79 Eng Rep 603 (1625). Although the case itself does not mention a remedy
against the creditor, the headnote indicated that an action on the case was available against a person who
procured an attorney to appear for a defendant without his consent. But in a 1578 case involving very
similar allegations, the debtor lost a deceit action against the attorney because the latter said that he had
been retained by the plaintiff's co-debtor to appear for both debtors and the court subsequently held that
the plaintiff's allegations of "fraud and covin" between the attorney and the creditor were "traversable." See
Manser v Franklin, 73 Eng Rep 811 (1578).
285. One very complicated case presented such a possibility. William Pollard was a defendant in two
suits brought in 1287 and 1289, both by William, son of Roger. The two suits were related, both involving
land in the village of Fulbeck. William of Welby was the defendant's attorney in the first suit and the
defendant claimed the same regarding the second suit, in which William of Welby represented the plaintiff.
The defendant lost the 1289 suit by default and as a result William Pollard brought two misconduct suits
against William of Welby, one alleging William had agreed to act for him and the other alleging William
had been appointed to act for him. William Pollard lost both misconduct suits as the first allegation was
unprovable and the second was false. See CP 40/126, m 63d (Hilary Term 1299), reprinted in PB3 (xviii)
(cited in note 26); e-mail from Paul Brand to Jonathan Rose (July 28, 1998) (cited in note 138). William
Pollard did not allege that William of Welby had breached a duty of loyalty by representing the plaintiff in
the second related suit after representing William in the first one. He might have fared better had he done
so since such conduct was probably a breach of William of Welby's duty of loyalty. See notes 115-36 and
accompanying text.
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and the manifest danger of his disinheritance."'r Two seventeenth century
cases also involved abuse of client confidences. In one, a creditor brought an
action on the case against his lawyer for giving the debtor his bond, enabling
the debtor to cancel it.' In the other, a debtor prevailed in an action on the
case for breach of trust against his attorney for obtaining a writ to execute a
judgment against him, which was likely facilitated by use of confidential
information."5 In a somewhat different context, William of Watergate justified
his refusal to pay Henry de Burne, his lawyer in a 1279 suit by Henry for his
fees on the ground, inter alia, that Henry "had revealed his counsel to his
adversary."' 9
The general tenor of these cases seems closely related to the side switching
cases. In a sense, one might characterize them as a kind of incipient
ambidexterity. The lawyer has acted disloyally, but in some respect the conduct
falls short of classic ambidexterity. In none of the cases has the lawyer actually
switched sides and appeared for the adversary or at least there is no clear
evidence of side switching. In most of the cases, the client has not yet lost his
land or been otherwise injured. Interestingly, Comyns treats disclosure of
confidential information and classic ambidexterity similarly, stating they gave
rise to an action on the case for breach of trust.2
The information misuse cases all involved a similar fact pattern in which a
client hired a lawyer to assist the client in purchasing land and instead the
lawyer purchased the land for himself or a third party. Somerton v. Colles
(1433), a case well known for its impact on the evolution of assumpsit, is a
good example."9 In Somerton, William Somerton brought an action for deceit
against John Colles, alleging that he had retained Colles to "be of his counsel"
286. See "Form of deceit when someone is retained of counsel and then reveals his counsel" in Kiralfy,
Action on the Case at 219 (original Latin) (cited in note 225), reprinted in PB2, no 33 (English translation)
(cited in note 26). Paul Brand says the particular details in the writ suggested that it was used in a real case.
See id.
287. See Tanton v Harris, 82 Eng Rep 306 (1626); Kiralfy, Action on the Case at 90 (cited in note 225).
288. See Lawrence v Harrison, 82 Eng Rep 833 (1654); Kiralfy, Action on the Case at 90 (cited in note
225). Although there was no clear evidence of collusion between the lawyer and the debtor's adversary, the
debtor said it was not necessary and the court said that the lawyer's conduct showed "a combination"
against the client.
289. See JUST 1/915, m.39 (Sussex Eyre 1279), reprinted in PB3 (iii) (cited in note 26). William was
able to settle the matter himself with his adversary.
290. See Comyns, 1 Digest at 348-49 (cited in note 27).
291. Somerton v Col&s, 11 Henry VI (1433), reprinted in Baker and Milsom, Sources of English Legal
History at 385-89 (cited in note 213). Many of the leading commentators discuss this case and its impact on
assumpsit and on the remedies for nonfeasance. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 382-84 (cited in
note 16); Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law at 332-34, 343-44 (cited in note 225); Kiralfy,
Action on the Case at 88 (cited in note 225); Milsom, Historical Foundations ofthe Common Law at 363-64
(cited in note 16); Plucknett, Concise History ofthe Common Law at 641 (cited in note 16); Simpson, History
ofthe Common Law of Contract at 252-55 (cited in note 225).
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in buying land, but that Colles "by collusion between him" and John Blount,
"scheming wickedly to defraud" the plaintiff, "maliciously revealed all his
counsel" to Blount and "falsely and fraudulently became of counsel" for Blount
and purchased the land for him.292 An eighteenth century treatise, The Impartial
Lawyer, identified a 1435 case allowing an action on the case for deceit against
a lawyer who was retained to buy land for a client, but instead fraudulently
bought the land for himself.29
The imposition of liability on lawyers in these information misuse cases
reinforced the loyalty norms imposed in the cases involving side-switching in
the same case and the few cases involving conflicts between the client's interest
and the lawyer's personal interest.9 4 Later treatise writers, focusing both on the
client's failure to obtain the land and the lawyer's divulgence of confidential
information, have treated the cases involving both purchases for a third party
or for the lawyer himself as establishing a broader loyalty norm vindicated by
an action on the case for deceit or for breach of trust.29 On occasion, this
loyalty norm seemed even to be equated with ambidexterity. 6 However, it is
also possible that these cases stand for an even broader proposition not
distinctive to lawyer liability. As was suggested previously with regard to
conflicts involving the lawyer's personal interest,2 7 these cases involving the
failure to obtain the land for the client and the misuse of information may
involve an agency principle applicable to anyone who fails to carry out the
292. See Baker and Milsom, Sources of English Legal History at 385 (cited in note 213). There is some
uncertainty about Colles's status as a lawyer. Many commentators have treated him as a lawyer. See, for
example, Kiralfy, Action on the Case at 87-88 (cited in note 225); Milsom, Studies in the History of the
Common Law at 164 (cited in note 223); Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law at 641 (cited in
note 16); Simpson, History of the Common Law of Contract at 253-55 (cited in note 225). Baker refers to
Colles as an "adviser" (see Baker, Introduction at 383 (cited in note 16)) and seems less certain about
whether Colles was a lawyer. See letter from John Baker to Jonathan Rose (on file with author). Milsom
thinks that the fact that Colles was a lawyer facilitated the use of deceit of the court as a basis for the action.
See Milsom, Studies in the History of the Common Law at 164 (cited in note 223). "Counsel" was an
ambiguous term and did not necessarily indicate the presence of a professional lawyer. See Penny Tucker,
London's Courts of Law in the Fifteenth Century: The Litigants' Perspective in Christopher Brooks and
Michael Lobban, eds, Communities and Courts in Britain 1150-1900 25, 34-36 (Hambledon 1997).
293. See The Impartial Lawyer at II (cited in note 27). Simpson also discussed this case. See Simpson,
History of the Common Law of Contract at 255 (cited in note 225).
294. See notes 69-114, 188-91 and accompanying text.
295. See Sheppard, Actions upon the Case for Deeds at 277, 295, 331 (cited in note 27); The Impartial
Lawyer at 10-11, 17 (cited in note 27). These writers frequently cited Somerton v Colles (cited in note 289)
as authority for these propositions regarding lawyer liability.
296. See Sheppard, Actions on the Case for Deeds at 295 (cited in note 27).
297. See note 213 and accompanying text.
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purpose for which the principal retained the agent or generally to disloyal
conduct by an agent.' s
c. Other Possible Instances of Liability
There is one final possible category of lawyer civil liability. It arose out of
the retainers that entitled the lawyer to an annuity in return for service, as
discussed above.' The language in the retainer between a counsellor, Robert of
Leicester, and his client, William of Hoo, raised this possibility. It stated that
"if William should be undefended in any matter through his failure or neglect
he would restore any damage by the arbitration of lawful men."' More
generally, Professor Baker notes that a lawyer could be sued in covenant for a
failure to provide services that he expressly agreed to perform."' Presumably
this liability could be imposed when the lawyer appeared adverse to the client
with whom he had entered the retainer although the liability was premised on
the failure to perform and not on the conflict of interest. Although these
retainer cases sometimes reflected the implementation of loyalty norms,-2 the
formal retainer as reflected in the deed, not disloyalty, was the basis of the
lawyer's liability. Thus, it is difficult to associate this civil liability with
ambidexterity.
3. Medieval Civil Liability of Lawyers:
Some Conclusions and Comparisons
In terms of its nature, availability, and remedies, the civil liability of
medieval and early modern lawyers to victims of their conflicts of interest
seems quite different from that of modern lawyers despite some similarities.
The main thrust of modern lawyer civil liability is negligence, based on a
298. Simpson clearly views Somerton v Colles and similar cases as establishing an agency principle and not
a notion of liability confined to lawyers. He credited Fitzherbert for identifying this principle-that
actionable deceit arose when a person acted in the name of another and the other suffered loss. See Simpson,
History ofthe Common Law of Contract at 253-55 (cited in note 225). Interestingly, Sheppard cites the same
oft-cited passage in Fitzherbert's New Natura Brevium for the propositions regarding lawyer liability. See
note 293. Although Fitzherbert does talk about lawyers in this passage, it is not limited to lawyers. See
Fitzherbert, New Natura Brevium (cited in note 8).
299. See notes 137-145a and accompanying text.
300. See Baker, Legal Profession and the Common Law at 104 (cited in note 16). William of Leicester was
described as a 'iuris professor." Id. This retainer was discussed above in the discipline section with respect to
adversity to a client in an unrelated matter. See note 146 and accompanying text.
301. See id. Although this might suggest that the language in the Leicester-Hoo retainer was redundant,
perhaps it was significant in substituting arbitration as an initial or exclusive remedy in lieu of an action in
covenant.
302. See notes 137-51 and accompanying text.
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breach of the applicable standard of care, although there are other theories as
well. 3 With regard to the nature of medieval civil liability, one must be
cautious in opining on its conceptual premises, given the nature of medieval
pleading and its impact on the judicial role'" and in viewing the medieval era
through a modern jurisprudential lens."5
With those caveats, it seems fair to say that the medieval liability of lawyers
to victims of their conflicts of interest is unrelated to negligence, at least at a
formal level. As discussed earlier, the medieval liability of lawyers was grounded
in deceit and initially arose as an adjunct to deceit of the court."° Moreover,
the leading modern treatise does not consider fraud or deceit as a form of legal
malpractice.0 7 However, in the the cases discussed above, particularly the early
modern ones involving actions on the case, there are early manifestations of
something akin to the modern notion of liability based on a breach of fiduciary
duty."' This idea is more explicit in seventeenth and eighteenth century
commentators and the seventeenth century case specifically stating that a
disloyal lawyer could be sued for breach of trust."° Moreover, as a practical
matter, classic ambidexterity would be actionable today either as professional
negligence or as a breach of fiduciary duty."' Interestingly, civil liability based
on disloyalty has become more common in recent years.3"' Thus, medieval
303. See, for example, Restatement §5 71,72, 74, 76A (Tentative Draft no 8, March 21, 1997); 1 Ronald
Mallen and Jeffrey Smith, Legal Malpractice §§ 8.1-8.13 (West 4th ed 1996); 2 id at § 18.1-18.10.
304. See notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
305. See Baker, Lecture (cited in note 32); Millon, Positivism, 1989 Wis L Rev 669 (cited in note 32).
306. See notes 229-58 and accompanying text.
307. See 1 Mallen and Smith, Legal Malpractice at § 8.9 (cited in note 301). The authors regard this tort
as a distinct wrong whose elements are unrelated to defendant's status as a lawyer. They state that the same
rules are applied to all defendants generally, although they note some contextual aspects of such suits against
lawyers. Id.
308. See, for example, Restatement § 76A (2) and comment (d) (Tentative Draft no 8, March 21, 1997);
Mallen and Smith, 2 Legal Malpractice at §§ 14.1-14.4 (cited in note 301). The tenor of the later cases is
consistent with John Baker's view of the increased importance of judicial opinions as a source of law "in
early Tudor times, as a result of the Renaissance emphasis on judicial positivism." See Baker, Introduction at
227-28 (cited in note 16). Moreover, he believes that the increase in actions on the case as well as the use of
written pleadings influenced this "radical change." See John Baker, The Superior Courts in England, 1450-
1800 in Bernhard Diestelkamp, ed, Oberste Gerichtsbarkeit und zentrale Gewalt in Europa derffiihen Neuzeit
72, 110 (B6hlau Verlag 1996).
309. See notes 286, 288, 293 and accompanying text. As indicated, these commentators often supported
their statements with references to fifteenth century cases, especially Somerton v Colles.
310. Mallen and Smith divide legal malpractice into two categories: breach of the standard of care (i.e.,
professional negligence), and breach of the standard of conduct or fiduciary duty, which includes violations
of loyalty and confidentiality. See Mallen and Smith, 2 Legal Malpractice at § 14.1 (cited in note 301).
Thus, they would treat civil liability based on conflict of interest as the tort of breach of fiduciary duty. See
id at § 15.1-15.20, 16.1-16.27. Many others would consider disloyal misconduct actionable as either tort
and would treat the violation of the ethical and fiduciary duty of loyalty as evidence of a breach of the
standard of care. See, for example, Restatement % 72, 74, 76A (2) (Tentative Draft no 8, March 21, 1997).
311. See Mallen and Smith, 2 Legal Malpractice at § 15.18, 16.23 (cited in note 301).
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liability, although unrelated to most common forms of legal malpractice, may
have some doctrinal and practical similarities to modern lawyer liability.
The availability of civil remedies to medieval victims of their lawyers'
conflicts of interest might be more limited than that of modern lawyers in two
senses. First, with respect to the medieval era, it was only clearly available in
cases involving switching sides in the same case, classic ambidexterity. As the
earlier discussion revealed, although this kind of conflict of interest was the
most common and most serious, it was not the only type of case where loyalty
norms were imposed. For example, there is litde evidence of the availability of
civil remedies in instances of adversity to a former client or to a current client
on an unrelated matter. In the modern world, a lawyer would be liable in most
cases of adverse representation regarding both current and former clients as
long as the other elements of the cause of action such as causation and injury
were satisfied." This narrower ambit of civil liability for medieval lawyers
seems unsurprising. As noted earlier, loyalty norms were imposed in fewer
situations in the medieval as compared with the modern period.3 The
narrower civil liability in the medieval and early modern eras reflected,
therefore, both the more limited liability norms and the less developed theories
and systems of civil liability.
The availability of civil liability might be seen as more limited in another
sense-as well. Initially, the civil remedies for victims seemed to be a subsidiary
or complementary aspect of a disciplinary process that punished lawyers for
deceit of the court, a public wrong."' Although modern discipline can include
civil remedies for victims,31 modern civil liability stands on its own
independent footing. On the other hand, over time, particularly as the action
on the case developed and such cases were brought against lawyers, the civil
liability of lawyers seemed to separate from the initial notion of deceit of the
court and to emerge as a more distinct cause of action. Thus, the more limited
availability of civil remedies in this sense diminished as tort law evolved.
The remedies in the earlier period also seem more limited. In the modern
era, damages for professional negligence or breach of fiduciary duty include
standard tort damages, including punitive damages in appropriate cases." 6 But
it is difficult to generalize about the civil remedies imposed in the medieval and
312. See, for example, Restatement § 71, 72, 74, 75, 76 A (Tentative Draft no 8, March 21, 1997);
Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice at § 8.1-8.4, 8.12; 2 id at 5§ 15.18, 16.23 (cited in note 301).
313. See pages 50-52.
314. See notes 229-238 and accompanying text.
315. See, for example, Ariz Supreme Ct Rule 52 (a) (7) (1998); American Bar Association, Model Rules
for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement Rule 10 (A) (6) (1996) (restitution).
316. See, for example, Restatement §§ 75, 76A (Tentative Draft no 8, March 21, 1997); Mallen and
Smith, 2 Legal Malpractice at § 19.1-19.21 (cited in note 301).
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early modern periods. In many cases, the nature of the records and state of the
proceedings simply do not permit any specific conclusion about remedies."'
Some cases, however, do have some details regarding relief. Some of these cases
may have involved restitutionary remedies such as returning a fee paid to a
lawyer or restoring the land lost as a result of the lawyer's conflict of interest."'
In other cases, the victim requested a greater amount of damage, which was not
clearly limited to restitution, although the basis of assessment was unclear and
the court often awarded a lesser amount."9 Although making a comparison is
difficult, a conclusion that remedies were more restricted in the earlier period
seems warranted.
Thus, overall the medieval and early modern civil liability of lawyers to
victims of their disloyalty seems more limited in its nature, availability, and
remedies as compared to that in the modern era. Of course, the enormous
chronological, social, and economic differences in these two periods make such
a conclusion quite understandable and predictable. After all, the comparison is
between an aspect of civil liability during its formative and rudimentary period
with one that is very sophisticated, complex, and detailed as result of years of
judicial, legislative, and commentator activity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Drawing conclusions from this historical research requires some caution.
First, one must minimize the natural tendency of any modern observer to see
the past in the present and vice versa. 2 Second, one must be careful when
viewing historical legal activities and phenomena through the modern optic of
conventional positivism.'2 ' Finally, for several reasons, there is a danger of
overreading the historical evidence. Many of the medieval judicial records may
only contain a result or some procedural determination. As such, it is necessary
317. For example, in 1299, Gilbert de la Grene simply asked for "a remedy against the said falsity and
deception" against John de la Haye. The situation was similar in the 1293 case against Simon of Crucoyl.
See notes 279-280 and accompanying text.
318. See, for example, text at note 277. Restitution is awarded in modern liability cases also. See
Restatement § 76A (3) (Tentative Draft no 8, March 21, 1997).
319. For example, in 1291, Arnold Purdeu "assessfed] his damages at one hundred shillings" in his suit
against William Tebaud. See note 274 and accompanying text. In a 1296 case, John, son of Thomas of
Bruneswell asked for damages of 20 marks, but was awarded the lesser amount of 40 shillings although his
debt bond was also nullified. See note 281 and accompanying text.
320. On the other hand, some have seen a virtue in "emphasizing the similarity of past and present," "the
presentness of the past" and "pastness of the present." Such an approach would increase the influence of legal
history scholarship on legal scholarship, which has, like academic history, emphasized the "pastness of the
past" and the past's irrelevance to modern conceptual and normative notions. See Banner, Legal History and
Legal Scholarship, 76 Wash U L Q at 37-39, 42-44 (cited in note 34) (emphasis in original).
321. See Millon, Positivism, 1989 Wis L Rev 669 (cited in note 32).
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to be careful about drawing doctrinal conclusions. Moreover, as John Baker has
pointed out, to the extent that one sees doctrinal evidence, some confusion
rather than neatness is not surprising as "the legal historian ...is probably
looking at law being made.""
With sensitivity to these caveats, several conclusions about medieval
ambidexterity are possible. First, ambidexterity was a common and serious
form of medieval lawyer misconduct. In its most frequent manifestation, its
classic form was switching sides in the same litigation. However, it was not
limited to this form as it also appeared as disloyalty to former clients and
litigation adverse to clients with whom the lawyer had a retainer. Second, the
protection of confidential information was an important concern both in
reinforcing the lawyer's duty of loyalty and in preventing the misuse and
disclosure of such information. Third, the remedies against lawyers guilty of
ambidexterity were both criminal and civil. The criminal remedies included
imprisonment, fines, and disbarment. The civil liability of lawyers to client
victims grew out of the criminal offenses and the lawyer's duty to the court as
illustrated by the use of the writ of deceit. As the action on the case for deceit
emerged, the private remedies developed an independent footing, but one
distinct from the liability of other professions and the general precursors of
negligence based liability. As noted, there were both basic similarities and
important differences between the medieval and modern aspects of all these
legal ramifications of conflict of interest.
In addition to what this research reveals about medieval conflict of interest,
however, the research identifies important gaps in knowledge and the need for
further research. As Brian Simpson has noted, it is "the nature of historical
research" that it "raises as many questions as it solves;"" and so with
ambidexterity, there are many unanswered questions. Perhaps the most
fundamental question involves the source of the loyalty norms. Their
incorporation in the Statute of Westminster I, chapter 29 and the London
Ordinance of 1280 and their development and implementation by medieval
judges reflect their institutionalization in the legal system. However, this
incorporation does not reflect their source, but their adoption and adaptation.
Certainly one source would have been the conception of loyalty of the
322. See Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law at 390 (cited in note 16). He has also noted
that cases were not necessarily the only source of doctrinal development as there was a "largely oral
systematic tradition" that contributed importantly to the "making" of law through repeated "systematising
and explaining." See Baker, The Third University ofEngland at 19-20 (cited in note 224).
323. See A.W.B. Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 Cardozo L
Rev 287, 333 (1989).
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professional community of judges and lawyers. In addition, broader societal
or cultural, but nonlegal, notions may have been a source of these norms. One
possibility is the obligations and norms of knighthood. The characterization of
a lawyer as one who serves, serviens ad legem,"5 and some of the language of
retainers and oaths support knighthood as a possible source of these loyalty
norms."' Another possibility is that the loyalty norms had a religious source.
James Brundage's scholarship on canon lawyers provides clear evidence for this
possibility. He found that the lawyer's duties of loyalty and confidentiality
were well entrenched in thejus commune, the principles combining canon and
Roman law, long before the end of thirteenth century when it appeared in the
English common law.32 ' In addition, the use of the term, ambidexter, in the
religious polemics of the fourteenth century reinforces the possibility of a
religious influence. 2 ' More generally, loyalty is a notion deeply embedded in
moral, religious, community, and personal norms,"' which would likely
influence professional norms. In any event, further research on the source of
the behavioral norms applied to lawyers seems a useful endeavor.
324. Professional lawyers were likely quite influential later on, as in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries juries of attorneys and members of professional societies were used in King's Bench and Common
Pleas attorney discipline cases. See, for example, C.W. Brooks, Lawyers, Litigation and English Society Since
1450 131, 141 (Hambledon 1998); Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth at 119-20, 144-46
(cited in note 16); Baker, ed, 1 Dyer's Reports at xxx, 132-33 (cited in note 80); 2 id at 309-10.
325. See Rose, Legal Profession in Medieval England, 48 Syracuse L Rev at 20 & nn 80-81 (cited in note
23).
326. See notes 14 5-14 5a and accompanying text.
327. See James Brundage, The Ambidextrous Advocate: A Study in the History ofLegal Ethics (unpublished
draft, June 1, 1999) (on file with author); e-mail from James Brundage to Jonathan Rose (June 1, 1999)
(cited at note 62). Brundage found rules in the ius commune prohibiting switching sides in the same case,
representation adverse to a former client, and representation to an current client on an unrelated matter that
were very similar to those that this article found in the medieval English law, and had similar remedies as
well. Moreover, he found that ius commune rules, like those in English common law, also were not very
concerned with conflicts between the lawyer's personal interest and that of the client or with consent. Id.
328. In the Wycliffite controversy at the end of the fourteenth century, one of the twelve Lollard
conclusions, which were posted on the doors of Westminster and St. Paul's in 1395 responding to the
bishops' accusations, accused the latter of holding temporal and spiritual offices simultaneously. The
Lollards believed that this dual office holding was inappropriate, saying, "we think that hermaphrodite or
ambidexter would be a good name for such men of double estate" and citing as authority the biblical gospel
of Matthew that "no man can serve two masters." See Anne Hudson, ed, Selectionsfrom English Wycliffite
Writings 26 (Toronto 1978). Moreover, complaints about this type of ambidexterity were not new. See
Anne Hudson, Hermofodrita or Ambidexter: Wyclifflte Views on Clerks in Secular Office, reprinted in
Margaret Aston and Colin Richmond, eds, Lollardy and the Gentry in the Later Middle Ages 41 (St Martin's
1997). Not all agreed with the Lollard charges, and one lengthy response denied a conflict in secular and
temporal roles; it characterized it as serving one master, God, in two capacities and noted a commendable
kind of ambidexterity, the ability to suffer want and enjoy abundance. See H.S. Cronin, ed, Rogeri Dymmok
Liber Contra XII Errores et Hereses Lollardorum 155-59 (Wyclif Soc'y 1922). l am grateful to Professor Fiona
Somerset of the University of Western Ontario for bringing this to my attention.




Further research is warranted in other areas as well. For example it seems
that no broad inquiry into the development of the civil liability of lawyers has
been undertaken. Although this article studies this issue in the context of
ambidexterity, a more general inquiry is needed into the cases involving civil
remedies against lawyers for the numerous types of lawyer misconduct that
occurred in the medieval era.3 Also litigation involving lawyers may have had a
disproportionate influence on the general development of civil liability,"' an
issue that also warrants further investigation. In addition, the extent of
conflicts between the lawyer's personal interest and that of the client and the
apparent lack of concern with such conflicts probably merits further study.
Thus, important and varied questions concerning the medieval law of
lawyering remain to be examined. With broader relevance to legal history
generally, James Brundage's research on the canon legal profession 2 and
Richard Helmholz' scholarship on defamation and Magna C'arta. raise broader
questions of the cross-fertilization of the ius commune and the English common
law, challenging the traditional nationalistic and insular view of English legal
history.
330. For a cataloguing of the various types of misconduct, see Rose, Legal Profession in Medieval England,
48 Syracuse L Rev at 60-61, 123-30 (cited in note 23).
331. See, for example, Baker, Introduction at 382-84 (cited in note 16); Baker, 2 Spelman's Reports at
236-37 (cited in note 80).
332. See, for example, Brundage, The Ambidextrous Advocate (cited in note 325); James Brundage, The
Rise of Professional Canonists and the Development of the Ius Commune, reprinted in 81 Zeitschrift der
Savigny-Stiftung ffir Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung 26 (1995). The influence of canon law on
secular law is also evident in his more general work on canon law. See James Brundage, Medieval Canon Law
175-89 (Longman 1995).
333. See Richard Helmholz, ed, Select Cases on Defamation to 1600 (101 Selden Soc'y 1985); Richard
Helmholz, Magna Carta and the ius commune, 66 U Chi L Rev 297 (1999).
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